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Innovation has been the foundation of human and societal development since the dawn of civilization. It 
has resulted in enormous benefits for human wellbeing while at the same time is has brought the world to a 
critical crossroads where further unconstrained development risks societal and environmental collapse. The 
current rate and direction of innovation is insufficient to achieve the United Nation’s (UN) ambitious goals for an 
inclusive sustainable future for all, in part because of a relatively narrow focus on technology innovation without 
also addressing societal, institutional, and cultural innovation. We need to rebalance so that all dimensions of 
innovation and invention are promoted simultaneously, including addressing inequities. We also need to develop 
more proactive efforts to promote diffusion and learning, and to address barriers, constraints, and unintended 
consequences of innovations. 
We live in interesting times. They are times of great dangers and uncertainty for humanity and the planet, 
but times of unprecedented opportunities for directing development toward a just, resilient, and sustainable 
future. The current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is disrupting the status quo, providing an 
opportunity to create sustainable societies with higher levels of wellbeing for all and mitigating environmental 
impacts at all scales. Properly directed, the stimulus packages underway to restart economies can ignite and 
leverage effects toward sustainability. The risk is that they may promote resurrection of the ‘old normal,’ 
going back to business-as-usual, rather than a transformation toward sustainability. 
This report, which focuses on innovation, is the third by The World in 2050 (TWI2050) initiative that 
was established by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and other partners to 
provide scientific foundations for the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This report is based 
on the voluntary and collaborative effort of more than 60 authors and contributors from about 20 institutions 
globally, who met virtually to develop science-based strategies and pathways toward achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Presentations of the TWI2050 approach and work have been made at many 
international conferences such as the United Nations Science, Technology and Innovation Forums and the 
United Nations High-level Political Forums. 
In 2018, the first report by TWI2050 on Transformations to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals 
identified Six Exemplary Transformations needed to achieve the SDGs and long-term sustainability to 2050 
and beyond: i) Human capacity, demography and health; ii) Consumption and production; iii) Decarbonization 
and energy, iv) Food, biosphere and water; v) Smart cities; and vi) Digital Revolution. 
The focus of the second report, The Digital Revolution and Sustainable Development: Opportunities and 
Challenges, launched in 2019, was the Sixth Transformation. Although it could arguably become the single 
greatest enabler of sustainable development, it has, in the past, helped create many negative externalities like 
transgression of planetary boundaries. The Digital Revolution provides entirely new and enhanced capacities 
and thus serves as a major force in shaping both the systemic context of transformative change and of future 
solutions; at the same time it potentially carries strong societal disruptive power if not handled with caution, 
care, and innovativeness. 
This third report, Innovations for Sustainability: Pathways to an efficient and sufficient post-pandemic 
future, assesses all the positive potential benefits innovation brings to sustainable development for all, while 
also highlighting the potential negative impacts and challenges going forward. The report outlines strategies 
to harness innovation for sustainability by focusing on efficiency and sufficiency in providing services to 
people, with a particular focus on consumption and production. It concludes with the related governance 
challenges and policy implications. 
Completion of this report has involved voluntary contributions from many colleagues around the world. 
Special thanks and gratitude go to all contributing institutions that provided personal and institutional 
support throughout. We are especially grateful for the contribution and support of the IIASA team who have 
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provided substantial in-kind support and the vision needed to conduct an initiative of this magnitude. Special 
thanks go to the Chapter lead authors Geoff Clarke, Kris Ebi, Arnulf Grubler, Julia Leininger, and Sander van 
der Leeuw, and all authors and contributors without whose knowledge and dedication this report would not 
have been possible and who contributed despite the challenging circumstances.
The publication of this report in July 2020 and its launch during the United Nations High-level Political Forum 
is timely. TWI2050 outlines ten key messages on the linkages between innovation, efficiency and sufficiency, and 
the sustainability transformations. Despite the magnitude of the challenge and the current unsustainable direction 
of development, additionally impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, the transformation to a sustainable future is 
achievable—we have the knowledge, means, and capacity. However, at this point in time, with only 10 years until 
2030, there is a general lack of political will within many governments across the globe to mobilize the necessary 
resources and make the required policy and structural changes to achieve the 2030 goals. It is our belief that 
this report will provide policy and decision makers around the world with invaluable new knowledge to inform 
action and commitment toward achieving the SDGs in these interesting and challenging times. The level of global 
commitment and cooperation displayed during the development of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda 
needs to continue and deepen during this critical implementation phase. We hope this report provides a roadmap 
toward a sustainable future in a ‘new’ post-COVID-19 world and will divert from the ‘old’ alternatives that both 
transcend the planetary boundaries and leave billions behind.
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Johan Rockström
Director,
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1Key Messages
1. The world is at a crossroads. Only 10 years to go to achieving the 2030 Agenda and progress to date has 
been slow. The world is not on track to achieve the majority of the aspirational and ambitious SDG targets. 
Achievement of the 2030 Agenda is possible, but choices need to be made and require political will toward 
“accelerated action and transformative pathways: realizing the decade of action and delivery for sustainable 
development.”
2. Ensuring a just and resilient sustainable future for all will require socioeconomic development for 
improved human wellbeing while preserving Earth-system resilience. There is increasing inequality within 
and between societies with billions left behind and overwhelming evidence of rising global risks due to ever-
increasing human pressures on the planet.
3. The COVID-19 pandemic is a great and immediate threat to humanity, especially for those with previous 
health risks and those deprived through poverty, lack of health care, and living in fragile states. It is challenging 
the status quo, providing an opportunity for disruptive and accelerated change. Properly directed, the stimulus 
packages underway to restart economies can ignite and leverage effects toward sustainability. Creating 
employment opportunities out of the crisis is a high priority, but the risk is that they may promote resurrection 
of the ‘old normal.’
4. Six TWI2050 Transformations provide the necessary framework for how to achieve a sustainable, just, 
and resilient future. Jointly these transformations can accelerate actions within the next decade. As they take 
place in systems whose evolution depends on governance, values, policy tools, etc., they can be managed and 
socially steered as their outcomes depend on choices and human intentionality. Moreover, because the Six 
TWI2050 Transformations interact with all the SDGs, they provide an entry point for achieving them.
5. Transformative governance is emerging but unfavorable political contexts threaten innovation. There 
is a growing understanding of how governance needs to be designed for integrated SDG implementation. 
However, if global political trends—autocratization, fracturing of societies, lack of global cooperation, and 
distrust of science—continue to unfold, the sustainability transformation will be difficult to achieve. 
6. Science, technology, and innovation are at the core of human progress and have contributed to explosive 
development, such as the doubling of life expectancy, providing secondary education for half of humanity, and 
the wellbeing of billions, but paradoxically they have also brought about negative environmental and societal 
impacts. At the same time, Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) are a collective learning process that can 
provide many possible solutions for achieving a sustainable future for the people and the planet. 
7. Granular innovations can be expected to have faster adoption and diffusion, lower investment risk, faster 
learning, more opportunities to escape lock-in, more equitable access, higher job creation, and larger social 
returns on innovation investment. In combination, these advantages enable rapid change. For such rapid 
transformation to occur investments should be directed toward innovations with high learning and diffusion 
potentials. This is also critically important for the achievement of the Six TWI2050 Transformations—from 
digitalization to decarbonization and health. 
8. Prioritize the renewal of the science-policy-society interface for evidence-based transformations. 
While states with higher investments in research and development and enlightened leadership perform better 
in managing the COVID-19 pandemic, we need a renewed global science-policy-society interface built on a 
culture of trust, communication of accurate information, and a reinvigoration of global science organizations.
9. Transforming service-provisioning systems is about safeguarding human needs and sharing available 
resources fairly within planetary boundaries. The central question is which types of technological and social 
innovations can contribute to decreasing inequalities, increasing resilience and our collective ability to deal 
with crises, while also decreasing the pressures on natural resources. To achieve accelerated change, the world 
needs to move away from a supply-driven model of development to one that is low-demand and services-
driven and that is based on efficiency and sufficiency, while focused on providing wellbeing and decent living 
standards for all. 
10. Transnational crises require global context-sensitive responses. Investing financial resources and 
nonmonetary support to assist local and municipal actors and international organizations is key. The COVID-19 
pandemic demonstrated system-wide weaknesses in implementing an early and effective global response. 
However, if the right lessons are learned, it provides significant opportunities to accelerate the societal 
consensus and political reforms needed to achieve the sustainability transformation.
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31. Creating a sustainable Anthropocene
Add as many mail-coaches as you please, 
you will never get a railroad by so doing. 
Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950)
1.1.  Nature of the challenge
The predicament of humankind is how to realize the 
benefits of global social and economic development 
within a safe and just operating space of a stable and 
resilient Earth system. There is increasing inequality 
within and between societies with billions left behind 
and overwhelming evidence of rising global risks due 
to ever-increasing human pressures on the planet. 
Ensuring future resilient sustainable development 
for all will require socioeconomic development for 
improved human wellbeing while preserving Earth-
system resilience (Rockström et al. 2009, Steffen et al. 
2015, TWI2050 2018).
 In 2015, the United Nations (UN) adopted the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN 2015b) that 
provides an aspirational narrative and an actionable 
agenda to be achieved by 2030, including 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets for the 
desired future for human development. It specifies 
far-reaching time-bound, often quantified, objectives 
based on the most comprehensive consultation among 
nations and civil society. For the first time, a world 
development agenda was adopted that integrated 
comprehensive and ambitious goals for inclusive 
social and economic development for all, to occur in 
parallel with achieving global environmental targets 
for land, oceans, freshwater, biodiversity, and climate; 
thus protecting the global commons (Nakicenovic et al. 
2016): This essentially means a roadmap for redefining 
sustainable development as a people and planet agenda 
for achieving a prosperous and fair world within 
planetary boundaries. The 2015 Paris Agreement 
(UNFCCC 2015) that commits all signatories to a long-
term target of holding global warming to “well below 
2°C” and if possible below 1.5°C above preindustrial 
levels, as well as the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda 
(UN 2015a), increased the urgency for achieving the 
2030 Agenda. Central to the overarching goals is the 
recognition of the necessity of attaining inclusive and 
fair social and economic development within the safe 
operating space of a stable and resilient Earth system.
However, the world is not on track to achieve the 
majority of the aspirational and ambitious SDG targets 
within the next decade. As such, the focus of the UN’s 
High-level Political Forum (HLPF) on Sustainable 
Development for 2020 is for “accelerated action and 
transformative pathways: realizing the decade of 
action and delivery for sustainable development.”1 
A prerequisite for achieving these aspirational and 
ambitious socioeconomic goals requires a fundamental 
transformation of the combined human and Earth 
systems (TWI2050 2018).
Humanity has entered a new geological Epoch, 
the Anthropocene, where humanity—one species—
constitutes the largest driver of planetary change. 
Global environmental risks at all scales are high and 
rising. Several planetary boundaries that regulate the 
stability of the Earth system have been transgressed 
(Rockström et al. 2009, Steffen et al. 2015), and 
thereby the ability of Earth to provide essential support 
functions, fundamental conditions for good and healthy 
lives, and ultimately a stable state of the planet is in 
danger. However, there is a general lack of political will 
within many governments across the globe to mobilize 
the necessary resources and make the required policy 
and structural changes. It is critically important that the 
level of global commitment and cooperation displayed 
during the development of the 2030 Agenda continue 
unabated and be strengthened. 
Humanity is at a crossroads: sustainable 
development is feasible at all scales—local to 
global—if stakeholders (national governments, cities, 
businesses, academia, and civil society) adopt actions 
in line with the SDGs under the 2030 Agenda and the 
Paris Agreement. Success is a matter of choice rather 
than inevitability or infeasibility. Choice requires 
the deployment of economic, political, and social 
instruments, technological and cultural innovations, 
and changes in lifestyles to bring about the needed 
transformational changes at every scale. It is a test 
of the capacity of the joint global community at all 
levels—in real time—to live up to what is necessary to 
do to enable a politically agreed and culturally accepted 
robust result to safeguard the necessary planetary 
conditions for the future. Despite the magnitude of the 
challenge and the unsustainable nature of the current 
trajectory, we have the knowledge, means, and capacity 
to move into a sustainable and resilient pathway. The 
needed transformations are beginning in some sectors 
and regions, however, much more is needed. Investing 
in high-quality education, well-functioning health 
systems, efficient and zero-carbon energy systems, 
environmental conservation and restoration, healthier 
1  https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf/2020 
Creating a sustainable Anthropocene1
4The World in 2050
and adequate food systems, more sustainable lifestyles, 
good governance, and global cooperation initiatives 
would leverage implementation of the SDGs (Sachs 
2020).
A new wave of nationalism, populism, ethnic 
awareness, and loss of values is emerging in many 
countries. Wide segments of the global population 
feel threatened by accelerating change, often 
driven by globalization processes, digitalization, 
robotic advancements, and other social and cultural 
phenomena. Even the suggested solutions connected 
to the sustainable development transformation itself 
(and its broad agenda) might be seen as threatening 
in many quarters, not dissimilar in style to the human 
reactions in earlier historical phases characterized by 
rapid change (e.g., during the Industrial Revolution). 
In 2019 this has been exacerbated by the coronavirus 
disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, one of the greatest 
immediate threats to humanity. The closing of borders 
and increasing ‘my country first’ attitudes have further 
amplified the perceived threats, failures, and lack 
of resilience in global economic, social, and natural 
systems. Resilience refers to the capacity of a system 
to absorb major external disturbances and shocks 
(Holling 1973), and even though many have warned of a 
possible major pandemic, it poses an incredibly difficult 
challenge of having a resilient system to overcome the 
COVID-19 pandemic and the possible major crisis in 
its aftermath. Rather than restoring the status quo or 
business as usual, improvement of systems resilience 
should be seen in the context of transformative change 
toward a just and sustainable future for all despite 
backlashes, setbacks, and major disturbances on the 
way forward. In other words, we define resilience as the 
ability of a system, or rather humanity, to pursue the 
transformation toward sustainability while managing 
systemic risk of disasters and inherently unpredictable 
shocks over time in a mutually reinforcing way (Keating 
et al. 2017, Laurien and Mechler 2020).
The challenge is to what extent can systemic risks 
like COVID-19 have set back progress? Yet at the same 
time, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought out some of 
the best human characteristics; self-sacrifice in helping 
others; empathy and solidarity despite the need for 
social distancing. This has also provided an opportunity 
to build positive narratives oriented toward future, 
human-centered visions on local, national, and global 
levels. We need significant investments in social 
cohesion and robust transformative alliances to 
enable resilient sustainable development and to avoid 
societal backlashes driven by insecurity, injustice, and 
disenfranchisement. It is even more important now 
to integrate social and economic goals with climate, 
water, oceans, biodiversity, and other Earth systems so 
that sustainable development is not threatened in the 
long term. 
1.2. Six grand transformations toward 
achieving the SDGs
Six Transformations (TWI2050 2018) capture the 
global, regional, and local dynamics needed to achieve 
the SDGs while reducing their complexity: (i) Human 
capacity, demography and health; (ii) Consumption and 
production; (iii) Decarbonization and energy; (iv) Food, 
biosphere, and water; (v) Smart cities; and (vi) Digital 
Revolution. These transformations include the major 
drivers of future change. All of these transformations 
are underway to some extent. Accelerating actions 
within the next decade implies further deep structural 
changes, reforms of institutions, shifting mental maps 
and norms, changing patterns of human behavior, 
widespread awareness raising and mobilization, the 
adoption of a complex adaptive systems approach 
to sustainability issues, and unprecedented problem 
solving. Transformative governance is required as well.
It is essential that local to international actors 
move beyond the sectoral and fragmented approach 
characterizing much sustainability research and 
implementation. Rather than only investigate the 
separate roles of water, or food, or energy, or even the 
water-food-energy nexus, true integration is needed 
across all possible domains affected, taking a holistic 
perspective that includes trade-offs and co-benefits. 
Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) can be 
harnessed to accelerate progress. The holistic approach 
incorporates the full complexity of the dynamics 
involved in each domain of social, social-environmental, 
and social-environmental-technological interaction—
from the basic values and world view of individual 
societies and cultures, to their ways of interacting, 
their institutions, their governance, and so forth.
The Six TWI2050 Transformations are not intended 
to be a new clustering of the 17 SDGs nor to be a 
‘reduced form’ of the SDGs and their 169 targets, but 
rather to describe systemic and integrative changes 
related to all SDGs, as illustrated in Figure 1. They are 
interlinked with all SDGs and interdependent, and 
together are central to ‘turning the tide’ of change to 
sustainability and resilience. 
1.2.1. Why these Six Transformations?
The Six Transformations have a people-centered 
perspective: building local, national, and global societies 
and economies that secure wealth creation, poverty 
reduction, fair distribution, and inclusiveness necessary 
for human prosperity in any society everywhere. Each 
country will pursue the transformations differently. 
Universal domains of action include: (i) institutions to 
enable and improve human capacities and capabilities, 
populations that enjoy secondary and tertiary—not just 
primary—education, adequate access to health care, 
fair labor markets, universal rule of law, and means for 
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managing aging societies; (ii) essential and strategic 
infrastructure for local, national, global economies 
and societies, such as energy, food systems, cities, 
settlements, and mobility systems; (iii) production 
and consumption systems that create wealth and 
ensure a good work-life balance, aiming at leaving no 
one behind; and (iv) STI that furthers progress toward 
achieving the SDGs (Box 1). 
Further, all of the Six Transformations are 
associated with powerful dynamics that could result in 
very different development outcomes for humanity—
positive and negative. At the same time, these 
transformations take place in systems whose evolution 
depends on governance, values, policy tools, etc.; that 
is, these can be managed, and the outcomes depend 
on choices made by humans. Moreover, because the 
Six Transformations interact with all the SDGs, they 
provide an entry point for achieving them.
It is worth noting at this stage that these Six 
Transformations differ slightly from those articulated 
by  Sachs et al. (2019).2 The salient elements remain 
2 Building on the initial work of TWI2050 these authors 
reformulated the original Six Transformations, specifically 
subsuming consumption and production into the 
Decarbonization and Energy transformation and splitting 
the Human Capacity and Demography transformation into 
‘Education, Gender and Inequality’ and ‘Health, Wellbeing and 
Demography’.
consistent albeit with slight modifications. What is 
essential is that the Six Transformations reduce the 
complexity of the 17 SDGs and their 169 Targets into a 
more consistent framework that renders achievement 
of synergies easier, especially in terms of the needed 
policy levers. For the purposes of consistency with 
previous TWI2050 reports we have chosen to retain 
the original formulations of the Six Transformations 
for this report. 
The Global Sustainability Development Report (GSDR 
2019), like the TWI2050 (2018) report, highlights the 
importance of the 2030 Agenda and provides science-
based conceptual frameworks for achieving the SDGs 
(Box 2). The need for transformational change is central 
to both reports and both argue for the reduction of 
complexity, conflicts, and trade-offs while maximizing 
synergies. Working toward the goal of complexity 
reduction, the GSDR describes six entry points to the 
needed transformations that are complementary to the 
TWI2050 Six Transformations. Both reports capture 
all 17 SDGs in an integrative and holistic manner and 
demonstrate the indivisibility of the 2030 Agenda. 
As argued above, focusing on individual or selected 
SDGs—during policy analysis or implementation—
comes with the danger of adverse side effects in 
other SDG domains or missing out on potential 
synergies and resulting multiple co-benefits. A holistic 
systems perspective helps to prevent lock-ins and 
Figure 1. TWI2050 focuses on Six Transformations that capture much of the global, regional, and local dynamics 
and encompass major drivers of future changes: (i) Human capacity, demography, and health; (ii) Consumption and 
production; (iii) Decarbonization and energy; (iv) Food, biosphere, and water; (v) Smart cities; and (vi) Digital Revolution. 
Together they give a peoples-centered perspective: building local, national, and global societies and economies which 
secure wealth creation, poverty reduction, fair distribution, and inclusiveness necessary for human prosperity. They 
are necessary and potentially sufficient to achieve prosperous, inclusive, and resilient sustainability transformation 
embedded in the SDGs if addressed holistically in unison. Source: updated from TWI2050 (2018). 
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mobilizes opportunities to accelerate and leverage 
the transformation toward sustainable development. 
Convergence of knowledge, technology, and society 
must be considered for ensuring solutions for the 
SDGs (Roco and Bainbridge 2013). It also enables 
the exploration of multiple possible implementation 
pathways. Similarly, the Six Transformations are not 
intended to be viewed as separate domains but rather 
parts of a highly interconnected system—changes in 
one domain will inevitably result in changes, at varying 
degrees, in all the others. 
1.3. Science, technology, and innovation 
for sustainable development
Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) are at 
the core of human development. Since the onset of 
the Industrial Revolution, they have contributed to 
explosive development, such as the doubling of life 
expectancy, providing secondary education for half of 
humanity, and wellbeing for billions. However, they 
have also brought about negative environmental and 
societal impacts. The global STI community can guide 
the science and technology enterprise built over the 
past 200 years, including values, policies, and systems, 
to support sustainable development.
While all negative externalities, exogenous impacts, 
and shocks cannot be anticipated, STI can and should 
focus on enabling and achieving the 2030 Agenda. 
Various agencies, including the UN Interagency Task 
Team on STI for the SDGs (UN-IATT), the UN-science 
advisory committee, research institutes such as IIASA, 
organizations like the World Bank (WB), Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
and the European Union (EU), and individual countries, 
such as Japan, the Republic of Kenya3, and the Republic 
of Serbia, have been developing, analyzing, and 
proposing new thoughts, frameworks, and methods for 
the STI ecosystem to promote innovation, efficiency, 
and sufficiency for the achievement of SDGs (e.g., the 
Global Pilot Programme on STI for SDGs Roadmaps,4 
GSDR 2019, TWI2050 2019, Mission-oriented policy 
3 For readability, only ‘Kenya’ will be used in the remainder of 
this report.
4 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
partnership/?p=33852 
Box 1.  Key messages of the Six TWI2050 Transformations.a)
Substantial advances in human capacity are needed through further improvements of health care and education. Health 
and education are instrumental for enabling people to live a self-determined life, find decent work, and generate income to sustain 
themselves, but also to undertake climate change mitigation and adaptation and deal with environmental problems. The ambitions 
go hand in hand with the goals to end poverty in all its forms and to reduce global inequality.
Responsible consumption and production cut across several of the other transformations, allowing us to do more with 
less. Evidence shows that it is possible to reduce consumption of resources considerably by taking a more service and circular 
economy-oriented approach with respect to mobility, housing, food systems, and other sectors of our economies. Reductions in 
demand leverage large savings potential at different stages of the supply chain. 
It is possible to decarbonize the energy system while providing clean and affordable energy for all. Pathway analysis 
shows that energy efficiency and sufficiency, increasing the share of renewable energy, electrification, and carbon capture and 
storage all play a key role in decarbonizing the energy system around 2050, while providing access to modern energy for all. 
Achieving the Paris Agreement is still possible but only if combined with a focus on a broader set of SDGs. 
Achieving access to nutritional food and clean water for all while protecting the biosphere and the oceans requires 
more efficient and sustainable food systems. It is possible to meet the needs of a growing world population and at the same 
time limit the food system’s environmental impacts by combinations of increasing agricultural productivity, reduction of waste 
and losses, and changes toward a less meat-intensive diet. The highest priority is to provide healthy and affordable food for all and 
thereby to eradicate hunger. Heathy diets and lifestyles are also essential for reducing obesity in the world.
Transforming our cities will benefit the majority of the world population. Pathways show that by 2050 around two thirds 
of human population will live in urban areas. Sustainable cities are characterized by high connectivity and ‘smart’ infrastructure, 
enabling high-quality services, with low environmental footprint. Transforming slums into decent housing is feasible with low 
energy and material requirements. Good city design, sustainable lifestyles, empowered local actors, and participatory approaches 
that avoid one-size-fits-all solutions are needed to achieve this transformation to sustainable cities. 
Science, technology and innovations (STI) are a powerful driver but the direction of change needs to support 
sustainable development. The Digital Revolution symbolizes the convergence of many innovative technologies, many of which 
are currently ambivalent in their contribution to sustainable development, simultaneously supporting and threatening the ability 
to achieve the SDGs. There is an urgent need to bring the sustainability and the digital and technology communities together to 
align the direction of change with the 2030 Agenda and a sustainable future beyond. There is also a need to implement forward-
looking roadmaps and governance structures that allow the mitigation of potential trade-offs of a STI revolution, particularly 
relating to its impact on the workplace, on social cohesion, and on human dignity. 
a) Full descriptions of the Six Transformations can be found in TWI2050 (2018), available at www.twi2050.org.
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analysis, Smart Specialisation Strategies5 and Society 
5.06; see Chapter 3 and its Section 3.2.4 and Chapter 4 
and its Section 4.2.4 on sufficiency).
For innovation to play a major role in achieving 
the Six Transformations, it is necessary to understand 
what innovation actually is and the processes by which 
new innovations, whether technological, societal, 
institutional, or cultural, are adopted and implemented 
throughout society. This is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2.
1.4. The paradox of innovation
Innovation, as a collective learning process, has 
been at the core of human progress since the dawn 
of civilization. Few other species are known to have 
learned to use tools. Human progress is the result of 
key innovations such as language, the harnessing of 
fire, and development of tools that culminated in the 
Neolithic Revolution. The explosive and purposeful 
5 https://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/what-is-smart-
specialisation- 
6 https://www.japan.go.jp/abenomics/_userdata/
abenomics/pdf/society_5.0.pdf 
direction of innovational change leading up to and 
during the Industrial Revolution, with the invention 
of the printing press, trades, banking, and the 
establishment of technical schools and universities, 
fundamentally changed our settlements, families, 
societies, and the way we live, work, and interact with 
each other. The ‘Great Acceleration’ following the 
Second World War brought about a new era in human 
history, the age of the Anthropocene. A period in which 
one species dominates the planetary processes and 
has ever-increasing awareness of its responsibility for 
stewardship of the Earth and its own future. 
The ‘paradox of innovation’ is that it is both at the 
core of human progress and a major cause of human 
interference with the environment and planetary 
processes. At the same time, innovations in the 
broader sense will provide many possible solutions for 
achieving a sustainable future for the people and the 
planet. 
Efficient transformations to sustainable and 
resilient futures minimize the environmental harm 
or impact through innovations (e.g., by lowering the 
energy use or material requirements of a product or 
Box 2. Global Sustainable Development Report 2019. The Future is Now: Science for Achieving Sustainable 
Development. 
The Future is Now: Science for Achieving Sustainable Development, is the first Global Sustainable Development Report (GSDR) 
prepared by the Independent Group of Scientists appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General. The mandate, defined 
by UN member states, was to provide an integrated perspective on the state of sustainable development, to make available 
scientific knowledge on solutions and accelerated actions, and to strengthen the science-policy interface. The report was officially 
presented at the quadrennial SDG summit during the 2019 HLPF where UN member states acknowledged that decisions based 
on science must play a major role in advancing sustainable development.
The GSDR 2019 highlights the essential importance of science to understand and navigate relationships among social, 
environmental, and economic development objectives. It proposes three essential steps to support the implementation of the 
2030 Agenda:
• Build on a systemic understanding of SDG interactions: The GSDR 2019 calls for systemic thinking to deal with the complexity 
of SDG interactions. It argues that understanding the interconnections between the individual SDGs is essential to manage 
difficult trade-offs and harness synergies to devise coherent policies and effective interventions. 
• Address systemic entry points: It offers actionable intervention opportunities via six entry points to transform the key 
systems that define society today. These are congruent to the six TWI2050 Transformations: i) human wellbeing and 
capabilities; ii) sustainable and just economies; iii) energy decarbonisation and access; iv) food systems and nutrition 
patterns; v) urban and peri-urban development; and vi) global environmental commons. The main difference is that the 
sixth TWI2050 Transformation focuses on one global common, namely digitalization. Both reports call for transformational 
change for achieving the 2030 Agenda.
• Deploy key levers for sustainable development: The GSDR categorizes four levers of action: i) governance; ii) economy 
and finance; iii) individual and collective action; and iv) science and technology. While the GSDR outlines the abundant 
transformation knowledge available for these levers it also underlines that pathways to sustainable development can only 
emerge from combinations of such levers that respond to development challenges and priorities of specific local contexts.  
This is where innovation has its place. While all levers—from science and technology, to governments, the private sector, 
and society—are important means to serve the purpose of sustainable development, no one represents a silver bullet. The key 
innovations needed are new alliances between these sectors, and related actors must hence radically rethink their partnerships 
to overcome their silos. 
Such innovations are also required from science: while the report underlines the importance of stronger science-policy-society 
interfaces (see Chapter 4), it also makes the case for shifting current research priorities and supporting innovative approaches to 
sustainability science, emphasizing inter- and transdisciplinary partnerships, and committing support and resources to scientific 
institutions, particularly in the global South. Additionally, development aid budgets should prioritize boosting scientific capacity 
and access in the global South. 
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service). It guides innovations (with micro and macro 
perspectives) that anticipate and integrate short-term 
and long-term effects. This is to avoid the risk of overall 
unintended effects that may cause an increase of 
harmful environmental and/or social impacts, ideally 
through successively empirically informed feedbacks 
to the societal discourse. The diffusion of innovations 
(e.g., ideas, technologies, or policies), including de-
materialized societal innovations, can contribute to a 
more sustainable future for all, as envisioned by the 
UN 2030 Agenda and its SDGs or the Paris Agreement 
(UNFCCC 2015).
Martin Heidegger (1977) argued that “innovations 
[and technology] are … [a means to an end] [and] 
a human activity” or means to a human end. This 
concept can therefore be called the instrumental and 
anthropological definition of technology and in a 
broader sense innovation in general. The 2030 Agenda 
could, in the same sense, be seen as an anthropologically 
oriented and influenced conceptual sphere concerned 
with key factors dealing with human existence in a 
safe, just, and equitable world. So, it is about the future 
of humanity for which integrity of Earth systems is 
essential. It is fitting in the age of the Anthropocene that 
humans, as the current drivers of planetary change, are 
charged with the responsibility of ensuring both their 
own and planetary sustainability.
1.5. COVID-19: risks and opportunities 
for a sustainable future
The COVID-19 pandemic is a major immediate threat 
to humanity, especially for those with previous health 
risks and those living directly deprived through poverty 
and lack of health care, but at the same time presents an 
opportunity to redirect our focus on what is important 
to us as a society, to redirect trillions of dollars of 
intended public financing toward investments into 
innovative activities for achieving a sustainable future 
for all. STI is the main strategy for long-term pandemic 
protection and control, with scientists around the 
world cooperating to develop treatments and a vaccine 
for COVID-19. Once successful and approved, which 
could potentially take 12–18 months, there needs to 
be a huge upscaling of production and distribution 
technologies to effectively protect the health of 
everyone. Innovation will be required in health care 
systems for more effective early response strategies, 
protection for all, including the billions who do not have 
health insurance, appropriate protection of doctors and 
nurses, and adequate levels of intensive care capacity 
in hospitals. In the meantime, the main mitigation 
strategies include social distancing and contact tracing, 
including through mobile-phone apps. This also 
requires institutional and organizational innovations 
as continued lockdowns are already having drastic 
negative economic and social consequences, especially 
for those without adequate insurance or savings to pay 
rent and purchase food and other necessities while 
unemployed. 
It is clear that there are possible environmental and 
Earth-system benefits to the partial shutdown of the 
global economy. Some of the ‘old’ resource-intensive, 
inequitable and unsustainable characteristics of the 
global economy may be destroyed. There are declines 
in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and in air and 
water pollution. Societal benefits include declines in 
road accidents and fuel use from mobility reductions, 
materials use is down meaning less life lost in mining, 
and so on. The opportunity should not be lost to ensure 
that emerging employment and human activities be 
directed at achieving the sustainability transformation 
for people and the planet.
The list of negative societal consequences is very 
long, including adverse consequences for physical and 
mental health as a result of families being locked in 
their homes often without the possibility of being able 
to exercise outdoors or interact in social settings. There 
are reports of loss of education for children, and multiple 
burdens for the many working at home while taking 
care of children and other responsibilities. Another 
possible legacy of COVID-19 could be an increase in the 
challenges to achieving gender equity and empower 
all women and girls (SDG5). In the short term, stay-
at-home orders can reinforce old stereotypes, with an 
increase in women’s home responsibilities, including 
domestic activities, caregiving, and home schooling of 
children. These also increase demands and stress on 
women employed outside the home, whether in the 
formal or informal sector. The extent to which these 
changes will have longer-term consequences will 
depend on the length (and frequency) of these orders. 
In the short term, for example, limiting work often 
limits economic opportunities (Wenham et al. 2020). 
While there is great uncertainty in predicting exactly 
what the economic damage from the global coronavirus 
pandemic will be, there is widespread agreement 
among economists that it will have severe negative 
impacts on the global economy. According to this year’s 
World Economic Outlook (2020), global growth in 
2020 is predicted to fall by 3% under the assumption 
that the pandemic and required containment peaks in 
the second quarter for most countries in the world, and 
recedes in the second half of this year (a downgrade 
of more than 6 percentage points from the economic 
growth forecast). With the world economy valued at 
US$136 trillion7  (measured at international purchasing 
power parity) in 2018, this represents a systemic loss 
of about $4 trillion to $8 trillion—or 5 to 10 times the 
average global losses from current climate-related and 
geophysical disasters (World Bank 2020). 
7 $ refers to US dollars throughout this report.
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The proposed economic rescue plans already 
range in the trillions of dollars. Most are directed at 
preserving employment, which is absolutely necessary. 
However, one should ask the question whether some 
of the financing should be directed toward the Six 
TWI2050 Transformations to induce innovations 
and new lifestyles and norms toward sustainability 
for all. In fact, the danger is that these huge financial 
resources would be sprinkled in ‘helicopter’ style and 
would reinforce the current unsustainable practices 
and trends—maintaining the old and avoiding the new. 
The Six Transformations offer essential STI 
synergies to achieve a new direction of development 
at lower cost while supporting the most vulnerable 
who will suffer the most, in the short and long term, 
in the absence of appropriate strategies. Just consider 
the four largest refugee camps in Kenya, the largest in 
the world, with close to 350,000 inhabitants, followed 
in size by camps in Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 
the Republic of South Sudan8, the United Republic of 
Tanzania, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,, and 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan9 (UNHCR 2020). The 
top refugee hosting countries are Republic of Turkey, 
Pakistan, Republic of Uganda, South Sudan, and the 
Federal Republic of Germany10 (UNHCR 2020). Think 
of the millions of people suffering from the impacts of 
natural disasters, war zones, or climate change. Keep 
in mind the millions of children who do not have the 
chance to go to school. This is where some resources 
need to go, namely to those with worse starting 
conditions, little or no backup, little education, no jobs, 
and no safety nets.
Piketty (2019) proposed that every person in the 
French Republic11 should receive 120,000 Euros at the 
age of 25 to enable innovative initiatives among those 
who lack the capital to do so. This would provide more 
equal opportunities to everyone. Even in Germany, an 
affluent country with exemplary social systems and 
universal health care, the bottom half of the population 
own only 3% of the capital (Piketty 2019). The current 
system, and one may soon say the ‘old’ system, is not 
resilient and in many ways inadequate in responding 
to the crisis caused by COVID-19. Part of this results 
from the increased inequity in income, wealth, and 
opportunities, and lack of health care and social 
security benefits for all. The vast majority of the global 
population lack the capital needed for innovation as 
8 For readability, only ‘South Sudan’ will be used in the 
remainder of this report.
9 For readability, only ‘Pakistan’ will be used in the remainder 
of this report.
10 For readability, only ‘Germany’ will be used in the remainder 
of this report.
11 For readability, only ‘France’ will be used in the remainder 
of this report.
they persistently live from ‘hand to mouth’ and fight for 
survival. 
There is talk of what the ‘new normal’ may look like 
after the pandemic. It is unlikely that life will go back 
to the same. In addition to obvious changes that need 
to be made to global health systems and preparedness, 
practices resulting from social distancing requirements 
such as remote working and telecommuting, online 
schooling, e-commerce, local sourcing, etc., will 
become more common. As such changes become more 
widespread, there will be significant opportunities to 
accelerate the necessary long-term transformative 
changes toward sustainability. However, the risk is that 
exactly the opposite will happen, with governments 
and vested interests eager to return to a business-as-
usual agenda. Another important risk is a political shift 
toward totalitarian governance and the notion of ‘my 
country first.’ 
The COVID-19 crisis has finally alerted the world to 
the risks of biological shocks, not only in terms of human 
health but also in terms of their cascading economic 
and social consequences. The crisis raises profound 
questions about the resilience of sustainability 
transformation and the role that catastrophic systemic 
risk can and will have on reaching the SDGs in general, 
and specifically on the Six Transformations. To what 
extent can systemic shocks like COVID-19 set back 
progress: will systemic and catastrophic shocks mean 
that we risk taking one step forward and two steps back 
in meeting the SDGs? 
The global scale of the coronavirus is unprecedented 
in recent history; yet, it can be argued that at the 
regional, national, and local scales climate-related and 
geophysical disasters have had an equally or more 
devastating human and economic toll, significantly 
setting back development in many of the most 
vulnerable countries. 
In the recent two decades (1998–2017), climate-
related and geophysical disasters killed 1.3 million 
people—about 65,000 annually—and left a further 
4.4 billion injured, homeless, displaced, or in need of 
emergency assistance (Hallegatte et al. 2017). The 
mortality incidence of these non-pandemic events has 
been far more serious in highly vulnerable developing 
countries, where an average of 130 people per million 
have died compared to just 18 in high-income countries. 
In sharp contrast, COVID-19, at the time of writing 
(5 June 2020), has struck many countries both poor 
and wealthy, with mortality at 600 per million in the 
UK12, 300 per million in the United States of America13, 
12 For readability, only ‘UK’will be used in the remainder of this 
report.
13 For readability, only ‘USA’ will be used in the remainder of 
this report.
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Figure 2. The cartoon illustrates that despite the major immediate threat of the COVID-19 coronavirus, there are other 
delivery systems unaffected. The climate crisis is here and also injustice, inequity, and ever-increasing pressure on Earth 
systems and global commons. Source: TOLES © The Washington Post. Reprinted with permission of ANDREWS MCMEEL 
SYNDICATION. All rights reserved.
over 550 per million in the Republic of Italy14, 200 in 
the Republic of Ecuador, over 160 in the Federative 
Republic of Brazil, and 3 per million in the People's 
Republic of China15—with a global total of more than 
300,000 (JHU 2020). How the pandemic unfolds in the 
following months is still to be seen.
In this same two decades, non-coronavirus 
disasters—according to the WB—led to real losses to 
the global economy up to a staggering $520 billion per 
annum, with disasters pushing 26 million people into 
poverty every year (Hallegatte et al. 2017). 
The COVID-19 crisis adds emphasis to the 
historical evidence that catastrophic and systemic 
risk from natural and biological causes can greatly 
set back progress on the Six Transformations needed 
for meeting the SDGs. Prevention pays, yet history 
tells us that societies do not take the risk mitigation 
measures necessary to clear the way for progress. 
A transformation in disaster risk management that 
takes a more positivist and holistic approach and 
shifts significant efforts and resources to mitigating 
disaster risk, appears to be a prerequisite for meeting 
the SDGs. Health has finally been acknowledged as a 
global commons. So far humanity has not excelled at 
safeguarding the commons. Maybe the COVID-19 crisis 
14 For readability, only ‘Italy’ will be used in the remainder of 
this report.
15 For readability, only ‘China’ will be used in the remainder of 
this report.
is both a wake-up call and a training ground to enhance 
our joint and resilient response to future pandemics 
and other external disturbances. This is only the first of 
many possible future pandemics to come if we continue 
on an unsustainable development path.
1.6. Outline of this report
This report focuses on how innovation, and STI more 
broadly, can both drive and facilitate the TWI2050 Six 
Transformations toward a sustainable future. 
Chapter 2 considers what innovation actually is, 
and the processes by which innovations, whether 
technological, societal, institutional, or cultural, 
are adopted and diffuse. Such an understanding is 
fundamental for any attempt to direct or socially ‘steer’ 
innovation toward sustainability. Chapter 3 provides 
examples of the types of innovations required within 
and across the Six Transformations, with an emphasis 
on efficiency and sufficiency for enhancing prosperity 
for all. It is about ‘doing more with less.’ Finally, Chapter 
4 discusses the innovations required in governance, 
institutional, and societal structures and practices, 
across scales, to help guide these innovations to achieve 
the desired, just, and resilient sustainable future for 
people and planet.
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2. Invention and innovation for sustainability
Invention and innovation for sustainability2
If I had asked the public what they wanted,
 they would have said a faster horse.
Henry Ford (1863–1947)
2.1. A new look at the process of 
invention and innovation
 Our societies, globally, are currently experiencing a 
‘double whammy’—the conjunction of a short-term and 
a long-term disruption in their customary dynamics. 
The reaction to both of these is significantly different—
the societal reaction to the long-term disturbance, the 
sustainability conundrum, is at best hesitant and often 
a case of denial after some 30 or 40 years of exposing it, 
and its potential consequences. Yet the reaction to the 
short-term crisis—the COVID-19 pandemic—though 
initially hesitant, is now reaching its full defensive 
momentum. There are many interesting scientific 
questions concerning this difference. Questions that 
may have an important impact on the future of human 
behavior and organization.
One such question concerns the role of invention and 
innovation. We often hear, in the sustainability context, 
politicians, consultants, and others utter the phrase, 
“We have to innovate our way out of the challenge!” 
or “We should not waste a crisis!” whenever they have 
no answer to questions put to them by civil society. 
However, they often fail to recognize that 250 years of 
unbridled invention and innovation since the Industrial 
Revolution have landed us in this predicament. History 
matters. In this chapter, we will try and provide a 
fresh look at the role of invention and innovation in 
our current socioeconomic-environmental system 
dynamics to show why STI are the key for achieving 
the Six Transformations and thus the 2030 Agenda, 
provided they are handled more carefully than has 
been customary to date.
History and background
Inventions and innovations have always been a 
characteristic of human societies, with an acceleration 
after the Industrial Revolution. Why? Girard (1990) 
and Beckert (2016) argue that around the time of 
the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution in 
Europe, an important change in perspective occurred. 
Until that time, they argue, the future was viewed 
as being circular in the sense that “it was more of 
the same as had occurred in the past,” while a new 
distinction was made in that the future is “the time 
in which change can occur.” Looking at the past (ex 
post) was increasingly distinguished from looking 
at the future (ex ante). However, science was slow in 
adopting that perspective. For example, to be admitted 
into the community of recognized scientists of the 
Royal Society in London, one had to demonstrate or 
prove one’s scientific statements. As this could not 
be done for the future, for career reasons, scientists 
increasingly focused on looking for the origins of the 
present by focusing on the past. One could argue that it 
is only with the adoption in the 1970s of the so-called 
‘Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)’ (Mitchell 2009) 
perspective that scientists developed tools to look at 
the future by focusing on the emergence of phenomena.
A CAS is a system in which a perfect understanding of 
the individual parts does not automatically translate to 
a perfect understanding of the whole system's behavior 
(Miller and Scott 2007). In CAS, the whole is more 
complex than its parts, and also more complex than the 
aggregate of its parts (Holland 1998). The study of CAS 
is highly interdisciplinary and brings together insights 
from the social and natural sciences to develop system-
level models that allow for heterogeneous agents, 
phase transition, and emergent behavior (Auerbach 
2016). 
This change had important consequences for STI. In 
the CAS approach, one can, at least theoretically, focus 
scientifically on the process of innovation and change, 
rather than relegate invention and innovation to the 
scientifically untreatable black box of ‘creativity’ as 
was done in the era of reductionist science. Therefore, 
we adopt the CAS approach to the study of innovation. 
In doing so we hope to contribute to a trend of scientific 
and systems-based decision making that is increasingly 
called for in civil society and business (OECD and IIASA 
2020).
Multiple futures, ontological uncertainty, and 
unintended consequences
Like every scientific approach, CAS has its own strengths 
and weaknesses. A great strength of this approach is 
that it acknowledges the inherent complexity of most 
socio-environmental dynamics. Rather than reduce 
the full complexity of their interaction to a chain of 
cause and effect playing out in a few dimensions, as 
the reductionist approach does, the CAS approach 
views the emergence of novel phenomena as part of 
their multidimensional trajectories and thus does not 
simplify systems dynamics as much as the reductionist 
approach does. It follows also that the CAS approach 
always considers multiple future states of any 
phenomenon studied.
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An apparent disadvantage, that is often cited, is that 
using the CAS approach makes it more difficult to predict 
the evolution of systems dynamics over the short and 
the long term. But in our opinion that is erroneous, as 
the linear, reductionist, cause and effect does indeed 
make both short- and long-term predictions, but 
these are not necessarily more accurate. Instead, the 
CAS approach increases the accuracy of short-term 
predictions while performing no better on long-term 
ones. As Lane and Maxfield (1997) argue, the CAS 
approach acknowledges that the future is ontologically 
uncertain.
Due to limitations of humans’ short-term working 
memory, the perception humans have of any 
phenomena occurring in the external world is highly 
reduced in its dimensionality and thus also biased. 
But when human beings act in the environment based 
on these perceptions, the simplified perceptions are 
confronted with the full complexity of the external 
world. As a result, any action has many more 
consequences in the wider environment than can be 
perceived. Unforeseen and unintended consequences 
result from all human actions, including inventions 
and innovations (Huesemann and Huesemann 2011). 
The paradox of innovation is that it can resolve many 
perceived problems but in doing so, often creates 
unforeseen and unintended ones.
The need to improve control over invention and 
innovation
As our societies are envisaging that innovation “will 
get us out of trouble,” even though we would argue 
that the 250 years of innovative progress since the 
Industrial Revolution have got us into trouble—as 
humanity transcended many of the planetary and 
environmental boundaries while at the same time 
providing many benefits to humanity—we do not 
conclude that we must stop all innovation and aim 
for an undifferentiated no-growth economy without 
change. We think continued growth might be attained 
by growing in a dematerialized manner, emphasizing 
social and technological innovation. But that means 
one would have to be able to steer innovation. There 
are at present a number of barriers to doing so. The 
first of these is the nature of our current economic and 
financial systems, that are now so widely embedded 
in our societies that it is difficult to change. Although 
a pandemic such as COVID-19, which occurs against 
a background of increasing evidence of partial 
dysfunctionality of the system, might contribute to 
moving it in a different direction.
Does one favor automation over employing people? 
Or does one favor protecting people from the COVID-19 
pandemic over keeping them employed? The choice 
involves many different aspects of our current path-
dependent socioeconomic structure. For example, 
continued automation might lead to a point where 
most of our human needs can be met technologically 
(TWI2050 2019), but societies would have to deal with 
a large proportion of unemployment, unless the overall 
population size declines to the numbers needed for 
the service economy, or the system is being changed 
to one based on basic income for all irrespective of 
employment to avoid major societal conflict (Arthur 
2015). Either solution would have major unintended 
consequences and would represent a fundamentally 
different future development pathway. Such changes 
are only possible over the long term, and in view of the 
difficulty of taking long-term decisions in democratic 
systems, they may simply be impossible to implement 
on large scales. So we have to think in terms of 
cumulative incremental change. But who decides on 
how this might be achieved? In the past, fundamental 
changes have been disruptive and discontinuous such 
as the new development pathway that followed the 
Great Depression of the 1930s.
Another barrier to steering innovation is the 
fact that we have no accepted scientific ideas about 
how invention occurs. We need to distinguish here 
between invention (the act of creating something 
new) and innovation (the act of introducing that 
invention in society and spreading its use). We know 
a lot about innovation in society and how to promote 
it (Nakicenovic and Grubler 1991, Grubler 2000). 
Economists have widely studied both the conditions for 
stimulating invention and the result of innovation for 
the economy (Rosenberg and Nathan 1982, Rosenberg 
et al. 1992, Rosenberg 2000), but because reductionist 
science has, as mentioned above, considered creativity 
as a ‘black box’ (Rosenberg and Nathan 1994), we 
still do not really know whether we can really steer 
invention, let alone how to do so beyond ‘freeing the 
animal spirits,’ by asking certain questions and funding 
research to answer them. Only by gaining a better 
understanding of the process of invention itself may 
we hope to gain more control over it, and thus enable 
our societies to focus it in certain directions. New 
insights might emerge from the current exceedingly 
high premium for new means to combat COVID-19. 
A third issue is the question, who is, or who should be, 
involved in invention and innovation? If we do not want 
the current ‘freedom of invention and innovation’ to 
continue as is, but would like to mobilize invention and 
innovation toward certain goals (such as sustainable 
development), how could that be implemented? For 
example, if the precautionary principle were to be 
elevated to a prime goal of invention and innovation, 
which kind of political or administrative structure 
would that require? How would one involve the general 
public in this, so as to improve its trust in the policies 
introduced in that context?
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A related issue is the question of control over 
inventions and innovations. The Information 
Revolution has fundamentally changed our perspective 
on invention, from something achieved by a few 
individuals in isolation, to an awareness that invention 
is a systemic phenomenon that involves many people 
in a network, with both strong and weak ties among 
them. This posits the question, who can ‘own’ or 
‘control’ an invention? In other words, is our current 
system of patents and trademarks adapted to the new 
situation?
The roles of technology and economy in the 
evolution of our societal systems
For a long time, the accepted vision among economists 
was that technology adapted itself to the economic 
conditions of a society. However, if one does not merely 
consider individual inventions, but the underlying logic 
that is responsible for them, and which is relatively 
stable, the inverse can also be argued (e.g., Arthur 2009). 
In many ways, that seems to be a more productive way 
to look at the relationship, especially at a moment in 
time at which there is a clear shift in applications for 
patents, from those that generate new technologies to 
those that combine existing ones (Strumsky and Lobo 
2015) or are acquired to protect against competition.
But can either the current Western capitalist 
economy or its technology continue to develop, or are 
there inherent barriers to their continued growth and 
expansion? In economics, numerous dissenting points 
of view developed in a sustainability context argue that 
that is not the case. For technology, a similar argument 
can easily be made (van der Leeuw 2020, Zhang and 
van der Leeuw in press).
Hence, there is a need to introduce a fundamentally 
different socioeconomic approach, which does 
not oppose nature and culture, but builds on the 
relationship between the two to escape the current 
conundrum. That is what the other chapters of this 
report will be dedicated to.
2.2. Technology, social, institutional, and 
cultural innovation
Innovation must be viewed as a complex system in 
which all components, technology, society, institutions, 
and culture work interactively and holistically to 
bring about widespread transformative change. 
Innovation in one component will necessarily lead to 
innovations in all others if the innovation pathway is to 
succeed. Similarly, a failure to bring about innovation 
in one component can lead to overall failure. For 
example, autonomous vehicles are undoubtedly a 
groundbreaking technological innovation; however, 
without the necessary accompanying innovations 
in societal and cultural acceptance and regulatory 
frameworks they are likely to be reduced to a novelty 
or even an abject failure. As such, it is meaningless to 
discuss each of these components independently in 
the context of this report and the overall sustainability 
transformation. However, given that the processes 
of technological innovations have a long history of 
research, an examination of these processes can be 
relevant to understanding innovation more generally, 
and hence are a major focus in what follows. However, 
where relevant, the other components of innovation 
are highlighted.
Technology innovations 
Innovation is most simply conceived of as novelty, 
originating from human endeavor and inspiration. 
Technology innovations range from radical new 
inventions to marginal performance improvements and 
encompass social and behavioral changes alongside 
new technologies reflected in innovative processes, 
products, and institutional change. Innovations that 
are successful typically undergo widespread diffusion, 
upscaling, and commercial uptake. But this outcome is 
the culmination of an often-lengthy process which runs 
from research and development through demonstration 
and trials to early market formation and then diffusion. 
There are countless pitfalls along the way. The process 
is characterized by deep uncertainties—one can 
say that “many are called but few are chosen.” The 
majority of innovation journeys end in failure, some 
abject, others marginal. Innovation is neither costless 
nor determinate. Even successful innovators often 
have a history of failures that are important learning 
experiences for the eventual adoption. This renders 
study of the innovation process difficult because 
mostly successes are recorded followed by pervasive 
diffusion while failures, with a very few exceptions, are 
forgotten.
What is technology? Grubler (1998) points to the 
Greek origin of the name composed of τεχγε (techne—
art, the practical capability to create something) and 
λoγoσ (logos—word, human reason). Thus, τεχγε 
λoγoσ (technologia) is the science and systematic 
treatment of the practical. In a most general sense, 
technology is a system of means to a particular 
purpose that employs both technical artifacts and 
social information—often referred to as know-how and 
know-why. In the narrowest sense, technology consists 
of manufactured objects like tools (axes, arrowheads, 
and robots and software as their modern equivalents) 
and infrastructure or containers (buildings, pots, water 
reservoirs). The purpose is either to enhance human 
capabilities (e.g., a hammer can apply a stronger force 
to an object) or to enable humans to perform tasks 
they could not perform otherwise (a pot can transport 
larger amounts of water than your hands). Engineers 
call such objects ‘hardware.’ Anthropologists speak of 
‘artifacts.’ 
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But technology does not end there. Artifacts have 
to be made. They have to be invented, designed, and 
manufactured. This requires a larger system including 
hardware (such as machinery or a manufacturing 
plant), factor inputs (labor, energy, raw materials, 
capital), and finally ‘software’ (know-how, human 
knowledge, and skills). The latter, for which the French 
use the term ‘technique,’ represents the disembodied 
nature of technology, its knowledge base. Thus, 
technology includes both what things are made and 
how things are made. In that sense, technology is 
cumulative and a learning process. Changes build upon 
previous experience and knowledge and the stock of 
knowledge grows continuously. 
Finally, knowledge, or technique, is required not 
only for the production of artifacts, but also for their 
use. Knowledge is needed to drive a car or use a bank 
account. Knowledge is needed both at the level of the 
individual, in complex organizations, and at the level of 
society. A typewriter, without a user who knows how 
to type, let alone how to read, is simply a useless, heavy 
piece of equipment. In the case of a smartphone or a 
laptop, knowledge plays the essential role to render 
the use possible. Technologies also have to fit into a 
system. Laptops or smartphones are useless without 
the systems in which they operate such as the Internet 
or the Global System for Mobile (GSM) Communications 
system and their associated network infrastructure. 
Despite the immense complexity of the systems and 
devices, the knowledge needed to operate a phone or 
laptop need not necessarily encompass understanding 
the technical or software dimension of the underlying 
technologies of the devices themselves. 
Humans, of course, process matter (food, raw 
materials, etc.), energy (transportation, heating, 
lighting, etc.), and information (facts, stories, but 
also sound, smell, touch, or images). The first two of 
these are necessary for physically sustaining us as 
individuals. However, information is different. It is not 
concerned by the conservation principle, and therefore 
it can be shared. It is therefore the ‘cement’ that brings 
and keeps societies together by sharing values, ideas, 
customs, and institutions.
Over the long term, the ways in which individuals 
and groups process information determines their 
organization, their values, their ideas, their categories, 
their institutions, and their technologies. All these 
aspects of social life are dependent on information 
processing, and the evolution of that processing over 
time has driven the coevolution of all the above aspects 
of societies, from the small groups of hunter-gatherers 
in the Paleolithic to the complex societies of the present.
With respect to innovation, particular attention 
needs to be paid to the relationship between information 
processing and technology. Not only are all artifacts, 
from simple stone axes to nuclear reactors, the result 
of information processing and the decision making that 
is based on it, but they are also information processing 
tools in their own right. The complex mechanisms of a 
car, for example, exonerate the user of the vehicle from 
knowing all but the most basic information about how 
the car works, and thus frees a substantive amount 
of information processing power, leaving the owner 
only the task of driving it. Similarly, a saw limits the 
information processing that is needed to cut a tree 
by fixing a number of the decision parameters (such 
as the angle to hit the tree with an axe) and confining 
the cutting to pulling back and forth along a fixed line. 
We conclude that technology (and thus innovation 
and invention) are an externalized part of a society’s 
information processing apparatus.
Technological hardware varies in size and 
complexity, as does the ‘software’ required to produce 
and use hardware. The two are interrelated and 
require both tangible and intangible settings in the 
form of spatial structures and social organizations. 
Institutions, including governments, firms, and 
markets, and social norms and attitudes, are especially 
important in determining how systems for producing 
and using artifacts emerge and function. They 
determine how particular artifacts and combinations 
of artifacts originate, which ones are rejected, or which 
ones become successful, and, if successful, how quickly 
they are incorporated in the economy and the society. 
Unintended consequences of invention and 
innovation 
When an innovation starts diffusing, it calls forth novel 
arrangements and organizational forms. The new 
technology or new arrangements in turn may cause 
new problems. These in turn are answered by further 
novel arrangements (or by existing technologies 
modified for the purpose), which in turn may open 
the need for yet more novel technologies. The whole 
system moves through a learning process forward in a 
sequence of problems and their solutions—of challenge 
and response—resulting in structural change. In this 
way the economy forms and re-forms itself in spates of 
change, as novelty, new arrangements to accommodate 
this, and the opening of opportunity niches follow from 
each other.
Bringing such systems dynamics to a halt is 
difficult and in practice often impossible. We have 
been stressing that every solution in the form of a new 
technology creates some new challenge, some new 
problem. Stated as a general rule, every technology 
contains the seeds of a problem, often several. This is 
not a ‘law’ of technology or of the economy, much less 
one of the universe. It is simply a broad-based empirical 
observation—a regrettable one—drawn from human 
history. The use of carbon-based energy sources 
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has increased widespread economic efficiencies but 
resulted in global warming. The use of atomic power, 
an environmentally clean source of power, has brought 
the problem of disposal of atomic waste and danger of 
catastrophic accidents. The use of the chemical DDT 
was a marvelous advance for agricultural pest control 
but led to widespread health and environmental 
problems. The use of air transport has brought the 
potential of rapid worldwide travel and commerce but 
also the spread of infections and pandemics. In the 
economy, solutions lead to problems, and problems 
to further solutions, and this dance between solution 
and problem is unlikely to change at any time in the 
future. If the diffusion leads to the solution of negative 
externalities of technology adoption, a net individual 
and social benefit results that we call progress. Whether 
or not progress exists and how long it lasts condemns 
innovation—and the society and economy as a result—
to continuous change.
Evolution and diffusion of innovations
Schumpeter and Redvers (1934) distinguished three 
important phases in technological development: 
invention, innovation, and diffusion.
Invention is an empirical or scientific discovery of 
a new principle or a principal feasibility of a proposed 
solution. It can also be a new linking of existing needs, 
purposes, and effects. It rarely offers hints of a possible 
practical application. Invention is a lengthy process 
and not merely an accumulation of small changes. 
Inventions in one field can have large effects on the 
development of technology in other areas, leading 
to new technologies, processes, and new industries. 
Overall, as already mentioned, our knowledge about 
this phase is very limited and we need to study this 
scientifically to understand how we may be able to 
steer it. 
Innovation refers to the first application of an 
invention to a practical purpose. Often, process and 
product innovations are distinguished. More generally, 
innovation can refer to new social processes or 
creation of new institutions. A key question assessed 
in this report is whether the direction and purpose 
of innovations can be ‘socially steered’ toward a 
sustainable future for all.
Every technological innovation stands on a 
pyramid of previously available technologies and 
any future innovations are derived from presently 
available technologies. Innovations happen through 
combinations of existing technologies. They serve 
opportunity niches based on human needs and come 
with accompanying needs for infrastructure, skills, and 
processes. This is a continuous problem-solution circle 
that is flexible and ever changing. Innovations, once 
they have successfully diffused, can lead to domino- 
like collapses of the old for new technologies and 
industries. 
The third phase refers to diffusion—characterized 
by the widespread replication and adoption of the 
innovation throughout society. According to Rogers 
(2010) four main elements influence the diffusion 
of innovations: the innovation itself, communication 
channels, time, and the system. Once the innovation is 
widely adopted and has reached a critical mass, it can 
self-sustain. The diffusion of innovations is defined 
by temporal as well as spatial characteristics (Rogers 
2010). 
Diffusion is a transformative process characterized 
by improvements in many dimensions from costs to 
technical performance leading to competitiveness and 
eventual replacement of the ‘old.’ Other characteristics 
include increasing scale, variety, and complexity, 
division of labor and interdependence, interrelatedness 
and ‘network externalities’ (Grubler 1998). Figure 3 
illustrates diffusion in three dimensions: intensity of 
adoption, in space and in time. Early adoption generally 
leads to more pervasive diffusion and the further from 
the center in space (this can be virtual space of spillovers 
Figure 3. Spatial characteristics of diffusion. Diffusion tends to take more time in the case of early adopters than in 
the followers but adoption levels are higher in the core of innovation diffusion than in the periphery both in time and 
distance. Source: Morrill (1968).
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or some other characteristics of the process), the later 
diffusion generally starts, is more rapid but leads to a 
lower level of adoption. These are some stylized but 
salient properties of the diffusion processes.
Ultimately, diffusion is a social and economic 
process as it encompasses mutual interactions of 
concurrent technological, institutional, behavioral, and 
social change. It is not a linear but rather a complex 
interactive process including ‘bundles’ or ‘clusters’ of 
technologies.
The essence of technological change and diffusion 
is in the ‘new combinations’ (Schumpeter and 
Redvers 1934), particularly those that are disruptive, 
discontinuous, and radical—combinations that cannot 
be achieved by gradual modifications of existing 
systems. Radical change through new combinations 
is rare and nonlinear in comparison with more 
gradual improvements. Examples include the internal 
combustion engine, automobiles, and petrochemicals 
to name just a few new combinations that radically and 
irreversibly changed economic structure, consumption 
patterns, regulatory mechanisms, and governance in 
general (see Box 3).
Innovations diffuse as the result of substantial 
performance and productivity increases as 
organizations and individuals gain experience with 
them. Such improvements reflect organizational and 
individual learning and social changes in general. 
Learning can originate from many sources. It can 
originate from outside an organization through 
the purchase of expertise or new processes or 
organizational structure. Or learning can originate from 
the inside through research and development (R&D) 
and investments in new technologies or organizational 
structure. Learning can also come through improving 
know-how, that is, learning how to make things 
better with the things themselves (artifacts, designs, 
practices, jobs, etc.) basically unaltered. Or learning 
can come through improving design features and 
economies of scale, reducing costs by building and 
using larger and larger units. There is, however, one 
strict precondition for learning. It requires effort and 
the actual accumulation of experience. It does not come 
as a free good. At the same time, it is one area of human 
improvement that is not exhaustible as far as we know.
2.3. Transformation through learning
Technological learning phenomena—long studied in 
human psychology—were vividly described for the 
aircraft industry by Wright (1936), who reported that 
unit labor costs in air-frame manufacturing declined 
significantly with accumulated experience. Grubler 
(1998) gives numerous examples of technological 
learning from manufacturing and service activities 
ranging from aircraft, ships, refined petroleum 
products, petrochemicals, steam and gas turbines, 
and even broiler chickens. Applications of learning 
models have ranged from success rates of new surgical 
procedures to productivity in kibbutz farming and 
nuclear plant operation reliability (Argote and Epple 
1990, Grubler 1998). Learning and improvement 
through accumulated knowledge have been 
fundamental for human progress since the dawn of 
civilization and in principle are not limited like other 
activities. Learning is truly renewable and includes 
Box 3.  Innovation capabilities as a cross-cutting realm for upgrading societies’ transformation capacities. 
It should not be forgotten that innovation both pertains to various improvements of already existing solutions (both technical 
and societal) as well as brand new innovative ‘jumps.’ One example is the innovation to launch electrical cars. The innovation 
relates basically only to the motor side, not necessarily to the ‘car’ as a total technological system. However, this partial upgrading 
of the car opens up gradually for strong improvements of other kinds, for example, driverless cars, although the new artificial 
intelligence (AI)-computerized solution does not depend on the initial electric motor innovation. There could be even further 
technical steps such as some Le Courbousier visions about futuristic cities with helicopter-like vehicles zooming around in 
three-dimensional space. That is probably the step when you no longer talk about this transportation unit as a ‘car’ but rather 
something else. 
There is another innovation step dealing with the social organization of the technical upgrading, for example, transportation 
solutions. This occurs when you no longer atomize the transport system to individual car units but embed the transportation 
function in a broader computerized system with different types of sub-vehicles that provide a distributed systems function 
for transport of both persons and goods. Still another step would be to reduce the societal need to move material entities 
around and support the function of meetings to online exchange of information with the participants working from home-based 
positions. Further steps include systems that could be inbuilt in human bodies (as is already starting to happen in techno-medical 
prosthetics) where the hardware for manipulating the robot arm is implanted and directly connected to the human nervous 
system. 
Many of these advanced functions are already being linked in AI implementations using the knowledge space of vast databases 
(big data), such as, biometric and facial recognition technologies being connected to an individual’s societal records. This also 
holds true for identification of market behaviors and/or the political preference potentials of individuals. This also incorporates 
measures to track the spread of viruses (e.g., the coronavirus) by using network information of people's movements. Thus, these 
techno-social innovations raise deep considerations of a cultural/normative nature—both positive and negative in character.
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social, technological, economic, institutional, cultural, 
and behavioral dimensions in a holistic and integrative 
manner. 
In economics, ‘learning by doing’ and ‘learning by 
using’ have been highlighted since the early 1960s (see 
e.g., Arrow (1962) and Rosenberg and Nathan (1982)). 
Detailed studies of learning track the many different 
sources and mechanisms (for a succinct discussion 
of ‘who learns what?,’ see Cantley and Sahal (1980)). 
Here we focus on the productivity gains from learning, 
which can be very large indeed. During the first 
year of production of World War II Liberty ships, for 
example, the average number of labor hours required 
to produce a ship decreased by 45%, and the average 
time decreased by 75%. Current examples range 
from photovoltaics, microchips, windmills, and many 
other technologies with learning rates in the range of 
about 20% (cost reduction per cumulative doubling 
of output). There are also cases, however, where no 
learning is evident, and we briefly discuss the reasons 
for such learning failures.
Innovation and radical and disruptive new 
combinations have the potential of substituting new 
for old practices. Learning processes are central 
for the rapid improvement of new combinations 
compared to comparatively slow and incremental 
improvements of the old. Examples are plentiful and 
include replacement of horses and carriages by motor 
vehicles, sailing ships by steamers, copper wire by 
mobile phones, or traditional corn by hybrid varieties. 
As mentioned, these processes should not be seen in a 
narrow technological sense but rather in their broader 
social, economic, institutional, cultural, and behavioral 
dimensions. Despite the enormous complexities and 
inherent differences of many of these transformational 
processes, there are some commonalities. Suffice 
it here to highlight the commonality of learning by 
doing or using. The new generally has much higher 
improvement potential in terms of fulfilling human 
needs, reducing some fundamental limits reached 
by the old such as environmental externalities (e.g., 
air pollution), substantive cost reduction, or ease of 
use, to mention just a few of the drivers of eventual 
replacement of the old. For example, the great manure 
crisis toward the end of the 18th century was a huge 
constraint on further expansion of the horse economy. 
At the turn of the century there were some 15 
million road horses in the USA (Nakicenovic 1990) and 
100,000 horses on the streets of New York producing 
about 1,000 tons of manure per day, literally mountains 
of manure. London, Paris, and other growing cities 
shared this unsurmountable challenge. This attracted 
huge numbers of flies which then spread typhoid fever 
and other diseases. Add to that the liter of urine per 
day and large numbers of horse carcasses, this vividly 
describes the limits of the horse economy. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that when motor 
vehicles arrived at the turn of the century, they rapidly 
replaced horses. In most of the leading economies 
around the world the substitution lasted about 30 
years so that by the 1930s the process was essentially 
completed. Figure 4 shows the Easter parade on 
5th Avenue in New York City in 1900 and 1915, 
respectively. In the former picture, only horses and 
carriages are visible and 15 years later only motor 
vehicles. This was a fundamental transformation of 
leading economies with deep changes in the industrial 
structure, employment, consumption patterns, 
institutions, regulation, behaviors, and so on. While 
it is true that motor vehicles produced unbearable 
Figure 4. Easter parade in New York City on 5th Avenue in 1900 and 1915. Source: Adapted from Campanale, 
Carbontracker. 1900: National Archives and Records Administration, Records of the Bureau of Public Roads. Image 30-
N-18827, https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/picturing_the_century/newcent/newcent_img1.html. 1915:  Library of 
Congress Image LC-B2- 2529-9, hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/pp.print.
Easter Parade on Fifth Avenue, New York, 13 years apart
1900: where's the car? 1913: where's the horse?
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smog and congestion once their numbers and densities 
increased by orders of magnitude some half a century 
later, originally, they were a solution to the unbearable 
negative environmental externalities of the horse 
economy.
Mobile phones, and more recently ‘smart’ 
phones, are another great example of disruptive 
transformations in the broader sense of human 
development. In merely three decades since their 
introduction, essentially everyone in the world now 
has a phone. There are 9.3 billion mobile phones for 
7.7 billion people. However, there are close to a billion 
people who do not have access to electricity but still 
need a phone! When introduced in 1992, the first 
digital GSM phone, the Motorola International 3200, 
cost €6,300 (adjusted value) with a provider contract,1 
meaning it was essentially unaffordable. Today a good 
smartphone may cost more than a hundred times 
less. This is a breathtaking systems improvement 
in a very short time brought about by a combination 
of technological progress in phone design and 
performance, development of standards and pervasive 
infrastructure, and massive changes in human 
behavior, so that today a smartphone can replace some 
50 analog devices. This comes not only at a fraction of 
the cost but also results in 100 times less energy and 
emissions, even the materials and embodied energy are 
about 25 times lower. Granular end-use technologies 
such as smartphones diffused much faster than other 
technologies, such as improved sanitation (Figure 5). 
Smartphones are used for banking, social networks, 
communication, selfies, and more recently as a most 
promising means of proximity measurement, namely 
social distancing, and contact tracing in fighting the 
spread of COVID-19. 
1 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motorola_
International_3200
A common feature of these rapid transformations 
is the enormous improvement across scales as the 
new diffuses through changes in technological, 
economic, social, institutional, cultural, and behavioral 
dimensions through learning processes. The effect 
of cumulative learning by doing and using is difficult 
to measure quantitatively. Failures are an important 
feature of innovations. Very few are successful, but 
most of the evidence describes winners and not losers. 
Qualitatively the evidence for learning is massive. 
One proxy is the costs of systems as a function of 
cumulative production or sales. As mentioned above, 
Wright (1936) measured the number of hours needed 
to assemble planes and showed that hours decreased 
dramatically as a function of cumulative shipments. It 
turns out that per doubling of cumulative shipments 
the number of hours required to make a plane (of 
the same type) declined by some 20%. Everyone has 
experienced this personally when acquiring new skills, 
be it typing, cooking, or writing scientific papers—with 
experience and learning it gets easier and less time is 
required. 
Learning phenomena are described in the form of 
learning or experience curves, where typically the unit 
costs of production decrease at a certain rate. Unit 
costs decrease along an exponential decay function. 
Because learning depends on the actual accumulation 
of experience and not just on the passage of time, 
learning or experience curves are generally described 
in the form of a power function where unit costs 
depend on cumulative experience, usually measured as 
cumulative output.
Technological learning is a classic example of 
increasing returns, that is, the more learning takes 
place, the better a technology's performance. It is 
the technology counterpart of the increasing returns 
resulting from the accumulation of knowledge or 
Figure 5. Digital technologies are spreading rapidly in developing countries. Technology diffusion comparison of cell 
phones and toilets for OECD countries and non-OECD countries. There are still about two billion people without access 
to sanitation and toilets while almost all have a mobile phone even though still close to a billion people do not have 
adequate access to electricity. Data source: World Bank WDI, CC BY. Source: Model fit and graphic courtesy of Arnulf 
Grubler, cfr. TWI2050 (2019), Figure 9.
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increases in human capital that are the focus of 
endogenous growth theory (e.g., Romer (1986), Romer 
(1990); or Grossman and Helpman (1991) and as 
discussed increasingly also in the technology domain 
(cf. Arthur (1983), Arthur (1989)).
Granularity and rapid innovations deployment
Rapid deployment of innovation and replacement 
of the old by new combinations depends on short 
diffusion timescales, attractive risk profiles for 
investors, and strong potential cost and performance 
improvements through learning. These conditions are 
interdependent. Deployment generates experience, 
which feeds back into technology improvement. 
Improving competitiveness and reducing investment 
risk stimulate adoption and compress the time taken for 
technologies to diffuse through markets and be adopted 
across different users. Clear expectations for market 
growth attract further investment and strengthen 
the rationale for policy support (Wilson et al. 2020a). 
These dynamics are evident in recent trajectories of 
rapid solar photovoltaic (PV) deployment as showing 
in Figure 6.
Figure 7 shows the cost reductions of a number of 
consumer goods and larger-scale technologies such 
as power plants as a function of cumulative market 
(adoption) doublings. Large differences in the learning 
rates are portrayed. Figure 7 shows that learning is 
faster for more ‘granular’ systems and technologies 
(Wilson et al. 2020a) with the learning rate on average 
about 20% in terms of cost reductions per doubling of 
cumulative units produced. In contrast the ‘lumpier,’ 
large-scale systems and technologies portray on 
average significantly lower learning rates of about 
10% per doubling of cumulative units produced. 
Some technologies like nuclear power plants display 
‘negative’ learning rates, where the cost increases with 
increasing number of installed plants!
The notion of ‘granularity’ is used to describe 
technologies in terms of scale—physical, economic, or 
both—and often this is also reflected in institutional, 
regulatory, and other processes associated with the 
respective innovations. More granular innovations 
typically have smaller and more variable unit sizes 
(e.g., in case of energy in terms of MW/unit) and lower 
unit investment costs in absolute terms (e.g., costs/
unit), and are more modular or divisible, so they are 
more likely to upscale through replication. In contrast 
‘lumpiness’ refers to larger units, higher unit investment 
costs, greater indivisibility, and more likelihood of 
Figure 6. Learning curves for a number of technologies including global photovoltaics with demonstrated cost 
reductions of two orders of magnitude, onshore wind (Denmark) and bioethanol (Brazil). Source: Updated from GEA 
(2012), Chapter 24 by Grubler et al. (2012a) and Wilson and Grubler (2014). Graphic courtesy of Arnulf Grubler.
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upscaling in unit size. Granular versus lumpy is clearly 
a continuum, not a binary categorization (Wilson et 
al. 2020a). Despite these caveats, the illustrations as 
reflected in the broader literature indicate that granular 
innovations can be expected to have significantly 
higher diffusion rates and thus shorter adoption 
times. Generally, they are also ‘closer’ to the consumer 
compared to the upstream lumpy ones where decisions 
of the consumer do not directly influence adoption but 
rather only indirectly through their demand for end-
use services. Consumers do not purchase power plants, 
microchip factories, trains, or planes.
More granular innovations can be expected to 
have faster diffusion, lower investment risk, faster 
learning, more opportunities to escape lock-in, more 
equitable access, high job creation, and larger social 
returns on innovation investment. In combination, 
these advantages enable rapid change. This is highly 
relevant for the role of innovations in the context 
of transformative change. It indicates that for rapid 
transformation to occur investments should be 
directed toward innovations with high learning and 
diffusion potentials. 
As such, this is also critically important for the 
achievement of the Six TWI2050 Transformations from 
digitalization to decarbonization and health. 
Digital Revolution
Digital technologies are examples of innovations 
with exceedingly rapid diffusion because they are 
granular, even though they are embedded in large and 
complex infrastructures and systems. Smartphones, 
AI, connectivity (the Internet of Things), digitalization 
of information, additive manufacturing (such as 3D 
printing), virtual or augmented reality, machine 
learning, blockchain, robotics, quantum computing, 
and synthetic biology are all examples of granular 
innovations. Digital technologies have spread rapidly in 
much of the world. They can be a powerful influence in 
helping overcome social inequalities, but they are also 
characterized by inequalities themselves (TWI2050 
2019). Large disparities in access to, usage of, and 
skills relevant for digital innovations exist, which 
are summarized as the ‘digital divide.’ Even more 
importantly, gaps also exist in the broader development 
benefits from using digital innovations. Digitalization 
has often boosted growth, expanded opportunities, 
and improved service delivery, yet the aggregate 
impact has fallen short of being inclusive and is thus 
unevenly distributed. Because of its generally granular 
nature and fast diffusion and learning rates, the Digital 
Revolution is already reshaping work, leisure, behavior, 
education, health, and governance and can facilitate the 
other five TWI2050 transformations (TWI2050 2019).
Digital technologies and innovations are disrupting 
production processes in nearly every sector of the 
Figure 7. Characteristics of accelerated low-carbon transformation on the granular-lumpy continuum. Data points in 
each panel represent an energy technology. Unit size and unit cost correlate strongly and are used interchangeably as 
measures of granularity on log horizontal axes. Vertical axes show measures of rapid technology deployment (panels 
(i) on diffusion timescale and (ii) on conventional learning) and escaping lock-in (panel (iii) on efficiency potential 
and (iv) on complexity). Panel (i) Dt, the time period over which a technology diffuses from 1 to 50% market share. 
Panel (ii) conventional learning rate, % cost reduction per doubling of cumulative capacity, conflates two drivers of cost 
reduction: unit-scale economies (more capacity per unit) and experience (more units). Descaled “true” learning rate, % 
cost reduction per doubling of cumulative numbers of units, strips out the effects of unit-scale economies on cost trends. R2 and p values denoted by asterisks describe simple bivariate model fits (*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001). Source: 
Adapted from Wilson et al. (2020a). 
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economy, from agriculture (precision agriculture), 
transport (self-driving cars), mining (autonomous 
vehicles), manufacturing (robotics, 3D printing), 
retail (e-commerce), finance (e-payments, AI trading 
strategies), media (social networks), health (AI 
diagnostics, telemedicine, drug discovery, social 
distancing apps), education (online learning, virtual 
classrooms—now becoming mainstream during the 
COVID-19 lockdowns), and public administration 
(e-governance, e-voting). In general, these 
contributions can raise labor, energy, resource, and 
carbon productivity, lower production costs, expand 
access to services, and dematerialize production, but 
they can leave many behind without proper policy 
frameworks and social ‘escape hatches.’ 
There are also clear dangers and downsides to the 
Digital Revolution, including the loss of jobs, rising 
inequality, and the further shift of income from labor 
to capital. With automation and advances in AI and 
robotics, many more workers, even those highly skilled, 
may find their jobs and earnings under threat. While 
new jobs might replace old ones, the new jobs may 
come with lower real earnings and poorer working 
conditions. The fears about increasing inequalities 
have given rise to renewed interest in a guaranteed 
minimum income. 
There are several other perceived threats from 
the Digital Revolution. Digital identities can be stolen, 
or artificial identities can be created. Proprietary 
digital information can be stolen especially with the 
diffusion of 3D printing where complete information 
about manufacturing is stored digitally and could 
be used to circumvent export and import barriers 
by manufacturing locally. Governments and private 
businesses can invade privacy and monitor individuals 
against their will or without their knowledge. A few 
digital portals may use their advantages in amassing 
big data to gain a dominant monopoly position in their 
respective markets (e-commerce, digital advertising, 
social media, cloud services, etc.). Cyberattacks or 
cyberwarfare can interrupt or degrade private and 
public service delivery. Social media can be manipulated, 
undermining democratic processes. The personal use 
of online technologies can be addictive and cause the 
onset of depressive disorders. Special dangers relate to 
advanced weaponry. The most fundamental question 
is whether the Digital Revolution as a self-evolving 
evolutionary process that has generated huge global 
monopolies is even amenable to ‘social steering.’
The Digital Revolution will have even deeper 
impacts on our societies, creating a next generation 
of sustainability challenges. General purpose AI and 
other digital technologies will be used in more and 
more decision-making processes embedded in devices 
(like self-driving cars), in our economies (in banks, 
trading firms, stock markets), and in our societies 
(in courts, parliaments, health care organizations, 
and security organizations such as police and army), 
complementing, substituting, and challenging human-
driven decision-making processes. We need to learn to 
manage and control the next generations of AI, machine 
learning, and (semi)autonomous technical systems and 
to align those with our normative settings. Moreover, 
the digital transformation will redefine our concept of 
us as humans. In the Anthropocene humans became 
the main drivers of Earth system changes. In the digital 
Anthropocene humans will also start to transform 
themselves, enhancing cognitive and brain capacities 
into what can be called ‘Homo digitalis.’ Humanity is 
moving toward new civilizational thresholds. Super-
intelligent machines might even develop a life of their 
own, with the capacity to harm human agents. Like 
in humans, machine pandemics and system failures 
may cause threats to human wellbeing like the great 
economic depressions in the past.
The digital transformation calls for a comprehensive 
set of regulatory and normative frameworks, physical 
infrastructure, and digital systems, to capture the 
benefits of the Digital Revolution while avoiding the 
many potential downsides. An essential priority should 
be to develop STI roadmaps to better understand the 
potential benefits and dangers of digitalization. The 
principles of digital transformation for sustainable 
development have yet to be written. 
Decarbonization through innovations
Energy systems have been decarbonizing since the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution. The replacement 
of traditional energy sources by coal eventually 
improved the overall efficiency of the systems and 
reduced carbon intensity (coal has less carbon than 
biomass per unit energy). Further evolution toward 
energy-dense oil and gas yet again reduced the carbon 
intensity of energy. For example, natural gas has half 
the emissions compared to coal and the power plants 
are more granular. The pervasive decarbonization 
continued with the current rapid penetration of 
renewables, such as wind and photovoltaics, due to 
their generally granular nature and rapid learning, 
together with the contributions of lumpy nuclear and 
large hydropower. Renewables, nuclear, and large 
hydropower can be characterized as being near-zero 
emissions systems. Thus, the pathway is clear, although 
it is not fast enough to offset increases in demand so 
that in absolute terms emissions are still increasing 
at historical rates. The granular nature of renewables 
offers the possibility of continued replacement of fossil 
fuels; however, there is significant inertia in the system 
due to the lumpiness of fossil technologies.
However, the major disruption caused by COVID-19 
may lead to a major rethinking about the inertia and 
the benefits of large-scale fossil dependence. As energy 
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demand has plummeted through reduced production 
and mobility, air and water are cleaner, congestion is 
reduced, and biodiversity is rebounding with animals 
appearing in places never seen before (see Chapter 3). 
It is indeed possible that the advantages of a sustainable 
future for all will become clearer and more desirable. 
This would further enhance the chance of zero-carbon, 
granular innovations. 
Furthermore, a shift toward renewables is also a shift 
toward smaller units, with large potential for learning 
and price reductions (see Chapter 3). For example, 
Figure 7 has shown that the costs of photovoltaics 
have declined by two orders of magnitude, and wind is 
today often the cleanest and cheapest source of energy. 
Granularity and decentralization need a higher degree 
of interconnectedness of the system through grids, 
together with rapid deployment of smart systems and 
digitalization. Electric mobility and ever more efficient 
houses and industrial processes are furthering 
this trend toward efficiency, decarbonization, and 
digitalization (TWI2050 2019).
More granular technologies offer larger potential 
efficiency gains, particularly for individual and 
household users for whom energy input costs have 
proven less salient than for industrial users of more 
lumpy technologies (Wilson et al. 2020a). Improving 
the efficiency of end-use technologies leverages more 
than proportionate improvements in overall system 
efficiency. Currently, one unit of energy saved through 
end-use efficiency avoids the need for 3.2 units of 
primary energy resource (Wilson et al. 2020a).
Across developing nations, solar, microhydro power 
generators, hybrid systems (of many components), 
batteries, and smaller diesel generators are part of a 
large suite of reliable, cost-effective energy sources 
that can enable the full suite of energy services—
lighting, cooking, heating, and air-conditioning as well 
as productive services for small, medium, and even 
large enterprises (NASEM 2019a).
Moreover, it has become increasingly apparent 
that the provision of modern low emissions energy 
that is affordable and reliable, is a critical building 
block for achieving other SDGs, a high quality of life 
and wellbeing, through improvements in education, 
health, food production, clean water, sanitation, and 
increasing resilience to climate change, security, and 
safety (NASEM 2019a) (Figure 8).  
Today’s reliable, affordable, and resilient energy 
options are driving a new paradigm of heterogeneity. 
Distributed solutions today offer increasingly 
compelling economics for those without access to 
traditional energy carriers, suggesting a fundamental 
reconsideration of infrastructure policies, energy 
access solutions, and economics that do not rely on 
uniform—or old and outdated—assumptions of energy 
systems, and embracing a portfolio of solutions versus 
singular approaches.
Smaller-scale renewable-based energy systems are 
becoming increasingly attractive economically, offering 
rapid scalability and applicability to serve growing 
energy demands and provide critical services (such 
as communications, lighting, and water pumping/
Figure 8. Energy within the building blocks of human security. Source: adapted from Eric Rasmus, Infinitum Humanitarian 
Systems.  
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purification—all that enable healthier, productive lives, 
education, reduced child/women labor, etc.). Utility-
scale variable renewable systems offer the potential 
to substantially reduce local air pollution, drastically 
cut GHG emissions, and provide reliable energy at 
low cost. Application of the appropriate mix of these 
heterogeneous energy systems offer developing 
countries another opportunity for leapfrogging. Much 
as cell phones and wireless communications have 
transformed communications in developing countries, 
distributed, affordable, and clean energy systems offer 
a compelling opportunity to leapfrog traditional energy 
paradigms.
Clean energy solutions, particularly renewable 
electricity technologies, have expanded globally over 
the past decade and offer an unprecedented opportunity 
to enable sustainable energy solutions across the globe 
(NASEM 2018). In most locations, renewable-based 
solutions are the most cost competitive option for new 
power, and in many locations, solutions are hybridized 
with battery storage to provide additional flexibility 
and critical services for grid management. Today, 
renewables supply nearly a third of global electricity 
capacity (IRENA 2020), with annual capacity additions 
growing from a few GW nearly a decade ago to over 
170GW in 2018. With total installed fossil electricity 
capacity estimated at ~4.5TW, renewables have an 
opportunity to replace approximately half that total in 
the next 10 years (at today’s annual installation rates) 
and possibly greater, implying significant reductions in 
GHG emissions from the power sector. High renewable-
based solutions have been realized in multiple 
jurisdictions, breaking down myths that represent 
uninformed barriers to advancement, and lessons can 
be applied across the globe.
Agriculture through innovations
Agriculture is now a dominant force behind 
many environmental threats. The development of 
‘industrialized’ agriculture has met the need to feed 
an increasing population with higher-quality foods, 
through increases in yields, productivity, and efficiency, 
and more nutritious crops. The grand challenge of our 
times is reducing agriculture’s environmental harm. 
A significant reformulation of food production and 
forestry are necessary if we aim at meeting society’s 
growing food needs while simultaneously keeping 
human activities within planetary boundaries. 
Today’s agriculture routinely uses sophisticated 
technologies such as robots, temperature and moisture 
sensors, aerial images, information technology, robotic 
systems, global positioning systems (GPS) technology, 
and molecular biotechnology. These advances allow 
businesses to be more productive, efficient, profitable, 
safer, and more environmentally friendly. Desired 
benefits include: 
• Decreased use of water, fertilizer, and pesticides, 
which in turn lower food prices
• Higher labor productivity, effectivity, and efficiency
• Higher crop productivity while increasing the 
efficiency of natural resources use and reducing 
environmental impact
• Less runoff of chemicals into rivers and groundwater, 
lower pesticides and herbicides use
• Reduced impact on natural ecosystems, restoration 
and reforestation of abandoned lands, biodiversity 
recovery
• Increased worker safety
However, industrial agriculture has created many 
side effects that still need to be confronted, including 
excessive deforestation, loss of biodiversity, soil erosion, 
chemical pollution, direct and indirect contributions to 
GHGs, and global warming. Today, agriculture should 
conceptually be understood as a partnership with our 
biosphere instead of an extraction industry. Vigorous 
innovation lags or is lacking altogether in areas that are 
not immediately profitable to the market, mainly in the 
developed world. 
Innovation opportunities for sustainable ocean 
development
The High-Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy 
estimates that innovative ocean solutions can contribute 
25% of the desired climate change mitigation (Hoegh-
Guldberg et al. 2019) and stresses its importance for 
human wellbeing and livelihoods providing food, 
marine genetic resources, energy, minerals, and human 
health. The global ‘ocean economy,’ which includes all 
maritime transport, fishing, offshore oil and gas, and 
tourism, is projected to double its size to $3 trillion 
by 2030 (OECD 2016). The majority of the world’s 
megacities (15 of the 23 most populated cities in 2015 
(Blackburn et al. 2019)) are situated at the coasts. 
Greater than average population growth in the coastal 
zones will lead to more than one billion inhabitants by 
2050 (Merkens et al. 2016) supported by rapid coastal 
development (Sengupta et al. 2018). How will this 
largest human system interact with the largest physical 
system on the planet in a sustainable way promoting 
prosperity and resilience (Mega and Mega 2019)?
Many countries have developed blue growth and 
innovation strategies, anticipating growth of their 
ocean portfolio including ocean energy, mineral 
resource extraction, fisheries and aquaculture, coastal 
tourism, transport, and marine biotechnology. 
To ensure that ‘blue innovations’ become ‘green’—
which means sustainable and equitable—and 
economically and ecologically balanced, integrated, 
transdisciplinary and cross-sectoral innovation is 
needed, bringing together natural, social sciences 
and humanities as well as policymakers, resource 
managers, private and public sector, and society at 
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large. Sustainable development of ocean use urgently 
needs coherent and consistent governance across all 
regions and sectors of human activities interacting 
with the ocean, particularly for rapidly growing 
coastal regions. The UN Decade of Ocean Science for 
Sustainable Development (2021–2030) has set out to 
connect science, knowledge, and development to build 
the needed capacity and cooperation around the globe 
(Pendleton et al. 2020). 
Health through innovations
Innovations have always played an important role in 
health systems. Hygiene and social distancing were 
recognized early as essential for fighting infection. The 
advent of antibiotics and modern surgery brought a 
paradigm shift in health care systems. More recently, 
imaging technologies, from X-rays and computed 
tomography scans (formerly known as a computerized 
axial tomography, CAT) to nuclear magnetic resonance 
(NMR) scans, have improved diagnostics and led to 
a major reduction in invasive procedures. This was 
accompanied by enabling institutional innovations to 
bring health care to increasingly more people though 
pervasive medical coverage in many parts of the world. 
Digital medicine involves new revolutionary 
technologies and algorithms, combining the fields 
of traditional ‘Western’ medicine, computer science, 
robotics, and applied mathematics (TWI2050 2019). 
Recent trends range from new technologies and 
business models to mobile health, telemedicine, 3D 
printing, robotic surgery, computer-assisted diagnoses, 
gene therapy, and virtual reality (for more detail see 
TWI2050 2019).
Telemedicine has the potential to reduce inequalities 
in access to modern medicine and medical practitioners 
experienced in many parts of the world, particularly 
in remote communities, and will help overcome the 
shortage of qualified health professionals, reduce 
travel and waiting times for patients, resulting is large 
savings for the health system. The use of telemedicine 
services has increased dramatically during the 
COVID-19 pandemic with patients discouraged from 
personal face-to-face visits to general practitioners in 
an effort to limit the spread of the virus.
In response to surging demand for medical 
equipment to deal with COVID-19, 3D makerspaces 
around the world started production of face shields 
and respiration devices, in close coordination 
with hospitals and health workers (McCue 2020). 
Furthermore, several bottom-up hackathons and open 
innovation challenges2 have been organized to find 
digital solutions to ease the pressure in the field calling 
users, consumers, or individuals or firms with ideas 
and equipment to collaborate in meeting the demand 
to combat social challenges. These clearly illustrate the 
2 For example: https://covid19challenge.mit.edu/ 
potential of such initiatives, given the spread of digital 
technologies such as 3D printers and scanners, in 
addition to information communication technologies 
(ICT) to diffuse and share the design concepts. 
Computer modeling and big data are increasingly 
used for drug discovery, which taken together with 
advances in synthetic biology, offers the possibility of 
not only discovering new drugs and therapies, but also 
making them personalized and cheap to manufacture. 
AI is being used extensively in the current quest to 
rapidly develop a vaccine for COVID-19 and in general 
for better disease diagnostics and treatment. 
Taken together these technologies will have 
significant impact on the global health system for both 
patients and providers. Undoubtedly this will lead to 
better health outcomes and improvements in human 
wellbeing and quality of life. However, this revolution 
is not without risk. 
A prerequisite of digital medicine is that a patient’s 
health records need to be digitized and accessible 
across the health system. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that cyber security is becoming a major challenge with 
the rapid development and diffusion of digital medicine. 
The world has recently experienced a multitude of data 
breaches and, unfortunately, the health care industry 
was a major target. According to the Identity Theft 
Resource Center Data Breach Report 2017, health care 
is the second biggest contributing industry with 334 
breaches in 2017 (ITRC 2018); the third industry to 
expose most records was health care; and the health 
care industry was hit hardest by hacking, skimming, 
and phishing attacks. 
In many cases, patients are now choosing to leave 
the health care providers that have failed to protect 
their data or electing not to have their health records 
digitized. According to Accenture (2015), more 
than 6 million people are victims of medical identity 
theft annually. Of particular concern is the use of a 
person’s health record by third-party external entities 
to deny people basic services, such as insurance or 
employment. These issues highlight just how critical 
compliance and security are to the health care world. 
The introduction of a contact tracing app for COVID-19 
in the Republic of Singapore3 to help reduce the spread 
of the virus resulted in less than 20% uptake by the 
population due to privacy concerns. A minimum 40% 
uptake was required for it to be useful in reducing the 
spread (Criddle and Kelion 2020). 
As with all digital technologies, the potential 
for improvements in the health care sector and 
achievement of SDG3, will depend on global equitable 
access to these technologies.
3  For readability, only ‘Singapore’ will be used in the remainder 
of this report.
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It is interesting to note the impact of the current 
COVID-19 pandemic on the uptake and diffusion of 
previously limited or niche innovations. The shutdown 
of economies and implementation of strict personal 
distancing measures across the world has seen the 
rapid deployment of online learning for students, 
telemedicine, remote working and telecommuting 
through videoconferencing, 3D printing of personal 
protective equipment, and AI for vaccine development 
to name just a few. Although global economies are 
forecast to shrink dramatically as a result of the 
pandemic it could be argued that the impacts could 
have been much more significant if these granular 
technologies were not ‘on the shelf ready to go.’ It has 
been suggested that many of these innovations will 
become the ‘new normal’ post-COVID-19 (see Box 11). 
It is unfortunate that it takes a global pandemic to 
highlight the advantages and efficiency of these 
innovations.
2.4. Epidemics, pandemics, and 
innovation
Disease epidemics and pandemics have often 
had devastating impacts on health, societies, and 
economies. Although with a very different mortality 
rate, elements of the COVID-19 pandemic are reflected 
in pandemics of the plague (black death) throughout 
history. The bacillus that causes that disease, Yersinia 
pestis, is transmitted by fleas associated with rats. The 
disease has three forms, of which the bubonic form has 
a 40%–70% fatality rate and the pneumonic form is 
generally fatal without treatment. Significant research 
efforts led to the discovery of the causative bacterium 
in 1894 (Butler 2014).
There were at least three major pandemics: the 
Justinian plague around the Mediterranean in the 6th 
century AD, the black death in Europe in the 14th 
century, and the epidemic in the Republic of India4 and 
China during the middle of the 19th century (Stenseth 
et al. 2008). In western Europe, about one third of the 
population died between 1348 and 1350 from the 
plague (Slack 1989). Mortality of 25% or more of the 
urban populations was common; for example, 60% 
of the population of Genoa was likely to have died in 
1656–1657. The black death had a major impact on 
Europe’s socioeconomic development, culture, art, 
religion, science, and politics. There were other major 
epidemics around the world. 
Efforts to control plague pandemics are echoed in 
the actions being taken to control COVID-19, including 
travel bans (the pandemic may have started in Asia and 
then traveled by ship), isolation of cases, contact tracing, 
mass burials, and proposals for unusual treatments 
(Slack 1989, Zietz and Dunkelberg 2004, Signoli 2012). 
4  For readability, only ‘India’ will be used in the remainder of 
this report.
The term ‘quarantine’ is Venetian in origin based on 
the 40-day travel restrictions imposed in Venice in the 
1370s. Recognizing the risks to health professionals, 
personal protection equipment, including a long 
cape and complex mask, were designed based on the 
prevailing miasma theory of disease transmission 
(Mussap 2019). Other innovations were improvements 
in living conditions that moved people away from 
animals into, for example, brick houses that are less 
hospitable to rats, measures to rat-proof dwellings, 
and public education about the disease, including 
publishing regular lists of the numbers and causes 
of deaths (Greenberg 1997, Zietz and Dunkelberg 
2004). In Seville in 1582, the city council imposed 
plague restrictions that attempted to balance medical 
concerns with economic interests (Bowers 2007); the 
restrictions included quarantines and travel bans, along 
with open lines of communication with residents and 
individual exemptions to maintain selected economic 
activities.
The world is deploying significant resources to 
bring the COVID-19 pandemic under control, including 
new investments into health systems to increase 
their resilience to unexpected challenges. While this 
is certainly needed, the history of population health 
indicates the sustainability of these investments over 
time is not assured. One example is the history of the 
control of yellow fever. Yellow fever is a viral disease 
primarily transmitted to humans by the mosquito 
Aedes aegypti. Mortality from yellow fever is high; 
of the 15% of cases that develop severe illness, the 
case fatality rate is 20%–60% (CDC 2018). There 
were widespread epidemics of yellow fever starting 
at least in the 17th century. The geographic range of 
yellow fever expanded with shipping and commerce 
(Gubler 2004). At the beginning of the 20th century, 
construction of the Panama Canal was at a standstill 
because of the high prevalence of yellow fever (PAHO 
2020b). Effective control of Aedes aegypti was central 
to successful completion of the canal. This continued 
until the last 25 years of the 20th century when there 
was a resurgence of Aedes aegypti. Factors contributing 
to this resurgence include a failure to maintain vector 
control programs. It had become increasingly difficult 
to convince policymakers to support programs to 
eliminate a mosquito when the numbers of cases of the 
diseases it carried had declined dramatically. Figure 9 
shows the geographic distribution of Aedes aegypti in 
the Americas in 1930, 1970, and 2004 (Gubler 2004). 
One consequence of this resurgence was an increase 
in another disease carried by Aedes: dengue fever. In 
2019, there were more than 3 million cases of dengue 
fever in the Americas (PAHO 2020a); this far exceeded 
the previous largest epidemic in the region when 2.4 
million cases were reported in 2015.
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Responses to COVID-19 are furthering traditional 
public health approaches, from rapid testing kits to new 
ways to manage pulmonary damage to vaccines. These 
will interact with other trends; examples include the 
speed of innovation, use of big data and AI, digitization, 
and miniaturization. For example, the importance 
of contact tracing is leading to the use of cell phone 
data to monitor the movement of individuals—and to 
discussions on how to balance the need for privacy 
with the need for information useful to control the 
pandemic. Figure 10 shows the difference across 
countries in confirmed cases and COVID-19 deaths. 
Investments in health systems, particularly weak 
systems in low-resource settings, and science-
informed decision making and implementation 
could be intentionally focused on increasing the 
sustainability and resiliency of these systems in 
ways that could support achieving transformations 
to achieve SDG3, which would support achieving the 
other SDGs and fighting COVID-19 (see Box 4).
2.5. Innovation investment and financing
As the future is inherently unpredictable, and to 
an extent a function of human intentionality in the 
Anthropocene, arguably the direction and magnitude 
of investments will help shape the evolutionary 
changes in the decades to come. Trillions of dollars 
have been pledged for economic stimulus to revive 
economies around the world after the unprecedented 
and deliberate shutdown in order to overcome the 
COVID-19 crisis. Sachs (2020) argues that this is a 
display of “intellectual confusion of the moment by 
labeling as ‘stimulus’ the legislation to pay workers 
and firms during this shutdown period. This is not 
stimulus, but [needed] income maintenance during 
a temporary society-wide quarantine.” Indeed, the 
Figure 9. The changing epidemiology of yellow fever and dengue, 1900 to 2003: full circle? Comparative immunology 
microbiology and infectious diseases. Source: Gubler (2004).
Figure 10. Total confirmed COVID-19 deaths vs cases, 2 July 2020. The number of confirmed cases is lower than the 
number of total cases. The main reason for this is limited testing. Source: European CDC Situation Update Worldwide 
graph by OurWorldInData.org/coronavirus CC BY.
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post-COVID-19 economic crisis may be as deep and 
fundamental as the Great Depression a century ago, 
which sent humanity on a new development pathway 
that brought the ‘Great Acceleration’ after the Second 
World War. Clearly, the solutions of the 1930s are not 
relevant to meet today’s challenges but we argue that 
humanity is at a crossroads, that there is a window 
in which we might embark on a just and sustainable 
future within planetary boundaries, but also a possible 
retrograde or a return to the ‘old normal.’ 
Innovation toward sustainability is a cumulative 
transformation that needs to be sustained and ‘socially 
steered.’ With appropriate governance, norms, 
values, and behaviors, it could bring efficiency and 
sufficiency needed for prosperity and wellbeing for 
all (see Chapters 3 and 4). Investments are essential 
for achieving such as sustained and pervasive 
transformational change. 
Total global investment is about 23% of economic 
output, or about $28 trillion purchasing power parity 
(PPP) per year. It has varied, with a high of over 
25% in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis 
and subsequent economic depression (World Bank 
2020). Global R&D investment is estimated at some $2 
trillion PPP per year (IRI 2016) or about 10% of total 
investment or 2% of global economic output. 
Figure 11 shows human and financial resources 
devoted across counties and major word regions toward 
R&D as an indicator of investments in innovation and 
a proxy for countries’ capacity for transformative 
change. The size of the circles is proportional to R&D 
expenditure while the horizonal axis shows R&D 
share of the GDP and the vertical axis the number of 
researches per thousand employees. The State of Israel 
and the Republic of Korea5 lead by a wide margin on 
both yardsticks, while China and the USA lead in terms 
of absolute expenditures. This comparison is a proxy for 
innovative capacity because these efforts are sustained 
over time growing gradually from year to year. What is 
not shown is the distribution or the direction of their 
expenditures which would be stronger indicators of 
transformative potential. 
5 For readability,  ‘South Korea’ will be used in the remainder 
of this report.
Box 4. Digitalization capabilities and COVID-19—social technology and innovation.
The digital capabilities of Taiwan, Province of China,a) helped enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its response systems, and 
coupled with citizen science and various social initiatives, allowed to develop effective governmental and community strategies 
to contain the outbreak. It involved three complementary measures: effective distribution of face masks, comprehensive testing, 
and self-isolation measures.
A Social Distancing App which uses AI and Bluetooth wireless communications protocols was also developed to alert users 
on their mobile phones if they come too close to one another based on the 1.5 meters indoor and one-meter outdoor proximity 
guidelines. Privacy is also protected as users are not required to register and data is not stored in the cloud, while a new hashed 
ID generated every 15 minutes prevents user recognition. Users who choose to upload their data onto the server to assist in 
contact tracing can do so anonymously, with the data deleted after seven days (Chang 2020). 
The wearing of face masks has become a crucial preventive tool against the spread of the COVID-19 virus worldwide. 
Developing quickly the capability to produce its own masks and a rationing system for their distribution has shown helpful. The 
digitalization of the National Health Insurance database, and the “the infrastructure upgrades and data management experience 
accumulated over the years,” also enabled the surgical mask rationing database and online system to be quickly set up (Ngerng 
2020). The first component for the rationing was the Pharmacloud system that was initiated in 2013 to store medical records 
in the cloud for health care decentralization. The second was the online g0v community, a decentralized civic tech community 
that grew out of the Sunflower Movement that started in 2014. It facilitated the growth of open-source communities that use 
open data and civil technologies to promote participatory governance. Through this, citizens with IT skills and engineers, using 
National Health Insurance (NHI) data, developed online maps with real-time availability of masks. This resulted in a variety of 
maps for different target audiences. 
Stringent testing protocols were an effective way to contain COVID-19. The Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC), which 
was activated to coordinate inter-ministerial responses, integrated travel history data from the National Immigration Agency 
(NIA) with the Pharmacloud system. This allowed doctors to determine if patients with respiratory symptoms and those who 
traveled abroad should be tested for the coronavirus. The database integration also enabled the back tracing of patient records 
and travel history for retrospective testing when required. 
Self-isolation and home quarantine are another effective line of defense to fight COVID-19, and the CECC tasked Chunghwa 
Telecom to develop an ‘electronic disease prevention platform’ where GPS data from mobile phones using the triangulation of 
base station data could be used to track people’s whereabouts, whereby people who leave their homes would receive warning 
messages which are also sent to the police and health agencies. However, this tracking platform and the integration of medical 
and travel databases have increased privacy concerns, though the government has claimed that the Communicable Disease 
Control Act and the Special Act on COVID-19 Prevention, Relief and Restoration gives the CECC the authorization to enforce such 
disease prevention measures where required. 
a) For readability, only ‘Taiwan’ will be used in the remainder of this report.
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R&D intensity—gross expenditure on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP—is one of several indicators used as 
targets to measure progress toward achieving SDG9 on 
innovation and is also an indicator of STI’s capacity to 
fulfill the Six Transformations. Growth in R&D intensity 
was widespread across the majority of OECD countries 
in 2018, with the USA, Japan, Germany, and South 
Korea accounting for much of the increase. In some 
countries, such as Canada and the Kingdom of Sweden, 
R&D expenditure remained stagnant (OECD 2020a). 
An important development, according to the OECD 
STI database, is that in terms of PPP and recent trends, 
China may already account for the largest volume 
of R&D expenditure in the world (OECD 2020a). Yet 
when comparing economies based on exchange rate 
conversions to a common currency, there is still a 
very significant gap between China and the USA, with 
R&D expenditure in the former only 50% of the latter. 
Other OECD indicators complement this comparison. 
In 2018, the USA had 23% more top-cited publications 
(top 10% of cited publications within a given field) 
than China, despite having a lower number of indexed 
publications. Selected OECD Patent Statistics indicate 
that China overtook Japan in 2017 for the second most 
patent applications, behind the USA. Based on recent 
trends, China’s patent applications may have surpassed 
the USA in 2019, or even as early as 2018. 
All of these indicators are ‘input’ measures 
of expenditure in STI, patent applications, and 
publications and as such are extremely relevant for 
assessing innovative capacities, but they are only 
proxies as they do not measure the ‘output,’ namely 
knowledge creation and innovative activities. Learning 
curves are another way of assessing progress of 
innovation but these are limited to certain measurable 
examples and do not give a holistic systems view for 
whole economies or the world. 
Equally important for assessing innovation is the 
direction and structure of expenditures and activities. 
Generally, the private sector continues to be the 
main global driver of R&D efforts and investments 
in general. The private sector accounts for 71% of 
all R&D performance in the OECD and saw its R&D 
expenditure increase by 4.2% in 2018. R&D investment 
in the higher education sector grew by 2.3%, while 
those by governments rose by 4.0%—the highest rate 
since 2009. Yet, R&D performance among government 
institutions remains only 13% higher than it was 
before the onset of the global financial crisis—on par 
with 2010 levels—and accounts for less than 10% of 
OECD R&D expenditure (OECD 2020b). 
An important principle is the subsidiarity that holds 
that social, political, and economic issues should be 
dealt with at the most immediate level that is consistent 
with their resolution. In the case of investments, this 
would involve the private sector consisting primarily 
of businesses, but also NGOs and foundations in the 
case of R&D. Yet, economic theory shows that the 
private sector generally underinvests in fundamental 
R&D and even more chronically in public goods such 
a health care, education, infrastructure, and social 
expenditures, because of difficulties of appropriating 
any gains achieved. The private sector is driven by 
profits realized in markets and not necessarily by social 
and public good, although there are increasing numbers 
of enterprises that include such considerations in 
their investment and R&D decisions. Hence there are 
some salient reasons why increasing government 
expenditures and support of transformative change are 
called for.
Figure 11. Human and financial resources devoted across counties and major word regions toward R&D, 2017, as an 
indicator of investments in innovation. The size of the circles is proportional to R&D expenditure while the horizonal 
axis shows R&D share of the GDP and the vertical axis the number of researches per thousand employees. Source: OECD 
(2020a). 
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In fact, government expenditure for R&D overall 
should grow substantially in 2020 in the aftermath of 
‘stimulus’ expenditures in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic and economic recovery in its aftermath. 
Chapter 4 estimates the total government stimulus 
commitments at approximately $7 trillion—a figure 
that is close to three times the size of the estimates of 
the $2.5 trillion funding gap per year for achieving the 
SDGs and the Six Transformations calculated prior to 
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
As mentioned, R&D intensity and other R&D 
indicators are useful as proxies for progress toward 
achieving SDG9. However, the 2030 Agenda is 
holistic, requiring a broader perspective to assess 
the full contribution of STI to the SDGs and the Six 
Transformations. Public funding of R&D is often needed 
to support the development of radically new solutions 
that help attain more than one objective at once and 
create multiple co-benefits (TWI2050 2018, OECD 
2020b). R&D budget data do not have the granularity 
of some SDGs. STI efforts can ultimately affect several 
SDGs at once—especially in the case of basic research—
but the channels by which this happens can take several 
years to materialize into concrete solutions and will 
likely require additional investments (OECD 2020b). 
Figure 12 presents tentative, experimental mapping 
of OECD government R&D support onto four SDG 
clusters. This clustering treats government support 
for the general advancement of knowledge and R&D 
tax incentives as related to STI for SDGs. Support for 
industry and knowledge has been the fastest growing 
category since consistent records have been available. 
More recently, growth in R&D funding has focused on 
defense spending, which is identified here with the 
SDG on security. Funding directed toward health and 
society reached a peak in 2009, while there has been 
limited growth in support for R&D on planet and 
infrastructure SDGs (OECD 2020a). Hopefully, there 
will be an increase of funding in these critical areas in 
the future. Chapter 3 gives estimates for investment 
needs to achieve SDG targets related to basic human 
needs. COVID-19 has created a window of opportunity 
to allocate stimulus funds toward sustainability 
transformations and policies promoting efficiency, 
sufficiency, and innovation. Whether financial resources 
are distributed for more sustainable purposes is not 
guaranteed; however, this will depend on policy and 
political reforms discussed in Chapter 4.
2.6. Science, technology, and innovation 
for sustainable development
Sience, Technology and Innovation (STI) are at the core 
of human development. They have greatly contributed 
to the explosive development since the onset of the 
Industrial Revolution such as the doubling of life 
expectancy, secondary education for half of humanity, 
and wellbeing for billions. However, they have also 
brought about negative impacts on the environment 
and society. While all negative externalities and impacts 
cannot be anticipated, STI can and should focus on 
supporting the achievement of the SDGs. In particular, 
public STI policy needs to internalize this overarching 
goal for enabling and achieving the 2030 Agenda. 
Since the UN member states agreed the SDGs in 
2015, STI has been expected to play a major role to 
address these goals and targets, but for that to happen 
Figure 12. Estimate of total government support for R&D in the OECD countries by SDG-related categories, 1990–2018. 
It indicates the largest increase in industry and knowledge followed by health and society with a slight increase for 
planet and infrastructure and a slight decline for security which includes defense. Source: OECD (2020a).
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traditional values and methodologies of STI need to be 
redesigned and transformed. 
Various agencies, including the UN Interagency 
Task Team on STI for the SDGs (UN-IATT), the UN-
science advisory committee, IIASA, OECD, EU, and 
Japan have been developing, analyzing, and proposing 
new thoughts, frameworks, and methodologies to 
redesign the STI ecosystem for innovation, efficiency, 
and sufficiency for achievement of SDGs; such as the 
Guidebook of STI for SDGs Roadmaps, GSDR2019, 
TWI2050 , Mission-oriented policy analysis, and EU 
Smart Specialisation Strategies and Society 5.0.
Based on these proposed frameworks, it is time 
for us to put into practice the ways and means of 
implementing pathways to achieving the SDGs goals 
at global, regional, national, and subnational levels 
(TWI2050 2018). The global STI community is now 
under great pressure to transform modern science 
and technology, its policies and systems that have been 
built over the past 200 years.
Research systems and organizations based on 
traditional social and industrial structures, lifestyles, 
culture, and science and technology areas need to be 
redesigned for the age of SDGs and beyond; from agenda 
setting processes, funding, and evaluation systems, 
to human resource development methods and career 
paths. It is necessary to diversify R&D investment 
and priorities according to actual needs and context. 
Collaboration between natural sciences, humanities, 
and social sciences is essential. Cooperation between 
supply and demand sides and combination of top-
down and bottom-up approaches is important.
We need to accumulate, share, and feed back those 
efforts for reflection and transformation. It is necessary 
in parallel to recognize the importance of preserving 
basic science, and dialogue between policymakers 
and researchers. Building trust and keeping scientific 
quality, integrity, and code of conduct is also important. 
However, initiating transformation is difficult 
due to institutional inertia by incumbent actors with 
vested interests and consumers/users with habits 
of following routines. In addition, the globalization 
of economic and social activities that has occurred 
over past decades has created intricate webs of 
activities, making transformation a complex process. 
Furthermore, existing studies indicate that current 
policy instruments are either absent or ineffective for 
achieving the magnitude of transformation needed in 
the expected timeframe (Weber and Rohracher 2012, 
Kivimaa and Kern 2016, Kern et al. 2017). This means 
that unless there are substantially advantageous 
(simple, low cost, superior, and universal) alternatives 
offered to individuals, achieving change is going to be 
difficult (Steward 2012). 
How STI can inform policymaking about SDG 
interlinkages 
The 2030 Agenda is unique in that the implementation 
should adhere to principles of indivisibility and 
universality. Yet, the 2030 Agenda does not specify 
what characterizes its indivisible nature, which 
interactions exist between the SDGs, the nature of 
these interactions, or what they imply for policy and 
decision making. Neither does it provide guidance on 
how to identify or address potential spillover effects 
and cross-scale interactions. The fast-emerging field 
of what could be referred to as SDG interaction studies 
seeks to provide such guidance.
Through such studies, the scientific community 
could play a vital role in supporting evidence-based 
decision making, for example by strengthening the 
knowledge base on SDG interactions and integrated 
policymaking. Indeed, since the adoption of the 2030 
Agenda, the number of studies aiming to create an 
integrated understanding of the SDGs has been growing 
rapidly. However, as yet there is no general agreement 
on what it means to take an integrated approach to the 
SDGs, nor on how to respond to the principle of treating 
the 2030 Agenda as an indivisible whole. 
In a recent review by Bennich et al. (2020)6 of the 
literature on SDG interactions the following four key 
questions were asked:
• What policy challenges related to SDG interactions 
have the scientific community addressed? 
• How are SDG interactions conceptualized? 
• What sources of data are used to underpin the 
interactions?
• What methods have been used to identify and 
analyze SDG interactions? 
The answers to these questions form four themes 
along which current SDG interaction research can be 
mapped: 
Policy challenges. Most research hitherto has at 
least had an implicit objective to strengthen policy 
coherence, assuming that integrated and more coherent 
policies hold the potential to optimize resource use and 
generate sustainable outcomes. Some studies focus 
explicitly on institutional barriers for policy coherence 
on how to better capture synergies and trade-offs in 
policymaking. Another example of a policy challenge 
addressed by the literature is the need for policy 
innovation, where research typically questions the 
outputs that traditional policymaking generates.
6  The paper is based on an extensive review including 83 peer-
reviewed papers. Bibliometric methods and network analysis 
tools are used to explore patterns and links between themes. 
Gray literature has been reviewed as a complement, to deepen 
the understanding of emerging approaches to support SDG 
implementation.
Invention and innovation for sustainability 12
31
Interaction conceptualization. There are 
numerous ways in which SDG interactions have 
been conceptualized in the literature. A relatively 
large group of studies focus primarily on the goals, 
targets, or indicators constituting the core of the 
2030 Agenda. However, a number of studies have 
linked the components of the 2030 Agenda to specific 
policy measures or broader themes of relevance in a 
particular context. Examples include studies exploring 
the potential impact of a policy on a specific SDG 
(target/indicator) or studies exploring links between 
parallel policy agendas such as the bio-based economy 
and the SDGs. 
Data sources. The most common source of data 
for SDG interaction studies are scientific literature, 
or gray literature, such as reports, policy documents, 
and news articles. The second most common source 
of data is official databases, compiled by international 
organization (e.g., the UN) or national, regional, or local 
offices. 
Methods of analysis. The methodological approaches 
employed in the SDG interaction literature span a 
wide range from qualitative (e.g., scenario building), 
via semi-quantitative (e.g., cross-impact analysis) 
to quantitative methods (e.g., General Equilibrium, 
Integrated Assessment and system dynamics models). 
Relatively few frameworks for analyzing SDG 
interactions have been used in real policy processes. 
The SDG Synergies approach developed by researchers 
at Stockholm Environment Institute has already been 
tested in partnership with national governments 
and international agencies and is constantly being 
improved and adapted, with tailored decision-support 
tools created in the process. Examples of case studies 
include the governments of the Republic of Colombia, 
Mongolia, and the Democratic Socialist Republic 
of Sri Lanka, as well as subnational applications in 
Colombia and by the European Environment Agency. 
The approach can be used to prioritize action on SDG 
targets and to identify the most effective partnerships 
and collaborations, based on an understanding of real-
world interactions between targets in a given context. 
The core of the approach is a three-step process 
of collaborative analysis. The process can involve 
scientific experts, representatives of different sectors 
of government, and a range of other stakeholders. 
Customization. Every use of SDG Synergies is 
necessarily unique, depending on the coalition of 
actors using it, and the context in terms of natural 
resources, economic conditions, governance set-ups, 
technological options available, current policies and 
practices, and prevailing ideologies. These factors, 
in turn, shape which targets are perceived as most 
relevant and important by decision makers. 
Scoring interactions. The subset of targets that has 
been selected are entered in a ‘cross-impact matrix,’ 
and each interaction is given a score against a guiding 
question. When the objective is to support priority-
setting and collaboration, a typical question would 
be, “If progress is made toward Target A, how does 
this influence progress toward Target B?” Consistent 
scoring is facilitated by the use of a scale of different 
types or strengths of interaction. Two scales have 
been used: one proposed by Weimer-Jehle (2006), 
which goes from "strongly promoting" to "strongly 
restricting," and one by the International Council for 
Science, which goes from "indivisible" to “cancelling” 
(Nilsson et al. 2016). 
Analysis: beyond direct interactions. With a 
completed cross-impact matrix it is possible to go 
beyond the direct interactions and identify patterns, 
clusters of interacting targets, and other network 
effects. More sophisticated network analysis methods 
can be used to gain a better understanding of how 
progress toward different targets could affect the 
whole system.
This is an approach that aims at balancing the 
requirements of policymakers’ realities and scientific 
rigor that are needed to make the connection between 
science and policy credible, relevant, and legitimate. 
The process and all analytical steps are fully transparent 
and easy to follow by all actors engaged in the process.
Another framework for analyzing SDG interactions 
for policy planning is the Integrated Sustainable 
Development Goals (iSDG) model developed by the 
Millennium Institute (Collste et al. 2017, Allen et 
al. 2019). iSDG incorporates quantitative analysis 
and simulations of anticipated future development. 
The approach thereby offers both qualitative and 
quantitative analyses of SDG interlinkages on an 
indicator level. It is a policy simulation tool designed to 
help policymakers and other stakeholders make sense 
of the complex web of interconnections between the 
SDGs. Different to databases and indexes that provide a 
measure of where a country stands, iSDG focuses on the 
dynamic interactions within the SDG system to reveal 
the best paths and progression toward delivering on 
the SDGs. Different policy choices give rise to different 
anticipated futures. iSDG also allows for quantifying 
estimates of synergies between policy options as well 
as SDGs (see Pedercini et al. (2019)). iSDG has been 
tested in partnerships with national governments 
and international agencies. Examples of case studies 
include the Commonwealth of Australia, China, the 
Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, the Republic of Malawi, and 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria7. 
7 For readability, only ‘Nigeria’ will be used in the remainder of 
this report.
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2.7. Regional and national STI 
approaches to sustainability
Europe
The EU’s Smart Specialisation Strategy (S3)8 is a place-
based and innovation-led agenda for socioeconomic 
transformation, growth, and sustainability. It combines 
science, technology, and entrepreneurial advances, 
such as research and development, with territorial 
development through innovative initiatives. The 
Smart Specialisation approach looks at territories 
through a systemic lens, with the assumption that 
different subsystems and actors have to interact and 
create synergies in order to generate change. Though 
originally focused more on economic development and 
innovation, with the change of the EU’s priorities (such 
as European Green Deal), the Smart Specialisation 
methodology is being adapted to include sustainability 
principles and social and environmental aspects 
from design to implementation. The main objective 
of the Smart Specialisation approach is to identify 
and support interdisciplinary innovations with the 
highest potential impacts. Examples are many and 
include territorial policy mixes designed to answer 
specific challenges affecting local communities. They 
can include policies that nurture talent, creativity, 
knowledge creation, and diffusion of new ideas and 
activities; supporting entrepreneurial ecosystems and 
innovation; the internationalization of universities etc.; 
enhancing university-business collaborative research; 
leveraging and engaging scientific and business 
diaspora; and promoting (horizontal) coordination of 
administrative processes. There are over 120 Smart 
Specialisation Strategies being implemented in the EU 
and worldwide, with the total public investment of over 
68 billion Euro in the period 2014–2020. This policy 
will be continued in the EU until 2027. At the same time, 
Smart Specialisation is getting more and more attention 
worldwide, and its uptake is steadily increasing. One of 
the unique features of the Smart Specialisation process 
is that the priorities for public-private investment in 
research and innovation are identified through a wide, 
inclusive, bottom-up participative process. Thus, the 
process allows numerous stakeholders from business, 
academia, and civic society achieve collaborative 
learning and knowledge-based consensus on future 
development trajectories. This creates an opportunity 
for the modification of behavior of actors in territorial 
systems and increased probability of wider change in 
socioeconomic and sustainability terms. Interestingly, 
a wide number of priorities identified in the present 
generation of Smart Specialisation strategies already 
focus on sustainable development. They include 
topics such as: the bioeconomy, climate change, eco-
innovations, resource efficiency, smart, green, and 
8 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-topic/smart-
specialisation 
integrated transport systems, sustainable agriculture, 
sustainable land and water use, sustainable 
production, and consumption or waste management. 
These priorities are translated into transformative 
actions mobilizing research and innovation for specific 
territorial realities and contexts. S3 is implemented by 
the European Commission (EC), with the support of the 
Smart Specialisation Platform established at the EC’s 
Joint Research Centre.
The European Green Deal (2021–2027)9 will be key 
in fulfilling the shift to a low-carbon, circular economy 
and the achievement of SDGs. This will require 
unprecedented integration of policies and measures 
from local and regional to the EU level and perhaps 
extending beyond to international cooperation. In 
particular, the integration and coordination of S3 and 
STI for achieving the SDGs offers a huge opportunity 
for social steering of development processes in the 
EU toward fulfilling the commitments of the Paris 
Agreement on climate change and the 2030 Agenda. 
For this, S3 policies at the level of European subnational 
territories, Member States and non-EU countries 
need to be aligned with other sector-specific policies 
and internationally to bring expected sustainability 
transformation. In the case of S3 policy, for example, 
this translates to a stronger focus on innovation, 
support to small businesses, entrepreneurial 
innovation, accelerators, digital technologies, and 
industrial modernization toward deep decarbonization 
of the economy and environmental protection. S3 
could expand the boundaries of its current scope and 
scale while at the same time refocusing its mission by 
highlighting sustainability: S3 as a ‘bottom-up’ driver 
for STI and sustainable development at the subnational 
level to complement the ‘top-down’ policies and 
measures to achieve SDGs at the national and EU levels. 
The coordination and integration of S3 and STI 
development for SDGs require harmonized roadmaps 
and action plans that meet the challenge of immediate 
action for long-term goals and achieving synergies 
across local, regional, national, and EU levels. Overall, 
this calls for holistic, systemic, and diverse approaches 
to bring about transformative change. There is no 
one size or one way that fits all, as reflected in the S3 
approach and the SDGs, which outline aspirational but 
achievable objectives. 
Transdisciplinary research project by the OECD 
The transdisciplinary research project (TDR) by the 
OECD Global Science Forum (GSF)10 focuses on a 
systematic analysis, methods, and practices across 
different communities and countries. It aims to 
9  https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/
european-green-deal_en 
10 https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/global-science-forum.
htm 
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promote mutual learning between countries through 
identification of common barriers and sharing of good 
practices by: 
• Reviewing the theoretical foundations and methods 
of TDR and differentiating it from other related 
modes of research and broader policy concepts 
• Developing a standardized analytical framework 
to explore the key variables and determinants of 
successful TDR 
• Using the framework to analyze case studies of 
specific initiatives 
• Analyzing relevant information on national policy 
initiatives to identify good practices 
• Formulating policy recommendations to promote 
TDR to address complex societal challenges. 
To achieve these goals, an international Expert 
Group from 11 countries was established to oversee 
and implement the project activities and outputs, 
building on existing work and engaging with relevant 
stakeholders. The forthcoming  project report (OECD, 
Zinsstag and Arimoto) consists of two parts (a) the 
overall study analysis, findings, and recommendations 
and (b) the collection of 28 vignettes for individual case 
studies. Each case study is different and the collection 
as a whole illustrates the diversity of issues; food, 
environment, urban planning, mobility, health, energy, 
water, disaster, that TDR can be used to address, and 
provides some important insights into the practical 
challenges of bringing together different disciplines 
and stakeholders to address specific challenges at 
local, regional, national, and global levels. 
The major recommendations in the report pertain 
to governments, research funders, universities, 
academic communities, and science associations. 
Governments should facilitate the engagement of 
public sector actors (e.g., sharing the relevant public 
sector data) and incentivize the private sector to 
participate in TDR. Research funders should provide 
long-term support, establish centers of expertise and 
national networks, implement proactive management 
and monitoring of TDR, emphasize the evaluation of 
societal as well as scientific outputs and impacts, and 
support capacity building and participation of non-
academic stakeholders.
Universities should develop sustainable 
institutional structures and mechanisms, cross-
department committees and meetings, build long-term 
relations with stakeholder communities nationally and 
internationally, introduce TDR learning modules into 
science education and postgraduate training courses, 
and support early career researchers who engage in 
TDR projects.
The academic community and science associations 
should support innovative peer review and evaluation 
processes which would promote TDR, support early 
career researchers who wish to engage in TDR, and 
contribute to the development of new STI indicators 
and measures that value multiple research outputs.
An important conclusion is that COVID-19 is a 
prime example of the need for TDR that effectively 
brings together science and practice at a local, national, 
regional, and global level. Participatory stakeholder 
processes that engage natural- and social sciences 
and that use academic and non-academic knowledge 
to address how disease control can be effective while 
maintaining economic activity and social peace, can 
guide how societal life and economic activity can best 
start again after COVID-19 (OECD 2020c). 
East Asia
Although many East Asian industrialized countries 
have developed technology and innovation plans 
for sustainable development, the impact has been 
minimal to date. For example, the Taiwan Province 
of China, 11 Science and Technology Roadmap focuses 
on ‘sustainability and environment’ as one of the 
four pillars for future science and technology policy 
and long-term emission reduction targets; however, 
the technological developments proposed by the 
government were not linked to the SDGs (MOST 
2017). In South Korea, the 5th Science and Technology 
Foresight was published by the Korea Institute of 
Science and Technology Evaluation and Planning 
(KISTEP) to support the formulation of the 4th Master 
Plan for Science and Technology; although highlighting 
the importance of several low-carbon technologies, 
such as using hydrogen reduction for steel production, 
and wireless charging for electric vehicles, there was 
no discussion pertaining to the linkage between the 
development of key future technologies with the SDGs 
(MSIT and KISTEP, 2017). In 2019, Japan formulated 
a long-term low GHG emission development strategy, 
with the aim of achieving climate neutrality by the 
second half of the century (NISTEP 2019). 
 In Taiwan the Action Plan to Promote Social 
Innovation proposed by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs in 2018, points out that the SDGs should be 
viewed as the guiding principle for social innovation. 
Furthermore, the Action Plan establishes a mechanism 
to encourage public procurement of social innovation 
products based on the SDGs. Moreover, the official 
Social Innovation Database also uses the SDGs as an 
essential attribute of organizations looking to join 
the platform and seek funding opportunities. These 
practices exhibit a close linkage between social 
innovation and the SDGs, which could enhance public 
awareness since the abstract goals and targets become 
the product and service of daily life. 
11 For readability, only ‘Taiwan’ will be used in the remainder 
of this report.
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Box 5. Taiwan, Province of China, 2050 Foresight Project.
The emergence and diffusion of digital innovations including the internet of things (IoT), artificial intelligence (AI), 3D printing 
(sometimes called additive manufacturing), and green energy technology should be carefully examined through integrative 
dialogue to include the social and environmental concerns and establish public legitimacy and ‘social embeddedness.’ The 
Taiwan in 2050 (TW2050): Developing a Foresight System for a Sustainability Transition, a four-year research project funded by 
the Ministry of Science and Technology, was established to develop a long-term strategy for the sustainable future to 2050, with 
a specific focus on the impact of digitalization on society.
This multidisciplinary research project organizes experts from futurology, sociology, economic sociology, environmental 
system analysis, demography, and public health to develop an innovative foresight study to support the sustainability 
transformation. Initially, the research will undertake horizon scanning, to identify the competitive niche and systemic risk of 
the technology and society and to have a comprehensive overview of the needed baseline information. Secondly, it will analyze 
the aging challenge through integrated perspectives, such as the effect on productivity and public health. Thirdly, the relations 
of social, economic, and environmental factors will be quantified using the Taiwan 2050 Foresight System Dynamics Model, to 
provide concrete information for scenario planning. Finally, to shape the social consensus of the future roadmap, the participatory 
approach will be adapted to enhance the social trust toward a long-term vision. 
As for the horizon scanning, this study applied the dynamic argumentative Delphi method and in-depth interviews with about 
220 experts to identify the critical signals for the technological and societal change. Based on the survey, the key research and 
innovation issues were identified which included digital transformation in the manufacturing sector, new types of employment 
resulting from digitalization, the upgrade of electricity grids, and health care reform. Furthermore, the key issues that required 
extensive social dialogue were also characterized which included the digital tax, autonomous vehicles, PV deployment policy 
etc. Moreover, the research and innovation topics were further examined through the perspectives of systemic risk and key SDG 
transformations to enhance the social embeddedness. The five systemic risks were prioritized and included extreme weather 
events, population aging and decline, social inequality, energy and resource security, and lagged adjustments of industrial 
structure. As a result, this project developed a nexus map between key research, development and innovation niches, SDG 
transformations, and systemic risk to guide future research and innovation policies. For example, in order to mitigate the risk of 
energy and resource insecurity, a move toward a digital and circular economy is needed, and it should be supported by AI-based 
circular design tools to help the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to increase their material efficiency. 
To accelerate the development of AI, Academia Sinica launched the AI Academy to nurture generations of AI talent for 
business, especially for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). However, the existing course design focuses on the theory of 
machine learning and deep learning, and related applications, whereas the ethical, legal, and social issues of AI are not included. 
Hence, the project team will work to overcome those gaps through the cooperation with the AI Academy to create the synergy 
between digitalization and sustainability transition. 
East Asian countries developed their technological 
strength through significant investments in science and 
technology that was helped by government policies to 
support the licensing, refining, and disseminating 
of foreign technology, and the provision of quality 
education, infrastructure, and R&D funding. East Asian 
countries therefore could serve as a development 
model for developing countries (e.g., electric vehicle 
production cooperation under the New Southbound 
Policy (Fuller 2002, Dahl and Lopez-Claros 2005, 
Sturgeon and Lee 2015)).
East Asia’s practice of responsible consumption 
and production (SDG12) coupled with its digital 
capabilities presents an opportunity to develop an 
alternative pathway toward sustainability (see Box 5), 
given the right policy mixes. The digital capabilities 
that East Asian industrialized countries have built have 
also strengthened their capabilities to cope with the 
recent COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic (see Box 4). 
2.8. Summary
This chapter has elucidated the current state of 
knowledge on invention and innovation, with an 
emphasis on the processes and prerequisites, such 
as granularity and learning, for the widespread 
diffusion of new technologies. Also highlighted is that 
although innovation has driven human development, 
and will continue to do so, it does not come without 
risk and unintended consequences. The real question 
is how to harness, or steer, future innovation 
toward a sustainable future while avoiding further 
detrimental social and environmental impacts. The 
chapter provides examples of how STI is already 
helping to shape a more sustainable future and 
outlines some regional and national approaches 
in this area. The following chapter will provide 
more detail on the types of innovations required to 
facilitate the Six Transformations, with an emphasis 
on efficiency and sufficiency, and how these can be 
deployed at the necessary scale.
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Efficiency and sufficiency for human 
wellbeing
3
The best way to predict the future is to create it.
 Alan Kay (born 1940)
3.1. Introduction 
The 17 SDGs and the six overarching transformations 
proposed by TWI2050 (TWI2050 2018) are co-
dependent and co-contingent in multiple ways and are 
from a holistic development perspective indivisible. 
Yet, some SDGs serve as a better entry point to address 
all the SDGs in a holistic manner compared to others. 
The central argument of this chapter is that SDG12 
(responsible production and consumption), and in 
particular its consumption component, serve as an 
ideal entry point to address the 16 other SDGs. This 
is recognized by TWI2050, which has adopted SDG12, 
as one of the Six Transformations that are required to 
achieve all SDGs. Transforming currently unsustainable 
consumption and production systems is therefore also 
key for the other five TWI2050 transformations. 
Another key tenet of this chapter is that ‘consumption’ 
is not defined in economic terms (commercial goods 
and services) but from the perspective of human 
wellbeing and that of services and service-provisioning 
systems. ‘Consumption’ in this chapter refers to the 
services (nutrition, communication, health care, 
shelter, mobility, etc.) that the use of economic goods 
and natural resources enable to further human 
sustenance and wellbeing (see Section 3.2), irrespective 
of whether they are provided by the formal or informal 
economy, the public sector, or by households. Service-
provisioning systems are (alternative) combinations of 
infrastructures, products, devices (technologies), and 
forms of (market) organization that provide particular 
services. The service concept is well established in 
some sectors like education or health care, but less so 
in sectors such as transport or consumer goods where 
often the misleading idea that commercial product 
equals wellbeing (e.g., for passenger cars) is advertised 
by industry. It is therefore important to differentiate 
services that directly link to human wellbeing (shelter, 
nutrition, thermal comfort, education, health care, etc.) 
from those services that are themselves intermediary 
(e.g., infrastructure construction and operations 
like roads, schools, or hospitals, manufacturing of 
pharmaceuticals, construction materials, or consumer 
goods, goods transport), that is, are required ‘upstream’ 
in the form of materials, resources, and infrastructure 
for the provision of direct wellbeing enhancing services. 
Service-provisioning systems are malleable, and 
a service—as opposed to a product or commodity—
perspective offers new opportunities for step changes 
through innovation and new behaviors in efficiency 
improvements not apparent from traditional economic 
analysis. As such, new forms and improved models of 
service provision underpin the transformations that 
are at the core of SDG12 with the objective to improve 
the equitable access to services, while minimizing 
resource use and environmental impacts.
The discussion on what human development entails 
involves values and moral judgments. Two main strands 
that have been prevalent in the discussion on human 
development are the needs approach and the capabilities 
approach (Holden et al. 2017). Doyal and Gough (1984) 
refer to needs as universal and objective goals. In the 
perspective of the needs approach advocated for by 
the economist Manfred Max-Neef (1992) (referred to 
as human-scale development), services are useful if 
they provide the satisfaction of human needs. While 
needs are finite and classifiable, how they are met is 
context-dependent (Max-Neef 1992) and malleable, as 
reflected in the concept of transformation of service-
provisioning systems below. Quantitative frameworks 
related to the needs approach are discussed in more 
detail below when discussing access to basic services 
and Decent Standards of Living concepts. Conversely, 
the capabilities approach advocated for by, among 
others, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, suggests 
that the objective is to create capabilities—referred to 
as the capability to reach outcomes that people value 
and have reasons to value (Sen 2001, Nussbaum 2011). 
However, in assessing whether capabilities are met, 
one typically has to refer to some metric to measure if 
human needs are met (Brock 2009). In the context of 
transforming useful services for the SDGs some metrics 
are provided by the SDGs themselves, for example, 
SDG2 Zero Hunger indicator 2.1.1 on prevalence of 
undernourishment, SDG3 Good Health indictor 3.2.1. 
on under-five mortality rate, or SDG6 Safe Water 
indicator 6.1.1. on the proportion of population using 
safely managed drinking water services. Others, for 
example, the capability to engage and communicate 
with others in society need to be considered in the 
context of other frameworks where they are explicitly 
dealt with (e.g., Decent Standards of Living).
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Why needs are not universally met and capabilities 
insufficiently developed today is testified in existing 
multidimensional inequalities (UNDP 2019, Zimm 
2019) encompassing health, relationships, safety, 
ability to have influence, knowledge, and many 
other dimensions including financial security. These 
inequalities cause a lack of social-ecological resilience 
and subsequently greater risk and exposure to external 
shocks by those with limited resources (Leach et al. 
2018). This is clearly apparent in the current COVID-19 
pandemic which over proportionally endangers people 
living in slums without conditions for social distancing, 
living with limited sanitation and health care facilities, 
especially in—but not limited to—the Global South 
(see Box 7).
Transforming service-provisioning systems is 
about safeguarding human needs and sharing available 
resources fairly within planetary boundaries. In 
this chapter we discuss, through the lens of service 
provisioning, which types of technological and 
social innovations could contribute to decrease such 
inequalities, increasing our collective ability to deal 
with crises, while also decreasing the pressures on 
natural resources.
The relationship between the types and levels 
of services and human wellbeing is highly varied 
and also highly nonlinear. Figure 13 presents a 
stylized relationship, whose exact shape will vary by 
service type and indicator of wellbeing considered, 
but is presented here for a basic categorization of 
service levels considered in the following discussion 
(Section 3.2). 
The essential first step in service provisioning is 
to overcome deprivation. Undernourishment, lack 
of access to safe drinking water and sanitation, or 
basic health care services are examples of inadequate 
or absent service provisioning that affect human 
wellbeing negatively. Assuring basic access to services 
(see Section 3.2.2) is thus the first and most important 
step and entails the highest positive gains in human 
wellbeing.
Although the provision of access to basic services 
is essential for survival, it does not necessarily allow 
full participation in economic activities, society, and 
higher degrees of self-fulfillment. Rao and Min (2018) 
developed a quantitative framework of the material 
resource prerequisites for human wellbeing which 
are framed through a bundle of services that together 
provide for so-called ‘decent living standards’ (DLS, see 
Section 3.2.3). Associated increases in wellbeing from 
moving from basic access to DLS remain high. It has 
been demonstrated that the service levels postulated 
by DLS can be provided for every inhabitant of the 
planet largely with existing practices (but with a focus 
on efficient ways of service provision) while staying 
well within planetary boundaries (Grubler et al. 2018).
Beyond DLS is a level of service provision that we 
have labeled here as ‘sufficiency’ level (see Section 3.2.4 
below). Here there are diminishing returns of achieving 
yet higher levels of service provision and consumption 
on furthering human wellbeing, but they remain 
positive. Sufficiency levels are difficult to define ex 
ante and analytically as they are subject to values and 
expectations that vary widely across individuals, social 
groups, and cultures. Yet, there are two important 
social and environmental constraints that influence 
sufficiency levels: Pareto efficiency (improvements in 
service consumption of one individual must not diminish 
anybody else’s consumption) as well as Planetary 
Boundaries (Rockström et al. 2009). With significant 
Figure 13. Stylized relationship between levels of service provisioning and human wellbeing. Different thresholds can 
be differentiated on the basis of absolute levels of wellbeing as well as by the rate (elasticity) of wellbeing change to 
changes in service provision/consumption levels that show diminishing returns at higher levels of service consumption. 
Graphic courtesy of Arnulf Grubler and Caroline Zimm.
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technological, social, and behavioral innovations to 
minimize resource use and environmental impacts, it is 
possible to provide higher levels of services than in DLS, 
that is, sufficiency, while remaining within planetary 
boundaries and also assure equitable access to natural 
resources (see the sufficiency corridor in Figure 13). 
An illustrative scenario for such sufficiency levels 
of service provision is given in Section 3.4.2 below. 
Lastly, there are also levels of service consumption 
that are so high as to diminish human wellbeing either 
at the level of the individual or at the level of society, 
labeled ‘overconsumption’ (obesity) in Figure 13 (not 
discussed separately in Section 3.2 below).
Consider the case of nutrition: food consumption 
(especially high energy food like fats and sugars) 
exceeding physiological needs, especially when 
combined with a lack of exercise, leads to overweight, 
even to obesity, a global nutritional pandemic (see also 
Box 6 on Malnutrition). In 2016 approximately two 
billion adults (~40%) worldwide were considered 
overweight, and 650 million (13%) were classified as 
obese (WHO 2020b). Obesity rates in some countries 
approach or even surpass one third of children and 
adult population, for example, the USA, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Republic 
of South Africa1, and are a major health risk, reducing 
life expectancy and thus wellbeing of those affected. At 
the same time, over 800 million people go hungry and 
over 150 million children are stunted (WHO 2020b). 
As another example consider motorized transport 
with privately owned vehicles: At high levels of vehicle 
ownership and use, particularly in densely populated 
urban environments, the benefits of a convenient 
and flexible individual mode of transport are quickly 
counterbalanced by congestion, urban air pollution 
and noise that diminishes not only the utility of 
vehicle ownership and use, but also the wellbeing of 
the individual car user and all urban residents. A high 
level of consumption that is therefore neither efficient 
in terms of individual wellbeing nor in terms of Pareto 
efficiency is classified as ‘overconsumption’ (obesity) 
in the discussion here.
3.2. Providing useful services to improve 
wellbeing while reducing resource 
needs
3.2.1. Introduction
This chapter uses ‘services’ as an analytical entry point 
into the challenge of rapid sustainable transformation. 
Services include nutrition, mobility, shelter and 
thermal comfort, entertainment, and socializing, all 
of which provide for human needs and wellbeing. The 
provisioning systems which deliver these services 
1 For readability, only ‘South Africa’ will be used in the remainder 
of this report.
require energy, material, and land resource inputs. 
The use of these resources—particularly in the form 
of fossil fuel combustion, agricultural practices, and 
forest conversion—generate GHG emissions and other 
forms of pollution which undermine wellbeing and the 
future capacity of provisioning systems to meet human 
needs. Services are therefore a bridge between human 
needs and wellbeing on the one hand, and resource use 
by provisioning systems on the other (Figure 14) and 
therefore are the central metric adopted in this chapter.
From this perspective, the pivotal challenge for 
sustainable transformation is: How can more services 
be delivered using fewer resources in order to satisfy 
all human needs and improve wellbeing? Figure 14 
shows the basic organizing framework used in this 
chapter. It has four main building blocks: human needs 
and wellbeing, useful services, service-provisioning 
(delivery) systems, and resource inputs.
Figure 14 also shows three dynamic constraints or 
pressures which require change in how resources are 
converted through provisioning systems into useful 
services to meet human needs. These constraints 
define the challenge of sustainable transformation: 
downward constraint on resource use (e.g., planetary 
boundaries), minimum thresholds and upward 
constraint on needs satisfaction (see Sections 3.2.2 
and 3.2.3 below), and downward constraint on service 
consumption (sufficiency, see Section 3.2.4 below).
We discuss each of the constituents of Figure 14 in 
more detail below.
Human needs and wellbeing
Providing for human needs is at the heart of sustainable 
development. There are many different conceptual 
and empirical approaches to needs. Maslow (1943) 
conceptualized a widely used hierarchy of needs which 
distinguished ‘basic’ needs for food, shelter, and security, 
‘intermediate’ needs for belonging, connectedness, and 
self-esteem, and ‘higher’ needs for self-actualization 
including through learning, creativity, and morality. 
This hierarchy is shown as the pyramid in Figure 14. 
Max-Neef (1992) developed a similar typology of 
fundamental human needs consisting of subsistence, 
protection, creation, freedom, leisure, identity, 
understanding, and participation. How these needs 
are satisfied is determined differently by individuals 
and groups, and with widely varying implications for 
resource consumption and sustainability (Vita et al. 
2019).
Satisfying needs ensures human wellbeing and 
quality of life. There are two distinct conceptualizations 
of wellbeing: hedonic and eudaemonic. Hedonic 
wellbeing is a subjective state of motivation and 
pleasure, linked to happiness and life satisfaction, 
and is commonly measured (subjectively) through 
self-reports. Eudaemonic wellbeing is associated with 
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fulfillment and self-realization, and places greater 
emphasis on the social and material context enabling 
people to flourish. Eudaemonic wellbeing is embedded 
in development strategies to enhance human 
capabilities (Sen 2001) or otherwise meet human 
needs (Doyal and Gough 1984).
Useful services
People consume useful services to fulfill their needs. 
More traditional economic concepts of ‘demand’ apply 
to bundles of goods (and services) acquired through 
market or nonmarket transactions. But demand is an 
intermediate not a final step. Human needs are met by 
the useful services provided by demand (Grubler et al. 
2012b).
As an example, demand for cars, fuel, and roads is an 
intermediate step toward providing the useful service 
of mobility. Mobility, not cars, meets people’s needs to 
move around in order to work, socialize, and recreate. 
Passenger-kilometers of mobility is a direct measure 
of useful service, rather than numbers of cars or 
quantities of fuel. Evidently, delivery of useful services 
requires technologies (vehicles), infrastructure (roads, 
bridges), and resources (fuels). These can also be 
framed through the service lens (e.g., ton-km for goods 
transport), but they do not directly provide for human 
wellbeing and are thus considered necessary but 
ancillary services required for the delivery of useful 
services.
The application of service concepts to environmental 
and sustainability challenges originates in the energy 
literature (Nakicenovic et al. 1993, Nakicenovic et 
al. 1996). Globally, only 14% of the energy resources 
harvested from nature deliver useful services to final 
users (72 of 511 EJ, see Section 3.4 below)—the 
remaining 86% is wasted (De Stercke 2014). Although 
there are thermodynamic limits on how much this 
wastage can be reduced, there are still enormous 
potentials for improving the efficiency of the global 
energy system as a service-provisioning system to 
meet human needs (Cullen et al. 2011). 
More recently, the narrow emphasis on energy has 
broadened to include materials and other resources. 
As a decarbonizing world sees energy supply systems 
relying ever less on fossil fuels, the consumption of 
materials, biomass, land, and other resource inputs 
will increase the burden on the natural environment. 
The term ‘resource-intensive services’ better captures 
this broadened focus, although ‘energy services’ is 
often used interchangeably.  
Service-provisioning systems
Focusing on useful services is important as it is a direct 
antecedent of needs satisfaction. From a sustainable 
transformation perspective, focusing on useful 
services also helps broaden the solution space beyond 
demand and resource-efficient goods to embrace the 
many alternative ways in which useful services can be 
delivered through provisioning systems.
Provisioning systems are those that make useful 
services available at the point of consumption. They 
include a wide variety of actors (e.g., manufacturers, 
internet start-ups) operating in institutional (e.g., 
Figure 14. Transforming the provision of services to meet human needs with fewer resource inputs. 
Sources: Needs based on Maslow (1943) and resource processing flow diagram from Bajželj et al. (2013). 
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markets, regulatory frameworks) and material contexts 
(e.g., factories, transport networks).
As shown in Figure 14, provisioning systems 
consume energy, material, land, and other resources to 
deliver useful services. These resources are converted 
through physical supply chains into a usable form in 
domestic and other settings.
As articulated in this chapter, the central challenge 
for sustainable transformation is to reduce the resource 
requirements of service-provisioning systems while 
expanding the capacity of those systems to deliver 
useful services to meet human needs.
Resources inputs
Energy, materials, biomass, and other resources 
consumed by service-provisioning systems cause GHG 
emissions and other environmental problems. Using 
Max-Neef’s needs typology, Vita et al. (2019), found that 
meeting human needs for subsistence and protection 
accounted for nearly half of global carbon emissions, 
with most of the remaining emissions accounted for by 
freedom, identity, creation, and leisure needs. Meeting 
needs for understanding and participation accounted 
for less than 4% of global emissions. 
Sankey diagrams capture how resource inputs 
are converted into useful services by provisioning 
systems, and the inefficiencies and losses at each 
conversion step (Cullen and Allwood 2010). Figure 14 
shows a Sankey diagram modified to also show the 
GHG emissions (far right of Figure 14) from the use of 
resources (right of Figure 14) to deliver useful services 
(far left of Figure 14). As this is a snapshot of global 
emissions in 2010, the resource impacts of global 
service-provisioning systems are dominated by fossil 
fuel combustion and land-use change. 
Constraints or pressures for sustainable 
transformation
The basic organizing framework for this chapter shown 
in Figure 15 describes human needs being satisfied by 
useful services made available by service-provisioning 
systems which require resource inputs. Objectives 
for sustainable transformation can be overlaid on the 
basic framework in the form of dynamic constraints or 
pressures. These are shown as arrows in Figure 15. The 
constraints are dynamic for two reasons. First, they 
are culturally, politically, and technologically defined 
and these landscapes are ever changing. Second, 
the constraints generally define directions of travel 
not fixed destinations. Constraints can push service 
delivery both upwards, for example, when considering 
the development objectives of poverty eradication 
and more equal access to service provided, or 
downwards, for example, by either reducing resource 
use, overutilization of global commons (atmosphere 
nutrient cycles), or overconsumption. Absolute 
constraints are represented by planetary boundaries 
that relate to climate change and global nutrient cycles. 
Taken together, these constraints ultimately influence 
both levels of resource use and associated services 
provided and hence human wellbeing. The only policy 
variable operating within these constraints is efficiency 
of service delivery and resource use which can be 
significantly improved through behavioral, market, and 
technological innovation.
Downward constraints on resource use
Use of finite or scarce energy, material, land and, other 
resources must be reduced to address climate and 
other environmental impacts of service-provisioning 
systems. There are many strategies for improving the 
efficiency with which service-provisioning systems 
convert resources into useful services. These include:
• demand-side strategies which change how services 
are delivered (e.g., more energy-efficient end-use 
technologies and passive systems, digitalization, 
business models to increase utilization rates);
• supply-side strategies which change how resources 
are converted (e.g., precision agriculture, 
decarbonization of power production) and how 
intermediate goods and capital are formed (e.g., 
net-zero energy buildings, circular economies, 
dematerialization, urban design).
While both strategies are interdependent and 
mutually contingent, this report focuses on the 
demand-side of service-provisioning systems, while 
recognizing and discussing the interdependencies 
between demand-side and ‘upstream’ supply-side 
transformations. The reason for this focus is twofold. 
Firstly, the linkages between services provided and 
human wellbeing under planetary boundaries (and thus 
the SDGs) are most direct and apparent on the demand-
side. Secondly, in analysis, modeling, as well as in 
current policy frameworks, demand-side perspectives 
and options remain significantly underrepresented 
(Grubler et al. 2012a). As such synergistic effects 
with the SDGs remain underexplored, as supply-side 
strategies tend to have more SDG trade-offs than 
synergies (see Section 3.4.3 below).
Constraints on services provided
Upward and downward pressures on services 
provided are discussed in more detail in the following 
Sections 3.2.2 to 3.2.4. Upwards pressures, that is, the 
need to increase service provision, are discussed in 
Section 3.2.2 on basic access and in Section 3.2.3 on 
decent living standards for all. Downwards pressures 
either on levels of resource use or service provision 
(or both) are discussed in Section 3.2.4 on sufficiency 
below.
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3.2.2. Basic access to modern services in 
low-income countries
Access to basic goods, services, and freedom are 
fundamental to human wellbeing and development. 
Minimum needs baskets to eradicate deprivation 
and poverty universally have been discussed in the 
literature, such as in A Theory of Human Needs (Doyal 
and Gough 1984) and Decent Living Standards (Rao 
and Min 2018). The UN 2030 Agenda also provides a 
broad framework that targets inclusive, equitable and 
universal access to basic infrastructure and services 
that mirror the minimum needs baskets identified in 
the literature. Figure 16 provides an overview of the 
current status of progress globally on some of these 
basic access indicators. What is evident from the figure 
is that access to these services is highly unequal across 
populations and across goals. National and regional 
differences are also vast and are further magnified 
when assessing differences subnationally between 
provinces, urban/rural, and population subgroups. 
While accelerated progress has been made in some 
regions since 2015, for certain goals, regions, and 
nations, in particular, the gaps between ambition level 
and current achievement is significant. For instance, 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals Report 2019 
highlights: 
• Almost half of the world’s population have no access 
to social protection (SDG1)
• Two thirds of more than 820 million undernourished 
people live in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa 
(SDG2) (see also Box 6)
• About a third of the global population lacks access 
to basic medical coverage (SDG3) (see also Box 7).
• More than half of the schools in sub-Saharan 
Africa do not have access to basic drinking water, 
handwashing facilities, the Internet, or computers 
(SDG4) 
• In South Asia, 30% of women aged 20 to 24 years 
are married before age 18 (SDG5) 
• A quarter of health care facilities worldwide lack 
basic drinking water services (SDG6)
• About 3 billion people lack access to clean cooking 
fuels and technology (SDG7)
• One fifth of all young people are not in education, 
employment, or training (SDG8)
Figure 15. Resource conversion chains as part of the provisioning system for useful services including heating, cooking, 
and mobility (illustrative for a typical European household). Source: Wilson et al. (2020b).
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• Only about half of the world’s population currently 
use the Internet (SDG9)
• In many countries an increasing share of national 
income goes to the top 1% (SDG10)
• Globally, 2 billion people do not have access to waste 
collection services (SDG11)
• The material footprint per capita in high-income 
countries is 13 times the level of low-income 
countries and exceeds their domestic material 
consumption (SDG12)
• About 70% of detected victims of human trafficking 
are women and girls (SDG16).
Figure 16 summarizes current global inequalities in 
access to basic service provision and the corresponding 
numbers of people lacking access.
Despite the undisputed value placed on expanding 
access to basic goods and services for all, at current 
levels of implementation, investment, and policies, 
many countries will not achieve the goals by 2030. 
Achieving the goals will require additional capacities, 
improved governance, and increased investments. 
According to one rough estimate, globally $5–7 trillion 
of annual investment is required for building the 
infrastructure needed to meet basic needs including 
roads, rail and ports, power stations, water and 
sanitation, food security, climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, health, and education by 2030 (UNCTAD 
2014). In Asia-Pacific developing countries, the UN 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP) Economic and Social Survey 2019, finds that 
an additional investment of $1.5 trillion per year is 
needed to end extreme poverty through universal 
health coverage, quality education, and enabling 
infrastructure. While the scale of investments needed 
are large, these are a small share of global GDP. Efforts 
to extend access to basic services more efficiently 
are also a way to reduce the scale of system capacity 
expansions required and investments needed (Grubler 
et al. 2018). In addition, there are significant synergies 
or spillover effects between social services, so that 
interventions in any one of these will have impact 
on others. Tapping these synergies is another way to 
reduce needed investments (see e.g., Dagnachew and 
Poblete-Cazaneve (in preparation)).
Bridging the achievement gaps also requires 
new approaches that go beyond just extending 
supply or merely providing connections to consider 
additional dimensions of access. Integrated planning 
for service provision requires linking supply to 
broader developmental and socioeconomic objectives. 
Providing access to basic services is a fundamental first 
step to enhancing wellbeing. But extending access to 
education, health care, water, sanitation, food, shelter/
housing, energy, and other basic goods and services 
alone is not enough, unless it is affordable, reliable, of 
good quality, and sustainable. 
Figure 16. International inequality in access to and use of basic goods and services essential for human wellbeing. Left 
panel: International Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients accounting for the share of population without access (distance 
between the origin and the start of the Lorenz curves on the y-axis) for select infrastructure service consumption. 
The 45° line represents the equality line where goods are distributed equally across the global population. The Gini 
coefficients represent the ratio of the areas between the equality line and Lorenz curves and the total area under the 
equality line. The higher the Gini coefficient, the more unequal the distribution. Right panel: number of people without 
access, access rates, and Gini coefficients for basic goods and services. Where no consumption level is available the share 
of population without access is equivalent to the Gini coefficient. Source: Adapted from Zimm (2019), updated using UN, 
WHO and WB data.
Service/Technology Population w/o access
Year bn % Gini
Adequate urban housing+ 2016 1.0 23 0.23
Secure food supply 2017 2.0 26 0.26
Safely managed water 2017 2.2 29 0.29
Mobile phones 2017 2.2 29 0.29
Banking services 2017 2.4 32 0.32
Clean cooking 2017 3.1 41 0.41
Essential health services 2017 3.8 50 0.50
Electricity (kWh)* 2014 0.5 10 0.50
Bicycles* 2014 2.5 45 0.54
Safely managed sanitation 2017 4.2 55 0.55
Internet (bits/sec)* 2016 3.0 52 0.77
+Only covering urban population.
*Smaller sample size of 80% of global population; consumption levels
available leading to Ginis higher than  non-access rates.
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Box 6. Malnutrition.
Globally, malnutrition is related to some of the largest noncommunicable diseases mankind is suffering from. More than 820 
million people, most of them in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, still regularly go hungry while at the same time some 679 
million adults are obese (WHO 2020b). Malnutrition is not only related to premature death but also to substantial impairment of 
wellbeing, work productivity, and cognitive development. According to the World Health Organization (WHO) malnutrition refers 
to deficiencies, excesses, or imbalances in a person’s intake of energy and/or nutrients. Undernutrition leads to stunting, wasting, 
and underweight. The prevalence of undernourishment has been rising since 2014 (FAO 2019). This rise is attributable to a 
continuation of poor economic access to food compounded by factors such as extreme weather events, political instability and 
conflict, as well as economic volatility. Prevalence of malnutrition is mostly concentrated in Asia (515 million people) and sub-
Saharan Africa (239 million people) (FAO 2017). In sub-Saharan Africa the percentage of the total population undernourished is 
23% mostly due to poverty and inefficiencies in agricultural value chains. Some 1.5 billion people are deficient in micronutrients. 
One in five children under the age of five are stunted as a result of receiving insufficient calories, proteins, and micronutrients, 
with lifelong implications for their wellbeing and productive potential (GNR 2018). Ironically, half of those malnourished are 
associated with poverty of small-sized farming lacking the means to purchase inputs for their operations leading to declining soil 
fertility and resilience (IFPRI 2015 cited in Hazell and Rahman (2014)). Some 33% of women of reproductive age are affected by 
anemia, with serious implications for their health and that of their children (Wirth et al. 2017). 
Although obesity has become an epidemic causing major public health issues in developed countries mostly affecting the 
less educated strata of society (OECD 2017), it is on a steep rise in metropolitan areas of emerging economies. Globally, some 
two billion people are overweight, of whom 679 million are obese (WHO 2020b). Together these contribute to diet-related 
noncommunicable disease outcomes such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes, and cancer. The latter diseases are projected to 
become the dominant cause of death in the decades to come (GBD projections) (Mathers and Loncar 2006, Hughes et al. 2011), 
placing a heavy financial and operational burden on health services and reducing productive potential for both developing and 
developed countries. Obesity in young children is hard to reverse once acquired. Many low-income communities in urban areas 
consume predominantly ultra-processed foods and beverages sold at fast-food and small retail outlets, often because they live 
in so-called ‘food deserts’—low-income areas where these are the only available foods (Popkin 2019). However, according to 
recent research, obesity is no longer purely a phenomenon in urban populations with more than 55% of the global rise in mean 
BMI from 1985 to 2017, and more than 80% in some low- and middle-income regions, due to increases in rural areas (Bixby et 
al. 2019).
Both forms of malnutrition are occurring unnecessarily and relate to a massive policy coordination failure within and across 
countries. Many countries face both undernutrition and obesity, thus bearing a double burden of malnutrition. One policy 
failure relates to distributional issues pointing to the need for an integrated approach to nutrition that enhances economic and 
physical access to foods that are not only sufficient in calorie terms, but also healthy. Undernutrition in poor countries should 
not be replaced by excessive consumption of low-quality calories, in particular processed foods. The other policy failure lies 
with insufficient supply amid a huge biophysical supply potential, inefficiencies and waste in supply chains, and distributional 
issues. Today, the provisioning service potential from nature to produce enough food, feed, and fiber for all would be sufficient 
to sustain even a doubling of the global population. From a pure calories supply point of view there should be enough food 
available on a global level, however, it is unequally distributed (GNR 2020). Long-run projections suggest that by 2050 the world’s 
agricultural lands and aquatic food supply systems could produce enough food for all, while at the same time safeguarding major 
environmental resources (FOLU 2019). This suggests that even a concerted action of incremental adjustments in the global 
food system could deliver acceptable sustainability outcomes. A more transformational approach overhauling the entire food 
system, demands, and embarking on bold conservations and restoration goals could deliver truly sustainable outcomes well 
within planetary boundaries.
Efforts to expand access to electricity in sub-Saharan 
Africa, for example, are often highlighted as insufficient 
because these have not kept pace with population 
growth in the region. Despite this, looking at national 
estimates of new connections over the last five years 
would suggest that between 2014 and 2019 more than 
115 million people gained access to electricity in sub-
Saharan Africa. This implies accelerated progress since 
the 2030 Agenda came into force, though not yet at the 
pace required to meet the goal. Looking at progress 
subnationally, though, highlights vast differences in 
the pace of providing access across provinces and 
regions (Falchetta et al. 2019). However, of even more 
concern is the fact that even among those with access 
to electricity, a vast distribution across access quality 
tiers exists (Falchetta et al. 2020). For example, in 
some countries, where rapid growth in electricity 
access has been reported (e.g., Kenya), the estimated 
final use among newly electrified households remains 
very limited and is growing very slowly (Fobi et al. 
2018). Such low levels of use suggest that people 
have not moved beyond subsistence use for lighting 
and phone charging to levels of demand that provide 
a means of livelihood through productive uses, 
enhanced employment, education, and income earning 
opportunities. Such low levels of use are attributable 
to an overemphasis on increasing connections without 
ensuring that the access provided is also reliable and 
affordable.
Accelerating efforts to provide reliable and affordable 
access to basic services requires rapid innovation 
in technologies, financing, and distribution models. 
Disruptive and digital technologies can increase access 
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to basic goods and services, and directly contribute to 
achieving many of the SDGs (TWI2050 2019). Recent 
innovations in ICT, particularly mobile phones and 
virtual financial services provide a powerful platform to 
deliver essential services like e-governance, education, 
health, energy, water, and financial inclusion (Alstone 
et al. 2015). Some key areas where such innovations 
are already having impact are:
• Monitoring, tracking, estimation, and reporting 
of multiple access dimensions and latent demand. 
Recent efforts have used satellite datasets and 
mobile phones to estimate road quality (Cadamuro 
et al. 2019), electricity supply outages (Correa et al. 
2018), and latent demand for electricity (Fobi et al. 
2018, Falchetta et al. 2020).
Box 7. Universal health coverage. 
Health is essential for the basic principles of equity and sustainability of the 2030 Agenda. SDG3 on health and wellbeing includes 
a target on u-universal health coverage which is the best preparedness element for any health event, including pandemics.
The response to the COVID-19 pandemic is one of the most practical examples of the importance of primary health care in a 
high-quality, universal and effective health system. The surveillance and monitoring function of the primary health care system 
was fundamental to identify and characterize the threat in China and elsewhere. Primary health care medical units also were the 
first line of action for testing, providing clinical treatment directions, and to refer cases to more complex health care facilities. 
This has been a common factor in the response, and most probably a key factor in the success in controlling the epidemic. Also, 
the primary health care system will be important in the exit strategy, the recovery stage, and to deliver the ultimate solutions, 
such as a vaccine.
This is not new in the public health arena. Since the Declaration of Alma-Ata (WHO), the relevance of primary health care has 
been recognized and was renewed and well stated at the 2018 ‘Declaration of Astana’ that emerged from the Global Conference on 
Primary Health Care: From Alma-Ata towards universal health coverage and the SDGs. The Declaration “affirm[s] the commitment 
to the fundamental right of every human being to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health without distinction of 
any kind. Convening on the fortieth anniversary of the Declaration of Alma-Ata, we reaffirm our commitment to all its values and 
principles, in particular to justice and solidarity, and we underline the importance of health for peace, security and socioeconomic 
development, and their interdependence.”
All health systems have been put under stress during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the very basic principle of universal access 
to a quality health system is an essential element in the response. Actually, most of the global first response was to guarantee full 
access to the health system for the entire population—an action everyone hopes will be maintained following the pandemic. That 
will be the best way to address the SDG target 3.8 “Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to 
quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all”. 
The fulfillment of this target will be the best way to establish a permanent preparedness for any future event of this magnitude, 
which can be expected due the current challenges posed by the various global changes that are on the way, such as climate change, 
loss of biodiversity, unsustainable urbanization, to name a few. 
This particular area requires a greater attention and special efforts to achieve the 2030 target. As can be seen from the 
estimate from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) (Figure 17), in the current pace the universal health care 
target will not be met by 2030 for many countries, and that ultimately means a less safe world for all, and human and health 
insecurity for a large part of the world population. 
Figure 17. Achievement of health-related SDGs. Source: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), http://vizhub.
healthdata.org/sdg. 
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• Options for providing services through more 
decentralized infrastructure in combination with 
highly efficient appliances and equipment that 
are more granular in nature and easier to scale 
up and diffuse (Wilson et al. 2020b). For example, 
direct current (DC) appliances and productive 
equipment in conjunction with off-grid solar 
energy technologies are increasingly being seen as 
a potential way to provide reliable and affordable 
energy services even to remote rural communities 
within the 2030 timeframe (Phadke et al. 2017). 
• Demand management, for example, enhancement 
(where demand is low) and contraction (where 
demand is high) through efficiency measures, 
behavioral nudges and shared economy applications 
via information dissemination, and virtual financing 
options to end-users and customers (Hilty and 
Aebischer 2015).
3.2.3. Decent living standards and resource 
requirements
Going beyond providing access to basic services (see 
Section 3.2.2) and further raising living standards 
in developing countries is central to the sustainable 
development pathways of TWI2050. The concept of 
wellbeing includes that everyone has the means to 
pursue a decent life, and avoid harm from extreme 
weather, disease, and pollution (Doyal and Gough 
1984). Everybody should have amenities that ensure 
good health, and that enable people to engage with 
society. This includes safe and uncramped shelter, 
adequate nutrition and water supply, clothing, health 
care, and basic comforts in the home, such as lighting 
and thermal comfort (including water heating), 
refrigerators, and clean cooking devices. In engaging 
with society, people seek knowledge about the world, 
and the means to communicate with others, which 
gives rise to the need for education, devices in the 
home to communicate (e.g., mobile phones) and access 
to broadcast media (e.g., television), and access to 
mobility.
Research has shown that high levels of wellbeing 
measured with different indices or indicators, such 
as the Human Development Indicator (Steckel et al. 
2013), access rates to basic services, average income, 
or life expectancy which can be achieved with different 
levels of environmental impacts (e.g., GHG emissions) 
(Lamb and Rao 2015, UNDP 2015). This very high 
elasticity of wellbeing gives hope to providing DLS in 
line with the SDGs for all of humanity with overall lower 
resource requirements and lower negative impacts on 
Earth systems. This means that developing countries 
can embrace a low-carbon transformation in their 
convergence with wellbeing levels of industrialized 
countries (Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2014, Stechow et al. 
2015). Overconsumption is currently pervasive in 
industrialized countries and high-income economic 
strata of developing countries.
The components of a decent life are reasonably well 
established in literature (Alkire and Santos 2014, Alkire 
and Robles 2017). The exact quantities of such living 
standards are subjective and vary across individuals’ 
and households’ choices, cultures, time, and location. 
Yet, there is enough commonality across humanity to 
identify a minimum set of core requirements (Doyal 
and Gough 1984, Rao and Min 2018). Trying to provide 
a first generalization, Rao and Min (2018) developed 
a framework and provided rough guidelines for the 
quantities of people’s requirements, where possible 
(Figure 18). This is what we call ‘decent living standards 
(DLS).’ 
Translating the DLS concept into tangible indicators 
and thresholds, they cover physical and social wellbeing 
and the necessary goods and services available at 
household and community level. The household level 
covers the following categories:
• Nutrition includes food and cold storage. DLS food 
requirements are specified in kcal per capita per day, 
and aggregated based on the population structure 
of each country (men, women, and children have 
different calorie requirements). People need the 
opportunity to follow an adequate, nutritious, and 
balanced diet with a limited share of meat derived 
calories. Ongoing work is already going beyond 
calories to include micronutrients (e.g., DeFries et 
al. (2018) for India). Availability of a refrigerator to 
store food produce is accounted for.
• Shelter and living conditions. Durable walls and roof 
and a minimum size of 30m2 for a household (or 
10m2 per person) to accommodate a bathroom and 
kitchen in an uncramped manner. Basic comforts 
include electricity and clean cooking devices, and 
inhouse sanitation and freshwater access, and 
devices to provide thermal comfort and hot water, if 
applicable (e.g., fans, heating, or air-conditioning). 
Adequate lighting and household appliances (see 
other categories).
• Clothing. Minimal material requirements to dress 
oneself suitable to the prevailing climate. 
• Information and communication. One mobile phone 
per adult and one television set per household 
to enable communication, information, and 
participation. 
• Mobility. Everyone should have access to motorized 
transport, either from private or public modes, 
depending on local starting conditions, while at 
the same time minimizing pollution and hazards 
to health. Without mobility options, people are 
severely limited in their livelihood opportunities. 
These household-level goods and services are 
supplemented by community-level DLS components 
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to help people develop their capabilities and thrive: 
accessible and adequate health care services (see 
Box 7), primary and secondary education, and public 
infrastructure (electricity, water, sewage, public 
transport and road infrastructure, ICT network).
The DLS are universal, minimum requirements. 
They have commonalities across countries but also 
follow local peculiarities when being operationalized 
intro country-specific thresholds. A universal standard 
for adequate floor space, durable housing, and thermal 
comfort translates to regionally different construction 
materials and space heating and cooling requirements 
(Rao et al. 2019). These vary with heating and cooling 
degree days, which can be estimated from nationally-
averaged, population-weighted data, accounting for 
future climate change impacts. The energy intensity of 
supplying water to households depends upon national 
water scarcity. Similar differences apply to modal 
choice or diets. The material requirements to achieve 
DLS for all in the near-term future in different countries 
thus differ with their distinctive starting conditions in 
each sector. 
Rao et al. (2019) have made an assessment for 
different scenarios for India, Brazil, and South Africa, 
using the following illustrative service thresholds:
 The DLS include a sufficient amount of an average 
of 2,500 kcal per person (accounting for age and 
gender) with the share of animal protein differing 
across countries. This is already a deviation from 
current household data that shows food deprivation 
in many households. To go beyond this toward healthy 
diets, micronutrient deficiency (e.g., zinc) of poor diets 
requires diet shifts. 
The annual energy demand for a household would 
be around 1 MWh and would cover an LPG cookstove 
(45% efficiency), an LCD television set, phone charging 
and electric lighting with a minimum illuminance 
level of 150 lux, and a 150 liter refrigerator. Thermal 
energy requirements in terms of water heating, air-
conditioning or heating would be additional depending 
on climatic conditions. Future efficiency improvements 
and long lifetimes for all appliances play an important 
role in reducing overall energy and material demand 
and costs. For example, currently only 25%–32% of 
households use LEDs for lighting in India, Brazil, and 
South Africa.
Figure 18. Decent living standards (DLS): hierarchy of material requirements and their derivation. We use the concept 
of Doyal and Gough (1991) for basic needs and Nussbaum (2000) for central capabilities to define physical and social 
wellbeing, for which the DLS serve as prerequisites. Source: Adapted from Rao and Min (2018). Graphic courtesy of 
Caroline Zimm.
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Inhouse sanitation facilities and a minimum 
quantity of 65 liters per capita per day (a generous 
interpretation of Gleick (1996)) in running water 
are accounted for. Clothing and footwear is based on 
observed household survey quantities. This translates 
to 1.3 kg of clothing and 0.9 kg of footwear in India 
versus 2.3 kg of clothing and 1.4 kg of footwear in 
Brazil. 
Two archetypes for rural and urban low-energy 
housing respectively (Mastrucci and Rao 2019) that 
use local and durable materials and construction 
practices and building configurations (Paulsen and 
Sposto 2013, Bansal et al. 2014, Nix et al. 2015) are 
provided. In rural areas, this is a single-story masonry 
structure, and in urban areas a four-story reinforced 
concrete structure. Energy-saving measures to reduce 
both construction and operational energy include 
aerated concrete blocks for masonry instead of fire 
bricks, and filler slabs instead of concrete slabs for 
roofing and roof insulation. Metal roofs are common 
for low-income permanent buildings in South Africa 
and India, for example, but they offer a significantly 
lower protection level to heat and cold compared to 
other solutions, potentially entailing increased health 
risks.
The mobility needs (in terms of distance) of a 
society are hard to define at a global scale because they 
are very place-specific and have grown historically. 
Overall, a minimum mobility of 10,000 passenger-km 
is derived from earlier work, which is roughly based 
on the average transport demand in an efficient, dense 
but affluent economy, i.e. (Japan (Rao and Baer 2012). 
This also allows for leisure travel. How such mobility 
demand is met depends on existing preferences, public 
transport options, and infrastructure. In India, currently 
two-wheelers are dominating the stock of light-duty 
vehicles (73%). With increasing wealth, passenger cars 
will likely catch up. In sustainable scenarios, public 
transport plays a large role to minimize air pollution, 
GHG emissions, and material demand for cars. 
What are the energy requirements for the provision 
of these DLS today and for different future scenarios? 
Currently, DLS reveal the prevailing extent of 
multidimensional poverty (Rao et al. 2019) with more 
people lacking DLS than the number of income poor, as 
defined by the World Bank’s International Poverty Line 
(2011 PPP $1.90 per day). In India, 15%–93% of the 
population lack various elements of DLS, in contrast 
to 20% of income poor; for example, more than 93% 
(over a billion) of Indians lack access to space-cooling 
to avoid heat-induced health effects (Mastrucci et al. 
2019). Box 8 provides an assessment of global future 
DLS energy demand for humanity.
The lifestyles people adopt as their wellbeing 
increases will influence material and energy demand 
growth (Creutzig et al. 2018). Means of social affiliation, 
including basic education and access to broadband and 
social media, require just a few gigajoules of energy 
per capita. Future construction energy and material 
demand could be avoided if slums and poor-quality 
rural homes were upgraded with energy-saving 
housing construction practices (Mastrucci and Rao 
2019), and if public transportation could meet future 
mobility demand. 
Achieving DLS for all aims at providing everyone 
with these standards while reducing the overall 
pressure on the Earth system. A world that achieves the 
SDGs and additional ambitious Earth-system targets 
has to ensure that the world has long-term adequate 
resource supply to guarantee these DLS everywhere 
and for future generations. 
The DLS are a floor, not a target or ceiling. They are 
far from the lifestyles prevailing in the Global North 
and (increasingly) wealthier populations elsewhere. 
But they are also a long way from anything resembling 
poverty. Average future living standards may exceed 
this level. With changes in technology, behaviors, 
and values, what is conceived to be decent or can be 
provided in a sustainable manner will change in the 
long run. For the coming years, however, we believe 
that the presented DLS provide a good basis for human 
wellbeing. Future work will have to go beyond energy 
(and meeting climate goals), to assess the quantities 
of materials (e.g., steel, concrete), moving toward 
also covering other Earth-system targets under 
development (e.g., by the Earth Commission and the 
Global Commons Alliance).2
3.2.4. Sufficiency in service demands and 
resource use
The origin of the sufficiency concept relates to 
the observation of decreasing marginal returns to 
consumption of services and goods that suggests an 
ultimate upper floor to consumption.
The first empirical proof of the general concept 
was demonstrated by German statistician Ernst Engel 
(1857) who demonstrated that the share of food 
expenditure decreases with rising incomes. Likewise 
Easterlin (1973) and Easterlin et al. (2010) observed 
that happiness or self-reported wellbeing saturates or 
even diminishes beyond certain income thresholds. 
These diminishing marginal utilities of consumption 
imply an upper bound on the ability of more services 
to meet more needs or ensure more wellbeing. It 
is important to note that these empirical findings 
typically apply to income expenditure on material 
goods, rather than, for example, time spent consuming 
services associated with the higher levels of Maslow’s 
hierarchy, which also can (but not necessarily must) be 
2  www.globalcommonsalliance.org
12Efficiency and sufficiency for human wellbeing 3
47
Box 8. Providing global decent living standards (DLS) with minimum energy.a)
How much energy would be needed to provide DLS (as proposed by Rao and Min (2018) universally and discussed in Section 
3.2.3) to the entire global population? The technologies assumed for this scenario are either the best available today, or those 
likely to become available in the coming decades. For example, for residential, public, and commercial buildings, we assume 
a full, global deployment of the most efficient buildings currently available (with respect to heating and cooling) and, when 
constructing these buildings, we assume embodied energy is minimized through the choice of materials and extension of 
buildings’ lifetimes. Assumptions like these allow us to estimate energy intensities of all the material services required to provide 
DLS. We also estimate the associated activity levels. In some cases, Rao and Min (2018) offer appropriate numbers. In other 
cases, we must produce quantitative and/or disaggregated values from their qualitative guidelines. Our assumptions relating to 
both technologies and activity levels are regionally dependent but do not vary with income or wealth. All variations in material 
consumption are between nations and due to differences in local climates, population densities, and the size and age structure 
of these populations. 
What are the energy requirements of such a world? In final energy terms,b) we estimate that Decent Living Energy (DLE) in 
such a future is achievable with less than 150 EJ/year (see Figure 19). This is over 60% lower than current global consumption, 
despite the 2050 population being around 30% larger than the present day. Per person, this represents 15.3 GJ/year on average, 
with our estimates varying from 13 GJ/year in temperate countries with high population densities, to >18 GJ/year in cold, sparse 
areas like Central Asia. In contrast, current final energy consumption in high-consuming regions in North America, northern 
Europe and the Middle East is ~150–300 GJ/year per person (Oswald et al. 2020); 10–20 times larger than our DLE estimates for 
these regions, while world average is over 50 GJ/year per person and thus 3.3 times higher.
We can also consider how this 15.3 GJ/year per person is spread across the dimensions of decent living. Mobility and 
nutrition each account for about 3 GJ/year; health care, hygiene, and shelter and living (which includes heating and cooling 
and construction of houses) account for another 1–1.5 GJ/year each; education, clothing, and communication and information 
(including operation and production of laptops and phones and the networks and data centers serving them) account for a 
further 0.5 GJ/year each.
Finally, we note that our DLE estimate is low relative to other researchers’ projections of future energy use—largely as we 
imagine a world of universal, DLE-based consumption. In 2050, DLE is 75% below the International Energy Agency’s business-
as-usual estimate and 60% below their most ambitious Beyond 2-degrees Scenario. DLE is also ~40% lower than 2050 energy 
use in the Low Energy Demand (LED) scenario of Grubler et al. (2018), with the difference allowing for higher levels of service 
provision beyond DLE (‘sufficiency corridor,’ Section 3.2.4 below). 
The LED scenario is one of very low energy demand, and the figure inserts give some indication why DLE remains significantly 
lower. LED considers a transition from the present day to a world of low demand, and hence substantial regional disparities in 
per-capita energy use remain. Average per-capita energy use in OECD countries is close to 60 GJ/capita—more than three times 
larger than in the Middle East and Africa (MAF). Energy use in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union also remains high 
at over 40 GJ/capita. Variations in DLE across nations is only ~13-18 GJ/capita, and hence variations between these regions are 
insignificant.
Clearly our current energy consumption is far higher than is required to meet basic human need and provide the foundations 
for good life for all. Much current consumption is instead wasteful and not directed toward human wellbeing or indeed is directly 
in opposition to it. The notion of DLE provides an alternative perspective that is far more materially generous than those opposed 
to strong reductions in consumption often assume
a) Based on Millward-Hopkins J, Steinberger JK, Rao ND & Oswald Y (in review). "Providing Decent Living with Minimum Energy: 
A Global Scenario." Global Environmental Change.
b) We use final energy as this better reflects the energy requirements of society and economic activity; primary energy assumes 
a portfolio of existing energy sources and the associated conversion losses occurring when, for example, coal is converted into 
electricity, or oil into gasoline. With respect to human wellbeing, final energy is still a means to various ends—but it is closer to 
these ends than primary energy.
(continued)
resource-intensive activities (e.g., when involving long-
distance international travel for cultural or recreational 
purposes). 
There are two other reasons to argue for an 
upper bound for services. First, if the resource costs 
and environmental impacts of service-provisioning 
systems are factored into the wellbeing calculus, 
then ever-higher levels of services imply ever more 
degradation of natural systems which undermines 
wellbeing for all (Knight and Rosa 2011). Second, 
wellbeing is seen in relative as well as absolute terms. 
The perceived wellbeing of others shapes people’s own 
sense of wellbeing. The wellbeing of others cannot 
be observed, so is perceived through proxies such as 
income, material wealth, and service consumption 
(including nonmaterial and nonmarket services). 
The World in 2050
48
Box 8 (continued)
Figure 19. Comparison of global energy demand for DLS in 2050 with exemplary energy scenarios (in EJ). Source: based on 
Millward-Hopkins et al. (in review). 
Inequalities in any of these measures can therefore 
undermine subjective wellbeing (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2010). Globalization of media, culture, and 
information transmission more broadly mean that 
referent social groups against which people compare 
their own service consumption are increasingly distant 
elites. This further polarizes perceived inequality.
Taken together, these arguments place an upper 
bound on the consumption of useful services. Together 
with the minimum thresholds for accessing basic 
services and DLS, this means there is a ‘safe operating 
space’ for service-provisioning systems guarding 
against both excessive levels of consumption and 
inadequate levels of consumption, that is, a ‘sufficiency 
corridor.’
Sufficiency is a common articulation of the upper 
bound to service consumption. Sufficiency means 
consuming less in absolute terms and is an intentional 
contrast to ‘efficiency’ which implies consuming 
more with less in relative terms. Sufficiency builds on 
longstanding concepts such as ‘resource conservation’ 
and ‘curtailment’ to avoid unnecessary waste but has a 
stronger normative meaning in which more becomes 
too much and is not just undesirable but is morally 
wrong and inequitable. For example, the concept of 
sufficiency has been discussed to argue for an upper 
bound to the level of service provision and associated 
resource use that is compatible with planetary 
boundaries, with climate targets used most frequently 
as examples in the literature (Friends of the Earth 
2018). 
A global survey of resource use and human wellbeing 
was conducted by O’Neill et al. (2018). In that study 
four planetary boundaries were downscaled to the 
national level to reflect heterogeneity and to determine 
per-capita sustainability thresholds for a sample of 150 
countries to derive a planetary boundary sustainability 
performance indicator. Typically (with exception 
of water) only between 34% and 45% of countries 
currently remain below their per-capita sustainability 
threshold. The study concluded that given current 
performance “no country meets basic needs for its 
citizens at a globally sustainable level of resource 
use.” Considering best practice (using best performing 
countries as a yardstick) suggests that meeting basic 
physical needs and access (see Section 3.2.3 above) 
could be met for all without transgressing planetary 
boundaries but the achievement of more qualitative 
goals of high life satisfaction (based on 11 social 
indicators) would require between two and six times 
the resource use above planetary boundaries given 
current average performance. From this perspective, 
efficiency of service provisioning will be key for defining 
sufficiency levels within planetary boundaries.
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Box 9 reviews the (sparse) scenario literature on 
quantitative sufficiency levels. While global constraints 
on levels of service provision and resource use are 
an important component, they are by themselves not 
sufficient without also considering distributional 
issues, that is, the question of the heterogeneity and 
differences in perceptions of sufficiency and the fairness 
in the distribution of resource use underpinning 
service-provisioning systems which remain highly 
inequitable. Sufficiency levels can also not be discussed 
without due consideration of the efficiency of resource 
use as they determine how much service provision 
may be possible within planetary boundaries.
Setting expectations for sufficiency in transitions to 
sustainable futures must take into account not only the 
fundamental limitations of resources and the need to 
increase efficiency in their use, but it must also examine 
the influence of norms, beliefs, and social identities 
in patterns of product choice and consumption. The 
patterns of consumption, and with it perceptions of 
sufficiency, are differentiated by culture, economic, and 
environmental contexts. This ranges from sufficiency 
that means little more than an aspiration in the face 
of a struggle for minimal subsistence among the least 
advantaged to a wide set of choices of products and 
quantities that may support long-term societal and 
Earth-system wellbeing. Perception of needs and wants 
is modulated by awareness of opportunities, that is, 
the availability of goods and services. That in turn is 
shaped by cultural influences, social media, as well as 
advertising, which in order to be effective needs to be 
attuned to local culture and norms. 
It is also important to look within a nation or a 
metropolis at a more granular scale of the community 
and a multilevel view of needs, opportunities, 
and abilities that influence community members’ 
perceptions of sufficiency and thereby some of their 
choices for consumption. At this scale, more culturally 
and contextually specific information can lead to more 
detailed insights and recommendations on how to 
foster sufficiency and more sustainable outcomes. The 
levels can be characterized as:
• The individual or household micro level, which looks 
at lifestyle, social identity, economic status, and 
educational level of the members of the community.
• The meso level is the local social environment 
with its culture, norms, degree of connectedness 
or separation of communities, and differences 
in symbols and narrative expressions indicative 
of social identities and distinctions in status and 
lifestyles. Social identities and narratives which may 
reveal them are significant in that they also may 
reflect a sense of inclusion or exclusion with regard 
to a particular community and thus also affect 
motivation for acting in accord with the community, 
including in following patterns of greater or lesser 
sufficiency.
• The macro level is the state or nation and, 
more importantly, its institutions of commerce, 
regulation, and finance. These support or hinder 
choices that can be made to fulfill needs in accord 
with community and individual norms of sufficiency.
What might be done to improve inclusive local 
decision-making processes that build awareness, 
understanding, and evidence of sufficiency principles 
(see, for example, Princen (2003) and Schäpke and 
Rauschmayer (2014)) and which actors could do that 
impact at the meso and macro levels?
What constitutes desirable sufficiency is ultimately 
a question that societies constantly have to elaborate, 
guided by available human knowledge. There is also 
a need for an ongoing process of assessment and 
adjustment by humanity to navigate toward a safe 
operating space, both globally and more locally. 
Furthermore, platforms for societal development 
debates/transformative spaces can facilitate and 
substantiate the foundations of what desirable 
sufficiency futures entail (Pereira et al. 2018). This 
includes understanding where there are ‘tension lines,’ 
and which interests may be synergized or will continue 
to go against each other. This includes a broader view 
of seeing the future as open and not locked in to a 
certain, unavoidable, development trajectory (as can 
be found in the idea of ‘the end of history’ (Fukuyama) 
as well as in some forms of historical materialism and 
determinism). 
Given the fact that heterogeneity generally increases 
at higher spatial and social resolution, the question 
of defining sufficiency appropriately for such a great 
diversity of contexts and scales remains daunting, if 
not impossible. In addition, equity principles need to 
be considered that take into account the relationship 
between sufficiency of service levels’ consumption and 
their corresponding resource use within planetary 
boundaries. As argued above, the Pareto efficiency 
principle should be applied, that is, increasing some-
one’s sufficiency level of consumption should not 
imply that anybody else’s defined sufficiency level 
is diminished under given planetary boundaries. 
The Pareto efficiency principle implies that the only 
remaining malleable variable for sufficiency levels is 
the efficiency of service provision, if indeed it can be 
increased above and beyond ‘average’ prevailing levels.
As a pragmatic solution to this theoretical and 
analytical conundrum we propose the following 
consideration. Across different social and spatial scales 
a minimum level, or ‘floor of sufficiency’ consumption, 
as defined by DLS, which is postulated as culturally and 
social context invariant, is first satisfied (see Box 10 
on sufficiency for the Six Transformations). After this 
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level has been provided, any remaining resource use 
that would not violate planetary boundaries could in 
principle be made available to increase sufficiency 
levels more in line with cultural, social, and regional 
specific circumstances and (path dependent) variations 
under some equity (distributional) principle. Planetary 
boundaries and a normative target for distributional 
equity (e.g., O’Neill et al. (2018) consider as a desirable 
social threshold a Gini coefficient lower than 0.3, which 
is at the high end of the equity of income distributions 
in countries worldwide) thus would define an ‘upper 
bound’ for the resource use of sufficiency levels in 
service provision and consumption. In turn, behavioral, 
organizational, and technological innovations could be 
called upon to maximize service provision levels under 
these boundary conditions.
Such an approach, albeit in a simplified manner 
(due to the relatively high level of spatial aggregation as 
used in state-of-the-art integrated assessment models) 
was used in the illustrative transformation pathway 
for an end-use focused strategy toward the SDGs (see 
Section 3.3 below).
Box 9. Sufficiency levels in energy scenarios.
The sufficiency concept was first introduced by Sachs (1993) and popularized by Princen (2005) in his book on The Logic of 
Sufficiency. Sufficiency levels consider human needs and wellbeing in the broader context of planetary boundaries. The objective 
is to avoid overshooting the ecological limits of the planet. However, one decade was needed to develop the first energy scenario 
which explicitly defines sufficiency levels for each dimension of human wellbeing. In fact, the French négaWatt (nW) scenario 
was developed in 2003. The scenario is based on a bottom-up approach and includes detailed data on sufficiency levels up to 
2050. It has been updated regularly with the last update being from 2017 (négaWatt 2017).
The adoption of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015) is accelerating the development of energy scenarios based on the 
planetary boundaries. Grubler et al. (2018) developed the first global LED scenario without overshooting the 1.5°C target nor 
relying on negative emissions technologies while meeting several SDGs. Rao et al. (2019) proposed energy requirements for DLS 
in India, Brazil, and South Africa. On the other hand, based on lifestyle (LS) changes, efficiency, and limits, Brand et al. (2019) 
proposed a mobility scenario with low mobility levels for Scotland. More recently Millward-Hopkins et al. (in review) developed 
the first global scenario explicitly based on the sufficiency concept. The DLS scenario with minimum energy (DLE) (see Box 8) is 
a bottom-up global scenario which considers the most stringent sufficiency levels identified in the literature (Table 1) (Saheb et 
al. in preparation).
Table 1. Sufficiency levels considered in 2050 for selected services as identified in scenarios based on the planetary boundaries. 
Source: Saheb et al. (in preparation). 
*Non-residential buildings include cafes, hotels, restaurants, health, education, leisure, sport, and office buildings including 
public ones, shopping malls and dormitories
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Sufficient levels per 
service required
Unit Scenarios
nW LED DLS LS DLE
France Global IND/BRA/ZAF Scotland Global
Sufficient housing space m2/cap 41.9 29 15 15
Household size Persons/
household
2.2 Not
identified
3 4
Sufficient space in non- 
residential buildings*
m2/cap 15.2 Not
identified
Not
applicable
Not
identified
Housing thermal comfort 
(heating)
kWh/m2/yr 15 21 Not
identified
Not
applicable
10.4.-12.9.
Housing thermal  
comfort (cooling)
kWh/m2/yr 10 10.14.-14.1.
Non-residential thermal 
comfort (heating)
kWh/m2/yr 37 Not
identified
Not
applicable
Not
identified
Non-residential thermal 
comfort (cooling)
kWh/m2/yr 78 Not
identified
Mobility levels p-km/cap 15043 9544-
17117
10000 9845 4900-
15000
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Box 10. Efficiency and sufficiency for achieving the Six TWI2050 Transformations.
The scientific consensus is that the Earth’s resoures and carrying capacity are limited. A number of critical tipping points have 
begun to emerge and amplify the negative impacts of climate-related factors on the livelihood of billions. 
Possible strategies for a way out of the ecological crisis include less resource use per unit of service (efficiency), the adoption 
of ecologically sound technologies (consistency), and the reduction of consumption (sufficiency). The main question being asked 
is whether well-established consumption habits can be perpetuated or not—and what this means for our economy.
Sufficiency can be defined as ‘modifications of production and consumption patterns that help to respect the Earth’s 
ecological boundaries while aspects of consumer benefit change.’ This definition of sufficiency is ideologically neutral and does 
not emphasize either self-deprivation or loss of potential profit or benefit. While this definition puts an emphasis on individual 
consumer behavior, it incorporates the possibility of political steering and policy. This definition is distinct from efficiency and 
consistency strategies which aim to provide the same benefit in a more sustainable way. To date, many questions relating to 
sufficiency have barely been addressed or do not have a final solution. What exactly is sufficiency? Why and in what areas is 
sufficiency needed? What constribution can it make to sustainable development? And can sufficiency be promoted by political 
measures which go beyond moral persuasion?   
In reality the answer lies in combining efficiency and sufficiency approaches. For example, the move to ride sharing illustrates 
that complex services, actions, lifestyle choices, or policy measures can seldom be classified as ‘only’ pertaining to a sufficiency, 
efficiency, or consistency strategy.
There are two considerations why sufficiency strategies are important building blocks on the path toward sustainbility:
• Efficiency and consistency approaches will often not be enough to limit natural resource consumption to sustainable 
levels (due to rebound effects, economic growth effects, technological uncertainties, and global development/global 
justice considerations); and 
• Sufficiency approaches can at at times be easier, cheaper, and simpler to accept (e.g., Germany’s climate targets can only be 
achieved if there is a significant increase in the biofuel quota, a doubling (or more) of electricity storage, comprehensive 
energy refurbishment of buildings, and huge expansion in the use of carbon capture and storage). Systematically taking 
sufficiency into account could open up more opportunities for action, tap additional potential, circumvent conflicts, and 
possibly reduce cost.
The potential for triggering a large social transformation toward sustainability includes ‘ripple effects’ (a measure so 
compelling that it is likely to be replicated) and the ‘potential for structural change’ (resulting from a measure changing the 
individual’s situation or social practice in such a way that the benefits are, with high probability, long-term) (see Section 3.2.4).
Questions for further research: 
• Beyond energy and climate protection, what are the ecological boundaries and need for action (e.g., in terms of raw 
material, biodiversity, land, water)? What are the interactions? What risks of problem shifting could occur? This is a 
question the newly established Earth Commission within the Global Commons Alliance is tasked with answeringa) 
• What combinations of sufficiency-efficiency-consistency strategies are needed?   
• What is a suitable policy mix of sufficiency and efficiency instruments, of legal and political feasibility, of distribution 
effects and of social acceptance?  
• What economic impacts of combined sufficiency-efficiency-consistency measures are to be expected?   
• How can social transformation be shaped politically? What role do different social stakeholders play in this transformation 
toward a sustainable culture? (See Chapter 4)  
a) www.globalalliance.org  
3.3. Cross-cutting strategies: 
transforming services through a 
TWI2050 Six Transformation lens
3.3.1. Introduction
How does a demand-side and service-oriented 
transformation that is at the core of SDG12 relate to 
the other five TWI2050 transformations (see Chapter 
1)? Taking consumption (and resulting production) 
as the entry point, two major relationships among 
the Six TWI2050 Transformations become apparent 
(Figure 20). 
First are transformations that are ‘enabling’ the 
demand-led transformation of consumption-cum-
production systems. Changes in human capacity and 
demography and digitalization are the two TWI2050 
transformations that both support and enable the 
step changes in efficiency and provision of services as 
described in the LED scenario (see Sections 3.4.2 and 
3.4.3). In turn, transformed consumption/production 
systems have important spillover effects on the three 
TWI2050 transformations of decarbonization/energy, 
food/biosphere/land/water, as well as smart cities, 
that are ‘beneficiaries’ of the consumption/production 
transformation that leads to more equitable access to 
services while drastically reducing resource use (and 
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hence costs and environmental impacts) of supply 
systems of natural resources or of urban infrastructures. 
While the benefits of the sustainability transformation 
in consumption/production systems are self-evident 
(see also the discussion in Section 3.4.4), we need 
further to discuss the two enabling transformations in 
the following section: People (actors), their knowledge 
and behaviors, as well as Digitalization (which was 
discussed in greater detail in the previous TWI2050, 
2019 report). 
3.3.2. Enabling transformations to support 
the SDG12 sustainability transition
3.3.2.1. Population, human capital, and lifestyle 
change
People are at the center of transformations to achieve 
the SDGs and long-term sustainability to 2050. While 
institutions and technologies play a key role in enabling 
people to practice low-carbon lifestyles, adoption of 
technologies and new lifestyles require changes in 
values, attitudes, and subsequently behavior. 
Awareness, perception, and concern about 
sustainable development and climate change are 
underlying factors that can hinder or facilitate 
behavioral change because an individual’s attitude 
generally drives the behavior of the person (Ajzen and 
Fishbein 1980). Indeed, there is evidence that pro-
environmental attitudes and climate change concern 
are associated with the uptake of household behavior 
such as electricity, water and energy savings, recycling, 
and purchasing green products (Alcock et al. 2017, 
Chankrajang and Muttarak 2017). The association 
between psychological values and behaviors, however, 
tends to be more related to low-impact behaviors than 
to high-impact behaviors (e.g., avoiding flying, living 
car-free, eating a plant-based diet), which require 
breaking a habit and hence are more difficult to change 
(Gifford et al. 2011). 
Sociocultural and demographic factors are key 
characteristics in shaping behavior. Not only does 
consumption and energy use vary with different 
life stages and socioeconomic status, attitudes 
and perceptions also fundamentally differ across 
demographic groups. 
Gender differences in climate-relevant attitudes 
and behaviors are evident across societies. Generally, 
women are found to be more likely to have better 
perceptions about the risk of climate change, to be 
more concerned about climate change, and more likely 
to embrace sustainable consumption compared to men 
Figure 20. Relationship between the Six TWI2050 Transformations, taking SDG12, Consumption and production, 
as the entry point. Transformations in consumption/production systems are enabled by the SDG-driven changes 
in Human capacity, demography and health as well as by the Digital Revolution (blue arrows). In turn, cities, energy, 
food/biosphere/water are beneficiaries of the step changes in more equitable service provision with radically reduced 
resource use (green arrows) to meet SDG12. Second order feedbacks and spillovers augment the interdependence and 
synergies among all Six Transformations. Graphic courtesy of Arnulf Grubler. 
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(McCright 2010, Gifford and Comeau 2011, Brough et al. 
2016). Apart from gender socialization that may explain 
female value orientations toward the environment 
(Strapko et al. 2016), having less capacity to cope with 
and respond to the changing climate make women 
more vulnerable and more concerned about the impact 
of climate change. If women are more likely than men 
to pursue sustainable lifestyles and consumption such 
as consuming a plant-based diet, producing less waste, 
and conserving water and electricity (Chankrajang and 
Muttarak 2017, Rosenfeld 2020), female empowerment 
(such as through education) that enables women to 
gain autonomy in decision making may contribute to 
a reduction in household environmental and resource 
footprints.
Age is another demographic characteristic that 
influences climate change attitudes and behaviors. 
Recent evidence consistently shows that younger 
people are more likely to believe in human-caused 
climate change and worry about the problem of global 
warming and climate change (Reinhart 2018, O’Keefe 
2019, Douenne and Fabre 2020). The gradient in 
climate change concern can indeed be due to the age 
effect. Because older people have fewer remaining 
years to live, they may perceive that the severe impact 
of climate change will not happen in their lifetime. 
Age disparities in concern about climate change can 
also be driven by the cohort effect, which results 
from the unique experience or similar exposure of 
individuals who were born in the same year. In the 
case of environmentalism, with younger cohorts being 
more exposed to media and school curricula related 
to environmental issues (Howell and Laska 1992), 
younger generations are generally found to be more 
environmentally and socially conscious than older 
generations (Franzen and Meyer 2009). 
There is also ample empirical evidence that 
younger cohorts differ markedly in their consumption 
patterns, in particular toward ‘usership’ (of services 
like urban mobility) rather than ‘ownership’ of end-use 
devices and products (such as cars)(see Box 11). For 
example, only 10% of the people under age 20 in the 
city of Stockholm now hold driver’s licenses, compared 
to well over 80% for older age cohorts (ITF 2017), a 
trend that is also apparent across many high-income 
countries, including the USA (where the percentage 
of 18-year-olds holding driver’s licenses has declined 
from over 80% to less than 60% over the last 30 years, 
Sivak and Schoettle (2011)). If more recent cohorts 
do show greater environmental and climate change 
concern, replacement of older cohorts with newer 
ones (‘demographic metabolism’) can bring about 
societal change (Ryder 1965, Lutz 2013). Recent global 
climate movements by young people, for example, 
may contribute to transformations toward a greener 
economy as it has been shown that climate change 
protests have contributed to structural breaks in CO
2
 
emissions in Europe and Asia (Adedoyin et al. 2020).
Education is another relevant source of 
heterogeneity in shaping consumption behavior and 
lifestyle (Figure 21). Consistently, it has been shown 
that individuals with higher levels of education express 
higher levels of concern about climate change and 
are consequently more likely to adopt green behavior 
(Muttarak and Chankrajang 2015, Chankrajang and 
Muttarak 2017, Hoffmann and Muttarak 2020). 
Individuals with higher levels of education tend to have 
better perception and awareness of climate change risks 
and better scientific knowledge. This shows that these 
features are associated with both level of education 
and the propensity to take pro-environmental actions. 
An increase in level of education in a population thus 
can potentially contribute to the adoption of green 
behavior (Lutz and Striessnig 2015).
Arguably, at the individual level, as income 
rises with the level of education and consumption 
increases with income, educational expansion may 
result in higher emissions due to the adoption of less 
sustainable lifestyles such as frequent air travel and 
higher meat consumption. At the macro level, higher 
educational attainment improves labor productivity 
and subsequently economic growth (Crespo Cuaresma 
et al. 2014, Lutz et al. 2019), which in turn lead to 
higher emissions. Recent evidence, however, points 
that a rising level of educational attainment only 
contributes to a modest increase in emissions (O’Neill 
et al. 2020). Furthermore, because women with higher 
levels of education have fewer children on average, this 
would consequently slow down population growth and 
lower emissions accordingly. 
Future consumption patterns and emissions thus 
depend greatly on population composition. Based 
on the age-gender-education differentials in climate-
relevant behavior described above, we may expect a 
society with a highly educated population, especially 
females, to pursue more sustainable lifestyles given 
their greater concern about climate change, which 
leads to sustainable consumption and consequently 
lower emissions (see also Box 12 on more sustainable 
diets). Therefore, in future socioeconomic development 
scenarios where investment in education is prioritized, 
we can expect younger educated cohorts replacing older 
ones. They can serve as a key force in transformations 
toward sustainability.
In addition to these demographic factors, changes 
in preferences and behavior can also be ‘nudged’ by 
policies (see Table 2). To change behavior focusing 
on individual’s identities is crucial (NASEM 2019b). 
Particularly in cases of wide social acceptance of 
the need to change behavior, such policies can have 
drastic and rapid effects as demonstrated in the recent 
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Box 11. Shared urban mobility.
Shared mobility models (e.g., Uber, Lyft, Didi Chuxing, 99, Careem, Curb), particularly for private passenger transport, have 
become ubiquitous from California to New Delhi, challenging both traditional (high-cost) taxi services and public transport. 
Using advanced ICT these mobility service business models (see below) can be extended into a single comprehensive urban 
transport service platform that integrates public and private transport, as well as all urban transport vehicles, including buses, 
cars, scooters, and bicycles (but not high-capacity rail-based systems, such as light rail or metros that remain the ‘backbone’ of 
urban transport systems).
The OECD International Transport Forum (2019) has conducted a number of detailed big data simulation studies for four test 
cities to explore the feasibility and impacts of a comprehensive urban shared mobility model in which all trips are provided by an 
integrated shared mobility service via a shared taxi and taxi bus fleet. The conclusions from these agent-based simulation models 
are stark. All urban mobility can be provided at any time and for any trip patterns with only a small percentage of the existing 
vehicle fleet, drastically reducing traffic congestion, energy use, and mobility costs, while simultaneously lowering emissions 
even with continued reliance on conventional (internal combustion) vehicle technology (Figure 22). 
Figure 22. Impact of comprehensive urban shared mobility on vehicle fleets, congestion, mobility costs, and emissions in four 
example cities, based on detailed big data simulations of trip patterns and an agent-based model of shared mobility coordination. 
Source: ITF (2019), cfr. TWI2050 (2019), Figure 36.
A particular appeal of this shared urban mobility option is that it can be implemented quickly, using existing vehicle fleets. 
It also offers a particularly attractive option to improve transport options and accessibility for traditionally underserved and 
disadvantaged segments of society (low-income households without cars, residents of peripheral city suburbs with inadequate 
public transport service), and it constitutes an attractive, cheap, and convenient alternative to individual private vehicle use.
Figure 21. Estimated probabilities to undertake environmental actions for different years of schooling and by knowledge, 
risk perception, and awareness levels. Source: Hoffmann and Muttarak (2020) CC BY 3.0. 
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Box 12. Charting a consumer-led transition to plant-based diets. 
Meat consumption is a major contributor to global warming. Given the worldwide growing demand for meat, and the severe 
impact of meat production on the planet, reducing animal protein consumption is a matter of food security and public health.
The recently published EAT-Lancet report Food in the Anthropocene (2019) warns that unless red meat consumption is 
significantly reduced, it will be impossible to feed, in a healthy and sustainable manner, an estimated global population of 10 
billion people by 2050. Meat-based diets are the norm in Western societies, with vegetarians accounting for less than 5% of the 
population. Rationalization of meat consumption in the West is summarized in the 4Ns: meat is natural, normal, necessary, and 
nice.
Changing consumer food behavior is a challenge and requires a positive attitude based on reasons and motivations. Fear-
based appeals can backfire and lead to a decrease in people’s willingness to reduce their carbon footprints. Taste preferences, 
culinary traditions, and social norms factor into food choices. Historically, animal welfare and health have been the two main 
motivations for people in developed countries to become vegan or vegetarian.  
Studies carried out by the European Commission show that only a small minority of people are aware of the meat impact on 
the planet, are willing to stop or significantly reduce meat consumption for environmental reasons, and have already changed 
their food choices for ecological reasons.   
The majority of consumers underestimate or ignore the potential of reducing meat consumption to mitigate climate change. 
As long as consumers perceive food as detached from the environment, it will be hard for them to make sense of the fact that 
food has an environmental impact. This may help explain why sustainability messages in favor of meat reduction are difficult for 
consumers to understand. A second barrier is that consumers have an overall positive image of meat that eclipses the value of 
environmental protection and climate mitigation.   
However, environmental motives are gathering increasing appeal with significant proportions of Western consumers ready 
to adopt certain meat reduction strategies, like meat-free days. Given that dietary habits are not static, providing consumers with 
nutritional and culinary education and information on the environmental toll of meat production could be a promising strategy 
to increase awareness and willingness. Those who are limiting meat consumption are typically female, young, meat-reducers 
(‘flexitarians’), ecology-oriented, and more likely to live in Europe and Asia than in the USA.  
COVID-19 crisis. Radical changes in social organization 
and rhythms in the form of home schooling, home office, 
wearing facial masks in cultures where these have not 
been usual in the past, etc., have been implemented 
quickly and become a new social norm. Evidently the 
shared commitment to respond to an exceptional crisis 
has resulted in these drastic behavioral changes that 
underlie the success of the crisis response of social 
distancing. They are also evidenced by quantitative 
indicators of resource consumption (see Box 11).
3.3.2.2. Digitalization
Digitalization is the general purpose (GP) technology 
of the 21st century. A GP technology is one that is 
applicable across a wide set of applications, sectors, 
and countries and that has the potential to alter ways of 
functioning and use of other technologies, thus creating 
new industries, businesses, and novel applications. 
Historical examples of GP technologies include steam 
power in the 19th century, and electricity in the 20th. 
For the consumption/production nexus, 
digitalization has three principal positive impacts 
that ‘enable’ the transformation to more sustainable 
consumption and production systems. Digitalization 
enables:
• Expansion of services at near-zero marginal 
costs of transactions. This vastly reduces costs of 
digitally enabled service provision in the domains 
of communication, entertainment, financial 
transactions, education, or health care and hence 
increases affordability of these services to poorer 
segments of society.
• Matching demand and supply in real time through 
digital coordination platforms and ‘smart’ control 
systems offer vast potentials for better asset 
utilization, improved quality of service, and resource 
efficiency, e.g., in the domains of the sharing and 
circular economy or of ‘smart’ cities, homes, and 
businesses.
• Substituting analog, physical service provision 
modes (e.g., physical media like newspapers, CDs, 
etc.) via virtual, digital (online and streaming) 
platforms, or of traditional physical forms of 
communication (e.g., business travel) by digital, 
‘dematerialized’ forms of communication (tele-
working, -collaboration, -conferencing).
The general principles and multitude of potential 
applications of harnessing the Digital Revolution for 
the benefit of sustainable development were discussed 
in detail in the TWI2050 (2019) report on the Digital 
Revolution. Here we provide some illustrations 
of potential benefits, particularly relevant for 
transforming prevailing consumption and production 
systems including new forms of organization and 
business models, digital device convergence, as well 
as health systems, considering in particular the first 
lessons from the COVID-19 crisis. We end with a 
cautionary note that digitalization may not only lead 
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Lever Action Steps Examples
Use social 
influence
Link the desired behavior to 
relevant social norms, appealing 
to human desire to fit in.
Calgary’s successful grasscycling initiative to reduce drop-offs at landfills: 
“Your neighbors are grasscycling. You can too!”.
Show that others are engaging in 
the behavior.
Telling students that other commuters were ditching their cars in favor of 
cycling. 
Reducing food waste by telling buffet diners that they could return for refills.
Highlighting a product’s positively viewed attributes more than its 
green credentials (Tesla is spotlighting innovative design and functional 
performance over environmental benefits.)
Make sustainable behavior public. After Halifax residents were required to put household waste in clear bags 
for pickup, garbage going to landfills decreased by 30%. 
Create positive associations with 
the behavior.
Asking hotel guests to signal their participation in energy conservation by 
reusing towels.
Campaign to promote solar home panels became more effective after 
advocates explained why they had installed the panels at their own homes.
Foster healthy competition 
between social groups.
WWF’s Earth Hour competition to switch off lights has expanded to cities in 
188 countries.
Shape good 
habits
Make sustainable behavior the 
default.
Using 16 billion disposable coffee cups as the default option in an effort 
to cut back on the 500 billion plastic cups used annually; energy-saving 
temperature setting in residential buildings as default setting; providing free 
travel cards for public transport.
Use prompts and feedback to 
create positive habits.
Text messages reminding people to use eco-friendly commute options.
Utility bills showing how a household’s energy or water usage compared to 
their neighbors.
Use incentives appropriately – 
and with care.
Coca Cola’s initiative to install reverse vending machines to reward recycling 
of plastic bottles.
Introduce sustainable behaviors 
during major life changes.
Encouraging people to adopt eco-friendly behaviors (after moving, taking a 
new job, marriage).
Leverage 
the domino 
effect
Make the first sustainable action 
particularly effortful.
IEKA's switch to sell only LED light bubs had a snowball effect on consumer 
behavior (lowering thermostat, insulating doors, wearing warmer clothes…)
Encourage meaningful 
commitments to behavior change.
Avoid publicizing actions that require only small commitments. Making 
behavior change last is difficult. 
Don’t allow consumers to signal 
that they are 'good people' with 
an initial token act.
Risk of slacktivism and negative spillovers (e.g., driving more after buying a 
fuel-efficient car).
Decide 
whether to 
talk to the 
heart or the 
brain
Tap into feelings of hope and 
pride.
Bacardì & Lonely Whale teaming up to remove 1 billion single-use plastic 
straws by 2020.
Subtly activate moderate feelings 
of guilt.
Explicit guilt appeals create negative reaction. Unilever’s campaign to 
spotlight its sustainability farmed palm oil, even while acknowledging 
that it leads to rain forest destruction elsewhere ( “what you buy at the 
supermarket can change world…small actions, big difference”).
Frame messages in terms of what 
can be lost.
Labels indicating the “10-year dollar energy cost savings” are prompting 
more energy-efficient purchases.
Offer concrete information and 
reference local impacts.
New York City’s campaign: garbage thrown out one day can fill the Empire 
State Building. Washing your clothes in cold water for one year equals a 
lifetime cell phone charging costs (Tide).
Encourage 
experiences 
over 
ownership
Consider business models that 
offer experiences rather than 
material goods.
Tinggly’s tagline to “Give stories, not stuff” to bypass conventional presents.
Think about how to repurpose 
your products when the 
consumer is finished with them.
“Rent the Runway” to share used clothing; Lyft’s promise to carbon offset 
rides globally. Eileen Fisher and Patagonia offering to buy back, refurbish, 
and resell clothes form its customers.
Table 2. Five levers to change consumer behavior towards sustainability. Source: adapted from White et al, (2019) and 
UNEP (2019).
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Box 13. Evidence of demand response dimensions to shocks based on COVID-19 pandemic mitigation.
The ongoing COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated that human behavior can change quickly provided that suitable technologies 
are available. The lifestyle response to lockdown and social distancing measures has been drastic and has shown the large 
malleability of human behavior and demand for certain goods and services, at least in the short run. Which changes will stick 
around for longer, however, remains uncertain.
We have seen abrupt shifts to telework and home schooling, the closure of recreational places, the reduction of production 
capacities due to decreasing demand or disruptions in supply chains, and large shares of the population (temporarily) out of 
work. As a consequence, service demand reductions compared to the same period in the previous year have been reported for 
the lockdown period. Reductions have been most striking in electricity consumption (e.g., a drop of daily electricity consumption 
by 15%–20% in the Russian Federation, between 25% and 40% in Western Europe, and 20%–25% in China (Bruegel 2020), 
while largely fluctuating between +5% and -15% in Nigeria) and transport activity (e.g., urban mobility was down to 4%–15% of 
normal levels in cities such as Amsterdam, Barcelona, Los Angeles, and Sao Paolo (Gosh 2020); in Vienna half of the population 
no longer commuted to work during the lockdown (Google 2020); car traffic saw a reduction of congestion levels by up to 90% 
across European capitals (Dickson 2020); and air traffic was down close to 90% in Europe (EUROCONTROL 2020)). 
Digitalization has enabled many of these behavioral changes: 1.5 billion children were out of school in 175 countries as of 
mid-April, 180 million schoolchildren were in home schooling in China (Iqba et al. 2020). Without digital technologies, a switch 
to home schooling would have been unthinkable. Differences in access to digital technologies (and even electricity) known as 
the ‘digital divide’ deepen societal disparities and have long-term negative impacts for those who currently do not benefit from 
such technologies (Patrinos and Shmis 2020). The crisis has exposed the extent of the digital divide in education and health by 
revealing the limits of connectivity, which endangers public health as well as education. This should lead governments to take 
more vigorous steps to extend broadband service and eventually 5G to all citizens as a matter of national security. A paradigm 
shift in education could also reduce the cost of education and democratize access to higher education. New innovations to 
increase sustained digital engagements and interactivity with educational materials will likely be required.
For those lucky enough not to have lost their jobs and who can work from home, a pervasive adoption of teleconferencing 
and e-meetings (e.g., +200% in daily meeting minutes to reach close to 3 billion minutes per day on Microsoft Teams in April 
2020 (TechRepublic 2020)) has occurred. Despite the surge in speaking minutes on the phone (+100%) and internet traffic 
(+20%–25%) (Kang 2020), no bottleneck in communication infrastructure was noticed, for example in Europe. This could lead 
to a paradigm shift in the future of work; a permanent change that will reduce costs and movement of people. Many services do 
not require in-person contact, including medicine, legal services, etc. This would affect demands for office space in downtown 
areas. Holding meetings online has become the norm, which could lead to reduced travel activity.
The lockdown has also led to increases in e-commerce and online purchases, with all their environmental and economic 
impacts. Amazon, for example, hired more than 175,000 new staff during the crisis to deal with the increase in orders (Palmer 
2020). At the same time, international trade has seen a plunge. The tourism sector has been hit especially hard, including its most 
polluting services of cruises and air travel, which basically came to a halt with travel restrictions in place.
Positive environmental effects of the changes in human demand and activity have been reported from around the world: 
reduced air pollution in many cities (e.g., China (Kottasová 2020), northern Italy and the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal 
(McGrath 2020)), the comeback of wildlife on land and in the sea (Gardner 2020), brighter night skies, or lower GHG emissions 
(McGrath 2020). 
It is unclear which of these recent drastic changes in behavior will have long-lasting impacts on lifestyles and social forms 
of organization. Rebound effects in energy demand and economic activity, as have been experienced in previous crises (Peters 
2020), are likely. Yet, the impacts of pervasive use of digital services are likely to last. The digital transformation with every 
citizen having access to smartphone connectivity to government should lead to two-way connections, especially in a pandemic 
or other crises, allowing the government to provide information to citizens (with increased targeting to neighborhoods, etc.) and 
for citizens to provide information to the government about immediate needs and developments.
Many companies that have resisted telework for years are now dealing with hundreds or thousands of employees in home 
offices and have realized that the world has not come to a halt. Twitter, for example, announced that all employees can now 
work from home forever (Paul 2020). This poses new questions on the impact on salaries or a new wave of outsourcing, but will 
undoubtedly have an impact on mobility demand.
New business opportunities have been created (e.g., online theaters and therapy). Sectors that have long fought digitalization 
have quickly adapted and have shown to be innovative in responding to changing circumstances (e.g., e-medication, prescription, 
and treatment in the Republic of Austria). Digitization of health care is likely to be pushed forward considerably, which could 
increase access and reduce costs of medical care (see Chapter 2). Necessity has already led to a great increase in telemedicine as 
both a means of consultation on symptoms of potentially infected patients without hospital visits and to reduce the burden on 
doctors and nurses while better protecting them from contagion. In the long run, telemedicine, whenever possible, may become 
desirable and far more efficient for both patients and doctors. In addition, with more sensors available through smartphones 
and smartwatches capable of providing real-time data to medical providers, preventive care may be substantially improved, and 
costs further reduced.
Widespread adoption of such practices and innovations can have lasting impacts on service demand and behavior. It is to be 
seen how these changes play out in the long run.
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to resource conservation, but through the possibility 
of new services also lead to an increase in resource 
use and consumption, which requires continued 
monitoring and technology and market foresight.
Digitally enabled business models have introduced 
new service and production opportunities for many 
consumers. Advances in research are holding promise 
for new frontiers of discovery. At the same time, the 
accumulation of personal data among governments 
and companies is raising concerns about privacy, digital 
control, and anti-competitive dynamics which require 
continued monitoring and ultimately regulatory 
oversight and regulation. 
Table 3 summarizes a range of service provision 
and business models in the digital, service, and sharing 
economies with corresponding examples.
Resource conservation through digitalization of 
services and device convergence is another illustration 
of the powerful leverage effects of digitalization on 
SDG12. Figure 23 contrasts the traditional ‘analog’ 
model of service provision in which consumers own 
a wide range of specialized, dedicated devices each 
delivering a specialized service with the new model of 
‘digital convergence’ in which all services are delivered 
in digital form via an integrated delivery platform 
(consumer interface): the smartphone. This alternative 
model of service delivery enables step changes in 
materials conservation and efficiency: material use 
(weight) is reduced by a factor of 260, embodied energy 
by a factor of 23, operational energy by a factor of 30, 
and peak power needs by a factor of 90. Even if such 
digital device convergence should not become 100% 
complete, such vast resource conservation potentials 
will nonetheless translate into sizable reductions in 
materials and energy use of consumer appliances.
New services leading to resource demand increases
Human ingenuity and perceived needs will drive the 
supply and demand for new services, some of which 
may counteract, or ‘take back’ efficiency improvements. 
Let us look at just one example: watching YouTube 
videos on a mobile phone. Preist et al. (2019) provide 
a detailed analysis of the energy and CO2 emissions 
from watching YouTube videos. Figure 24 shows that 
YouTube servers themselves only consumed 353 GWh 
per year,3 whereas the use of core and metro networks 
(1,850 GWh per year), access networks (4,418 GWh 
per year), user devices (6,091 GWh per year), and 
especially cellular networks (8,507 GWh per year) are 
using many times more energy to watch those YouTube 
videos. And yet, combined YouTube’s electricity use is 
(with some 21,220 GWh) only less than 0.08% of global 
electricity consumption. Streaming a video on a mobile 
phone is, however, more energy consuming than 
watching it on a LAN-connected computer, especially 
close to a backbone network. In fact, moving to the next-
generation 5G mobile networks4 is expected to greatly 
increase the energy and climate footprint of online 
video streaming, due to the much higher bandwidth 
available. 
An even higher impact could be new video gaming 
streaming. According to New Scientist Magazine, 
Google launched its Stadia streaming service which 
3 According to some estimates, 10 MtCO2 emissions are due to 
YouTube servers alone.
4 which are currently rolled out only in China and the Republic 
of Korea.
Model Description Company Example
Freemium Applicable for products and services with low marginal costs or 
where marketing and customer information have higher value than 
operating costs
Spotify, Linkedin, Xing
Subscription Aim is to bind the customer long-term. Customer benefits from 
improvements and extensions of the service.
Amazon, Netflix
Free offerings High value generated through customer information Google, Facebook
Marketplace model Digital marketplace connecting sellers and buyers Amazon, Uber, Alibaba, eBay
Sharing economy Access-over-ownership model, renting and leasing. AirBnb, Sharoo, Mobility
User experience 
premium
Service, the brand and especially the experience of the customer are 
improved and premium prices are charged
Tesla, Apply
Pyramid model With easy billing by technical aids, the pyramid models can be 
quickly built up and easily managed. Suitable for products with high 
margins and which can be easily explained. 
Amazon, Microsoft
Ecosystem To bind customers to an ecosystem in the long term through a ‘lock-
in’ process in a service
Apple, Google
On-demand model The immediate access is sold. The delivery, the product or the service 
can be called up at a certain point in time.
Amazon prime, Upwork, Uber
Table 3. Examples of New Service provision and business models in the digital, service, and sharing economies.
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Figure 24. Estimated energy usage of YouTube services across the entire provisioning chain. Source: Roehrl (2019), 
based on data reported in Preist et al. (2019). 
allows video gaming with a Wi-Fi controller, instead of 
a computer or a game console. Due to the streaming, 
and especially if this will be streamed on mobile phone 
networks, this new service like many others that are 
being planned are poised to greatly increase energy 
use and GHG emissions.  
These illustrative examples have highlighted both 
the upsides and downsides of digitalization: creating 
vast opportunities for improved energy and resource 
efficiency on the one hand, but potentially also novel 
services or vast demand increases for existing services 
that may counteract, or ‘take back’ some, or a significant 
part of efficiency improvements on the other. Future 
technological innovations, new behaviors, and re-
definition of what constitutes ‘desirable’ of ‘sufficient’ 
in terms of service demands remain wide open and 
uncertain. A prudent ‘precautionary’ strategy therefore 
suggests aiming for the maximum improvements in 
resource efficiency possible, to make room for these 
future contingencies while remaining safely within 
planetary boundaries. 
Figure 23. The rapid progress of information and telecommunication technologies could be an indication of the path-
breaking potential of next-generation digital technologies and their clustering in new activities and associated behaviors. 
A smartphone needs between 2.2 Watts in standby to some 5 Watts in use, while the numerous devices portrayed in 
the figure that it replaces need up to a hundred times more power. There is about a factor 25 reduction of embedded 
energy required to produce the devices and a proportional reduction in emissions. Bundling of services from various 
devices in the smartphone can be regarded as an example of the power of the Digital Revolution and its huge potential 
to increase resource efficiencies through new technologies and behaviors. Source: based on data in Grubler et al. (2018) 
and visualization of Tupy (2012), Graphic courtsey of Nuno Bento, cfr. TWI2050 (2019), Figure 20.
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3.4. How big is the efficiency resource?
3.4.1. Efficiency of service provision
The core concept and key intermediary between natural 
resources and human wellbeing of this chapter is that 
of services and service provision systems. The service 
concept recognizes that the traditional economic 
conceptualization of ‘demand’ as bundles of goods 
(fuels, material goods, etc.) exchanged with consumers 
via market transactions (gasoline for operating a car, 
grain for producing food, a cell phone to communicate, 
etc.), are in fact intermediary, economic rather than 
‘final’, social demands. The more appropriate unit of 
‘demand’ is rather the services (mobility, nutrition, 
communication, etc.) that the use of economic 
goods enable to further human wellbeing. Service-
provisioning systems are (alternative) combinations 
of products, end-use devices (technologies) and forms 
of (market) organization that provide particular 
services. For example, the service of personal mobility 
(passenger-km traveled) can be provided alternatively 
by electric or gasoline powered privately owned 
vehicles, but also by shared vehicles, or by soft-mobility 
modes (walking and cycling), or by means of public 
transport (electric metros, or diesel buses). Services 
can contribute directly to human wellbeing (shelter, 
comfort, nutrition) or are themselves intermediary 
(e.g., goods transport, ton-kms), that is, are required 
‘upstream’ in the form of materials and infrastructures 
for the provision of direct services.
Service-provisioning systems to satisfy service needs 
(e.g., illumination, nutrition, thermal comfort, etc.) 
comprise a series of interlinked processes to convert 
primary resources (e.g., coal, minerals) into usable 
products (e.g., electricity, copper wires, lamps, light 
bulbs) (see Figure 14 above). It is useful to differentiate 
between conversion and processing steps ‘upstream’ 
of end-users (mines, power plants, manufacturing 
facilities) and ‘downstream’, that is, those associated 
with end-users, including service levels, and wellbeing 
benefits (Kalt et al. 2019). The efficiency by which 
natural resources are extracted, converted, processed, 
delivered, and used for the provision of services can be 
calculated by the compound efficiency of all interlinked 
steps in the service provision chain.
Illustrative examples of such resource processing 
systems steps and associated conversion losses drawn 
from the literature are shown in Figure 25 for energy 
(direct energy conversion efficiencies (Nakicenovic 
et al. 1993, De Stercke 2014)), water use in food 
production systems (water use efficiency and 
embodied water losses in food production, processing, 
and consumption (Lundqvist et al., 2008; Sadras et 
al., 2011)), and materials (Ayres and Simonis 1994, 
Fischer-Kowalski et al. 2011) using the example of 
steel manufacturing, use and recycling at the global 
level (Allwood and Cullen 2012). 
Invariably, conversion losses along the entire service 
provision systems are substantial, ranging from 83% 
(water) to 86% (energy) and 87% (steel) of primary 
resource inputs. In other words, only between 14% to 
17% of the harnessed primary resources remain at the 
level of ultimate service delivered, the remainder being 
lost in upstream conversion steps and dissipated to the 
environment. Conversely, given these low aggregate 
systems efficiencies, the primary resource inputs for 
service provision are substantial. With a compound 
systems efficiency of 14%–17%, each unit of service 
delivered requires between 7.1 (1/0.14) to 5.9 units 
(1/0.17) of primary resources to be extracted as input 
to the corresponding service provision chain.
A substantial part of these losses happens at the 
level of end-use in final service delivery (where losses 
account for 47%–60% of aggregate systems losses for 
steel and energy respectively, and 23% in the case of 
water embodied in food, that is, in food waste). The 
efficiency of service delivery (for a detailed discussion 
see Brand-Correa and Steinberger (2017)) has usually 
both a technological component (efficiency of end-
use devices such as cars, light bulbs) and a behavioral 
component (i.e., how efficiently end-use devices 
are used, e.g., load factors). Using the example of 
mobility where service levels are usually expressed 
by passenger-km, the compound service provision 
efficiency is thus a function of the fuel efficiency of the 
vehicle and its drivetrain (typically only about 20%–
25% for internal combustion engines, but close to 
100% for electric motors) plus how many passengers 
the vehicle actually transports (load factor, typically 
as low as 20%–25%, i.e., one passenger per vehicle 
that could seat 4–5), that is, an aggregate end-use and 
service delivery efficiency of between 4% (0.2x0.2) to 
6% (0.25x0.25) only. Below we discuss in more detail 
the exemplary resource efficiency of three service-
provisioning systems: energy, water embodied in food, 
and materials using the example of steel.
The aggregate efficiency of service provision 
from energy inputs is estimated globally to be 14% 
(Figure 25, panel a). Estimates by different service 
categories/sectors are also available in the literature 
(see Figure 25, panel a) which suggests that the lowest 
compound efficiencies are for transport services, 
followed by residential/commercial applications 
(thermal comfort, lighting, communication), and 
materials (industry). The largest losses occur in the 
provision of energy services at the point of end-use: 
conversion of final energy to useful energy (chemical 
energy of gasoline to kinetic energy at the drivetrain; 
conversion of heating fuels to heat, or of electricity 
to lumens of light) and in the conversion of useful 
energy to energy services (service efficiency, e.g., load 
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factors of vehicles, thermal losses in buildings without 
insulation, etc.). Conversely, efficiency at the supply-
side (primary to final energy) are comparatively 
modest, with the largest conversion losses associated 
with the generation of electricity, which are, however, 
largely compensated by higher end-use efficiencies 
of electric applications (e.g., vehicles) illustrating the 
importance of always considering service-provisioning 
systems holistically and along the entire resource 
extraction-service delivery chain.
The example of energy efficiency in service 
provision discussed above also illustrates the 
contrast of the simple method of compound output/
input resource efficiency at its calculated aggregate 
efficiency (14%) with alternative, more sophisticated 
Figure 25. Efficiency cascades of resource use for energy (top panel a), aggregate, and efficiency by main consuming 
sector, water embodied in food (middle panel b), and materials using the example of steel (bottom panel c). The percent 
of the original primary resource extracted remaining at each respective conversion step until service delivery is shown 
as a percentage. Source: First-order estimates based on Lundqvist et al. (2008) and Sadras et al. (2011). Panel c (bottom) 
materials efficiency shown for the example of steel from primary raw material inputs (iron ore and steel scrap) to final 
retail, and recovery of post-use steel (scrap). The difference to primary inputs is comprised of additions to the material 
stock in the form of buildings and infrastructures but also due to material losses, part of which may be recoverable in 
future. Source: updated with 2016 data (J. Cullen pers. comm.) from Allwood and Cullen (2012); Ayres and Simonis 
(1994), Fischer-Kowalski et al. (2011). Graphic courtesy of Arnulf Grubler and Benigna Boza-Kiss, cfr. TWI2050 (2018), 
Figure 2.24.
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
Primary Energy
511 EJ
Secondary Energy ServiceUseful Energy
Sector
Industry (excl. N-E)
Residential/Commercial
Transport
Total
378 EJ
208 EJ
72 EJ
Water Crop NutritionFood
Ore and scrap 
input
Crude steel Recovered post-
use scrap
Steel in purchased 
products
a
b
c
The World in 2050
62
methodologies to determine resource use efficiency 
that also take qualitative characteristics into account: 
the so-called exergy method (see Nakicenovic et al. 
(1996), Sousa et al. (2017), Grubler et al. (2012a)). 
Illustrative exergy efficiencies of entire national or 
global service provision systems range from 2.5% 
(USA, Ayres (1989)) to 5% (OECD average, Grubler et 
al. (2012a)  and 10% (global, Nakićenović et al. (1996)) 
respectively. Indicative potentials for improvements 
revealed by exergy analysis thus range from a factor 10 
to 20 with the highest improvement potentials at the 
end-user and service-provisioning levels. This suggests 
that improvement potentials of a factor 6–7 based 
on direct conversion efficiencies are in fact rather 
conservative and could at least be doubled again.
A comparable efficiency cascade for water 
(Figure 25, panel b) based on irrigation water embodied 
in global food production and consumption, yields a 
comparable conclusion. While the global irrigation 
water use efficiency of some 40% (Sadras et al. 2011) 
is relatively modest, losses at the end-use part of the 
food chain, estimated at 43% efficiency (Lundqvist 
et al. 2008), are equally high, yielding an aggregated 
embodied water for food systems efficiency (from 
farm to plate) of 17%. While improved technology 
can help the efficiency of irrigation (effective water 
uptake by crops) somewhat, it needs to be noted that 
irrigation-associated water losses do not ‘disappear.’ 
Instead they are available for ecosystems services 
and recycling by the global hydrological cycle. Losses 
of water embodied in food are more consequential 
and also associated with corresponding unnecessary 
ecological footprints (land use) and economic impacts. 
These losses in water embodied in farm products arise 
from conversion losses in animal protein production, 
food losses in retail and distribution, and—above 
all—in food waste at end-use consumers, estimated 
to amount to up to 30% in industrialized countries 
(Gustafsson et al. 2011). Minimization of food wastes 
as well as dietary shifts away from high levels of red 
meat consumption, that has a particularly unfavorable 
calorific conversion efficiency (grain food calories 
needed per meat calorie delivered), are thus important 
strategies that synergistically link SDG2, SDG15 and 
SDG6, but they all entail changes in human behavior 
and habits, thus requiring social change rather than 
technological change alone (NRC 2015, NASEM 2019b).
The case of steel (Figure 25, panel c) further 
supports the conclusions of significant resource 
efficiency losses and improvement potentials. Globally 
only 47% of all primary iron and steel scrap end up 
as steel in purchased products (Allwood and Cullen 
2012) and only 13% of primary material inputs 
come from re-utilized post-use steel scrap (Allwood 
and Cullen 2012).5 Particularly, the material losses in 
the upstream supply chain of steel (manufacturing) 
deserve attention, but also face quality challenges, 
especially for high-quality and specialty steels. Not 
unlike the case of energy, where exergy (the ability of 
energy to perform useful tasks) gets destroyed, even if 
energy is conserved, important quality characteristics 
of steel can be lost even if the scrap tonnage may be 
recycled. Increasing recycling rates for materials 
also faces a trade-off with the desirability of lifetime 
extensions of products (buildings, vehicles, etc.) as a 
material efficiency strategy. Minimizing materials use 
beforehand through design changes (lightweighting) 
or alternative service provision models (e.g., shared 
vehicles fleets with high load factors and fewer vehicles 
instead of large numbers of individual vehicles that are 
used only rarely (typically only one hour a day), also 
linked with the notion of sufficiency (see Section 3.2.4)) 
are further options.
To harness additional gains in efficiency by shifting 
the focus in service provision systems to the end-user 
can translate into large ‘upstream’ resource reductions. 
For each unit of improvement at the end-use point of 
the service provision system, primary resource inputs 
are reduced between a factor of 6 to 7 units (water, steel, 
energy). For example, reducing energy needs for final 
service delivery equivalent to 1 EJ, reduces primary 
energy needs by some 7 EJ. This is hence a significant 
leverage point to waste less, while maintaining or 
improving services.
More efficient systems tend to be more resilient as 
they are more flexible in how to meet service demands 
as the overall system is smaller. In that they are not as 
prone to external shocks. 
3.4.2. Harnessed efficiency potentials by 
2050
How much of these vast efficiency improvement 
potentials discussed in the previous section can be 
realized? Figure 26 illustrates the realizable efficiency 
improvement potentials by 2050 in comparison to 2020 
(see Figure 25 above for comparison and conceptual 
definitions) decomposed by region and also by type 
of end-use using a (highly ambitious) LED scenario 
(Grubler et al. 2018) as an example. 
The aggregate efficiency from primary energy to 
ultimate service delivery improves from 14% in 2020 
to 41% in 2050, equivalent to 334 EJ, that is, two 
thirds (66%) of 2020 primary energy use. Efficiency 
improvements are largest at the end-user stage: -153 
EJ in service delivery (e.g., higher service delivery 
5 Data for global steel production in 2016, updating (Jonathan 
Cullen, pers. comm.) Allwood, J. and J. Cullen (2012). Sustainable 
Materials with Both Eyes Open. Future Buildings, Vehicles, 
Products and Equipment- Made Efficiently and Made with Less 
New Material. Cambridge, UIT Cambridge Ltd.
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efficiencies via more public transport and shared 
mobility, more efficient buildings, dematerialization 
via digital service provision, etc.) and -134 EJ in 
end-use energy conversion (more efficient [e.g. 
electric] vehicles, appliances, etc.), whereas efficiency 
improvements in energy supply are comparatively 
modest (-23 EJ—without systems interdependencies). 
By type of use, efficiency gains are the largest for 
buildings (including appliances): -160 EJ (pervasive 
adoption of Passivhaus building designs), followed 
by materials with -100 EJ (dematerialization via 
digitalization and shared mobility and recycling), 
and mobility with -50 EJ (more public transport, 
shared mobility, and electrification of vehicles). These 
efficiency gains are countered by activity increases 
and the impacts of system interdependencies. Realized 
efficiency improvements are therefore somewhat 
lower than suggested by the simple comparison to 
2020 (334 EJ). Systems interdependencies (e.g., more 
efficient electric vehicles improve efficiency at end-
use conversion, but lower the efficiency of energy 
supply (more conversion losses at power plants)), as 
well as substantial increases in service levels to meet 
the twin objectives of development in the Global South 
and DLS for all, ‘take back’ some of the energy savings. 
Primary energy demand in the LED scenario by 2050 
is, however, with 279 EJ still 45% (-232) lower than in 
2020 (511 EJ).
3.4.3. SDG benefits of demand-side solutions
Figure 27 contrasts a demand-side transformation 
strategy (using as example the LED scenario, Grubler 
et al. (2018)) with more conventional supply-side 
strategies that aim primarily at limiting global warming 
to below 1.5°C, as well as their corresponding (no 
climate policy) baselines for six illustrative SDGs and 
associated quantitative indicators.
The demand-side, service-oriented efficiency 
strategy of LED generally outperforms other scenarios 
in all six SDG indicators examined in Figure 27. The 
LED scenario scores high on the social goals-oriented 
SDG indicators (SDG2, SDG3, SDG7) due to its approach 
of maximizing useful service delivery with minimal 
resource inputs and its normative scenario feature 
of providing at least Decent Standards of Living for 
all while also allowing regional variation in culturally 
Figure 26. Realized efficiency improvements in an ambitious Low Energy Demand (LED) scenario compared to 2020 
base year (in EJ). Efficiency-induced reduction in energy use are shown at each corresponding stage of the service 
provision chain and are disaggregated by global macro-region (North, South) and by type of service/sector (buildings, 
transport, materials). Also shown are increases in energy use to meet SDG objectives like DLS for all, as well as systems 
effects of transport electrification that improve the efficiency in end-use but entail additional conversion losses in 
electricity generation upstream (gray bars on top of 2020 primary energy). Source: derived from data in Grubler et al. 
(2018). Graphic courtesy of Arnulf Grubler. 
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framed sufficiency levels that may exceed DLS. Due 
to its (lowest) resource demand, the scenario also 
either outperforms or equals alternative more supply-
side oriented scenarios on environmental and global 
commons related SDGs (SDG13, SDG14, and SDG15). As 
such, a high level of ambition and fulfillment of SDG12 
as in LED can generate significant SDG co-benefits that 
are not apparent from alternative strategies with no 
demand-side and service delivery focus.
Figure 28 complements Figure 27 with a qualitative 
scenario comparison in terms of their (potential) SDG 
synergies and trade-offs based on the IPCC Special 
Report on Global Warming of 1.5˚C. The qualitative 
assessment covers all 17 SDGs, where applicable, 
and tries to synthesize the available (albeit at times 
extremely limited) literature largely drawing on the 
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2014).
Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with 
no or limited warming overshoot require not only 
supply-side measures but also demand-side ones such 
as lowering energy demand, land-intensity, and GHG-
intensity of food consumption. Such measures can 
positively impact the achievement of other societal 
goals such as poverty alleviation, improved energy 
security, as well as health benefits. Equally, measures 
can lead to trade-offs with SDGs if not appropriately 
managed. 
One example of measures for lowering energy 
demand is introducing policies that increase energy 
efficiency or limit energy demand at a higher rate 
than historically observed. Such policies lower the 
mitigation cost for energy systems (Luderer et al. 
2013, Rogelj et al. 2013, Rogelj et al. 2015, Grubler et al. 
2018) Furthermore, in many sectors such as transport, 
industry, and residential sectors, strong demand-
side policies that accompany supply-side mitigation 
policies are essential to meet a 1.5˚C mitigation target 
while reducing the reliance on Carbon Dioxide Removal 
(CDR) technologies and carbon capture and storage 
(Grubler et al. 2018, Wachsmuth and Duscha 2019). In 
its 2018 Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5˚C, the 
IPCC shows emission reduction pathways that assume 
low energy demand (as a result of demand-side 
measures) yield the lowest carbon prices (Rogelj et al. 
2018). Furthermore, investment required for supply-
side measures could be lowered if strong policies to 
limit energy demand growth are implemented (Grubler 
et al. 2018, McCollum et al. 2018).
Figure 28 illustrates such SDG interactions, between 
demand- and supply-side mitigation measures on 
Figure 27. Scenario comparison of SDG synergies and co-benefits of a demand-side focused (SDG12) versus supply-side 
focused scenarios for meeting a 1.5°C climate target (SDG13). Also shows desirable direction for various SDG indicators. 
Source: After Grubler et al. (2018), cfr. TWI2050 (2018), Figure 3.7.
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the one hand and SDGs on the other, using the four 
illustrative pathways highlighted in the IPCC Special 
Report. The figure shows how different mitigation 
measures under all pathways can generation synergies 
and/or trade-offs with various SDGs. Such interactions 
vary for the same mitigation measure depending on 
the pathway. 
For example, looking at the supply-side measure of 
increased use of biomass (on the left-hand side of the 
figure), illustrates the potential to increase pressure 
on land and water resources, food production, and 
biodiversity and to reduce air quality when combusted 
inefficiently. 
Meanwhile, mitigation actions in energy demand 
sectors and behavioral response options with 
appropriate management of rebound effects can 
advance multiple SDGs simultaneously, more so than 
energy supply-side mitigation actions. 
Looking at supply-side land-use measures such 
as reducing deforestation, REDD+, afforestation, and 
Figure 28. SDG implications of alternative strategies of limited global warming to below 1.5°C. Source: IPCC Special 
Report on 1.5°C, Rogelj et al. (2018), Figure 2.28.
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reforestation, these have the potential to reduce access 
to affordable and clean energy as well as clean water 
and sanitation, in addition to increasing poverty and 
hunger. 
Comparing two pathways (via the right hand and 
the lower panels of Figure 28), one that assumes low 
energy demand (LED pathway) with another supply-
side measures dominated pathway, S5, shows that the 
LED pathway displays the largest number of synergies 
and least6 number of potential trade-offs. Meanwhile for 
the S5 pathway significantly more potential SDG trade-
offs are identified. Generally, the higher the emphasis 
on demand reductions and policies that incentivize 
behavioral change, sustainable consumption patterns, 
healthy diets, and relatively low use of CDR the more 
synergies with individual SDGs can be achieved. In other 
words, the choice of the mitigation measures portfolio 
can have positive (when demand-side based), or indeed 
negative (e.g., when CDR based), spillovers to other 
societal goals. It is important to note that uncertainties 
regarding the extent of such SDG interactions remain 
substantial. Various studies suggest that carefully 
coordinated policies and implementation strategies 
are required in order for positive SDG spillovers to be 
realized and negative ones to be avoided (Shukla and 
Chaturvedi 2012, Clarke et al. 2014, McCollum et al. 
2018). 
3.4.4. Impacts of demand-side 
transformation on upstream and 
supply-side systems
Because of fundamental interdependencies and 
linkages between demand and supply, the services-
oriented demand-side transformation as illustrated 
above in the Low Demand Scenario also provide a 
number of tangible benefits on the supply-side of 
resource processing systems as well. These include: 
• Over-proportional leverage effect of demand-side 
resource conservation on supply-side resource use
• Enabling and accelerating structural change in 
supply-side systems toward decarbonization
• Increasing flexibility and resilience in upstream 
supply-side technologies 
• Accelerating the SDG transformation processes 
throughout the entire system through higher use 
6 The trade-off shown for the demand-side measure “Behavioral 
response: sustainable healthy diets and reduced food waste” 
on SDG1 (no poverty) is based on a single reference from IPCC 
(2014) arguing that healthier diets and reductions in food waste 
could jeopardize traditional animal husbandry in parts of sub-
Saharan Africa. The argument on this potential trade-off is 
unsupported by other literature and also counterfactual. Dietary 
changes and reductions in food waste are prime concerns 
for affluent societies of the Global North. Traditional animal 
husbandry is not integrated into international food trade and 
hence remains unaffected by dietary regime changes outside 
sub-Saharan Africa.
of granular options that turn over much faster than 
lumpy supply-side technologies. 
We discuss each of these systems benefits below.
Leverage effect of demand-side resource 
conservation on supply-side resource use
Because of inherent conversion losses along the entire 
service-provisioning system, improvements in service 
delivery at the end of the supply chain, that is, at the 
service demand level, have over-proportional impacts 
on the supply-side inputs. These impacts, or leverage 
effects, are a function of the compounded conversion 
losses over the entire resource provisioning system 
that are substantial (see Section 3.4.1 above), yielding 
an upstream leverage effect up to typically a factor 6–7. 
Thus, saving one unit of output (resource use at the 
level of service provision) can conserve up to 6–7 units 
of inputs (resource extraction as input to the supply 
side of service-provisioning systems) and associated 
adverse environmental impacts (GHG emissions and 
air pollution, water and land-use, etc.).
Enabling and accelerating structural change in 
supply-side systems
Under continued demand growth, even record levels 
of investments into post-fossil alternatives have to 
date been unable to yield structural change in energy 
supply systems, as capacity and output growth of 
post-fossil alternatives have continuously fallen 
short of demand growth. Figure 29 illustrates this 
for renewable electricity generation into which the 
lion’s share of public policy support and induced 
investments have been flowing over the last two 
decades. With the exception of the year 2009, where 
as a result of the demand contraction following the 
2008 financial crises, growth in renewable electricity 
output (for ‘new’ renewables including wind, solar, 
and geothermal, as well as for all renewables together, 
also including conventional hydropower) actually 
substituted fossil fuel electricity generation, and 
ever larger record numbers of renewable electricity 
generation have been outpaced by demand growth. 
Noticeable and accelerated structural change in supply 
systems (e.g., as evidenced by declining emissions 
and other adverse impacts) is therefore enabled by 
a service-oriented efficiency strategy that lowers 
resource demands in absolute terms. In contracting 
markets, investments into sustainable alternatives 
can lead to rapid structural change. Changes in dietary 
preferences and food demand (e.g., lowering red 
meat consumption) will likewise underpin successful 
resource conservation efforts and a reversal in land-
use changes and agricultural water use and losses (see 
Box 12).
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Increasing flexibility and resilience in upstream 
supply-side technologies
Lowered demand also significantly increases flexibility 
and resilience of supply-side systems, particularly 
in cases of innovation failures, such as, anticipated 
technological options do either not materialize, 
remain uneconomic, or are unacceptable on social or 
environmental grounds. This has been demonstrated 
in the scenario studies performed under the auspices 
of the Global Energy Assessment (GEA 2012, Riahi et 
al. 2012). Figure 30 contrasts the (high demand) GEA 
Supply Scenario with the (low demand) GEA Efficiency 
Scenario to 2050. Next to differences in demand, both 
scenarios are also characterized by two alternative 
perspectives on the evolution of transportation 
technologies: conventional and advanced (e.g., 
electrification) transport systems. For each of these 
two scenario variants alternative so-called ‘technology 
knock-off’ scenarios were developed in which a range 
of 10 alternative supply-side options were assumed 
not to be available for future energy supply. Examples 
of options ‘knocked off’ the supply portfolio included 
nuclear, BECCs, unlimited biofuels (and hence land-
use conflicts), among others. The significant finding 
was that only under the low demand GEA Efficiency 
scenario, future energy supply remains robust across 
all 20 ‘knock-off’ scenario variants, that is, supply 
remains feasible even under a (significantly) restricted 
supply-side technology portfolio. Conversely, in the 
high demand GEA Supply Scenario, especially under 
conventional transport technologies, the unavailability 
of a range of supply-side technologies (‘knock-offs’) 
resulted in infeasibilities, that is, the high level of 
energy demand could no longer be met with a restricted 
supply-side portfolio in 8 out of 10 cases, with only 2 
scenario subvariants remaining feasible. With lower 
demand therefore supply-side systems become more 
flexible and tolerant to the exclusion of supply-side 
options thus increasing their resilience.
Harness the benefits of granular (small unit-scale) 
options
Demand-side transformations also enable harnessing 
particularly the benefits of granularity. The concept 
of ‘granularity’ (akin ‘small is beautiful’) has recently 
been demonstrated to be of particular relevance in 
accelerating low-carbon transformations (Wilson et al. 
2020a). Granular, that is, small unit-scale technologies 
Figure 29. Interannual change in global electricity demand (blue), ‘modern’ renewables (wind, solar, geothermal, red) 
and total renewable electricity production (including hydropower, green), in TWh. Changing quantities are reported by 
the following year, i.e. changes between the year 2000 and 2001 are reported for the year 2001. The graphic compares 
two data sources, one from an environmental post-fossil NGO (EMBER) and a predominantly fossil fuel company (BP). 
Both data sources agree that with the exception of 2008–2009 where electricity demand was reduced as a result of the 
2008 financial crisis, demand growth has persistently outstripped even record numbers of expansion of renewable 
electricity generation over the last 20 years. As a result, no impactful structural change in electricity supply was possible 
and emissions continued to grow. Source: data from EMBER (https://ember-climate.org/reports/) and BP (2019). 
Graphic courtesy Arnulf Grubler.  
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Figure 30. Contrasting the low demand GEA Efficiency Scenario with the high demand GEA Supply Scenario. Evolution of 
primary energy use 1850 to 2010 and in the two scenarios to 2050 (in EJ). Stacked bars show the corresponding energy 
supply by 2050 in a range of scenario sensitivities in which alternatively various supply-side options are assumed not to 
be available (are ‘knocked off’ the available technology portfolio). Altogether 20 scenario subvariants were calculated 
differentiated for conventional and advanced (e.g. electrification) transport systems. In the low demand GEA Efficiency 
Scenario all ‘knock-off’ variants remain feasible, whereas in the high demand GEA Supply Scenario only a limited set of 
scenario variants remained feasible, especially in the conventional transport scenario setup. Source: Riahi et al. (2012). 
support accelerated systems transformations 
through three main mechanisms: they enable exit 
from lock-in into existing systems (technologies 
and practices), they allow for rapid deployment and 
diffusion, as well as enjoying greater social legitimacy 
due to their associated employment and beneficial 
economic spillover effects. Wilson et al. (2020a) 
examine 10 indicators in these three dimensions of 
granularity benefits and demonstrate empirically how 
smaller-scale technologies could accelerate systems 
transformations.
Figure 31 illustrates three examples of their 
granularity indicators associated with accelerated 
systems transformations: shorter technical lifetimes 
leading to faster technology turnover; higher learning 
rates (cost reductions with accumulated deployment); 
as well as greater equality in availability and access 
(increasing social legitimacy). All three factors: 
faster capital turnover, faster improvements, and 
higher social acceptance of granular options enable a 
significant acceleration of systems transformations. 
While the benefits of granularity accrue to all options, 
irrespective if these are supply-side or demand-side 
ones, demand-related technologies are generally much 
smaller in scale and thus much more granular than 
supply-side technology options.7 Hence demand-side 
approaches to sustainability transitions enjoy the 
advantage of better being able to harness the benefits 
of granularity.
7 Counterexamples of ‘lumpy’ (large unit-scale) demand-side 
technologies include wide-body aircraft or skyscrapers, or, 
conversely, solar PV, as ‘granular’ technology on the energy 
supply side.
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Figure 31. Three example indicators of granularity benefits (out of 10 examined in Wilson et al, 2020a). Smaller-scale, 
‘granular’ technologies tend to have shorter lifetimes (Panel (i), implying faster turnover of capital stock), have higher 
learning rates (cost reductions per doubling of cumulative output, the cost reductions shown in panel (ii) correct for 
economies of scale effects and therefore represent ‘true’ learning rates), and enable higher equality of access (Panel (iii), 
low unit scale times low unit costs imply low cost barriers and hence higher affordability of access for the poor and thus 
more equitable access). Source: Adapted from Wilson et al. (2020a).  
3.5. Summary 
This chapter has elucidated the types of innovation 
required across the Six Transformations to ensure 
a sustainable, equitable, and resilient future with 
an emphasis on efficiency, sufficiency, and demand 
reduction. By taking a demand-based services 
approach, rather than a supply-based product 
approach, the chapter shows that providing DLS for 
all can be achieved sustainably at significantly lower 
cost and fewer environmental impacts than current 
business-as-usual scenarios. However, given the 
current development trajectory and vested interests, 
the necessary innovations highlighted in this chapter 
will not eventuate without direct intervention—that 
is, they need to be managed and socially steered in the 
right direction. This is the topic of the next chapter, 
which outlines the requisite changes and innovations 
in governance and institutions required across all 
sectors and at all levels, from local to global, to enable 
the transformation to a sustainable future. 
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4. Innovation in political systems, governance, and society
Innovation in political systems, governance, 
and society1
4
Global crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic are 
gamechangers. They hold opportunities and risks 
for inventions and innovation for the transformation 
to sustainability. Similarly, the pandemic’s political 
implications are also likely to be a turning point for the 
Six TWI2050 Transformations. Many political systems 
around the world are at a critical crossroads that will 
lead to either more inclusive or exclusive societies 
and to substantially more or less effective governance 
of sustainability. At the same time, geostrategic shifts 
in global politics reinforce trends in countries and 
challenge the much needed inter- and transnational 
cooperation in the time of crisis (Bremmer 2020).1
Political strengths and opportunities, on the one 
hand, have become obvious during the COVID-19 
pandemic. Firstly, the pandemic is a swan song on 
laissez-faire free market capitalism with deregulation 
(Cherkaoui 2020). It is now the hour of effective 
political institutions and leaders from local to global 
levels that care about public and individual health. 
In addition, balancing public and individual interests 
when dealing with the pandemic requires trustworthy 
state institutions and credible political leaders on all 
levels. This works in many countries and regions; take, 
for example, the effective work of the regional African 
Disease Center. Some of the most successful measures 
to contain the COVID-19 pandemic were orchestrated 
at the community level through honest reporting, 
cooperation, and information sharing, for example, in 
South Korea, Taiwan, Province of China,2 and Singapore 
(WHO 2020a).  Secondly, resilient and cohesive societies 
where individuals share inclusive identities, trust 
each other, and cooperate for the common good have 
been crucial in collectively enduring and overcoming 
stressful lockdowns (Bargain and Aminjonov 2020). 
In some societies trust has been increasing as a 
consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic because 
people unite and experience effective action of the 
state (Esaiasson et al. 2020, Khemani 2020). However, 
states and societies alone will not tackle crises like 
1 We would like to thank Christopher Rohles and Stefan 
Wunderlich, two fantastic research assistants at the German 
Development Institute, for their support in the making of this 
chapter.
2 For readability, only ‘Taiwan’ will be used in the remainder of 
this report.
For years, normality has been stretched nearly to its breaking point, a rope pulled tighter and tighter, waiting 
for a nip of the black swan’s beak to snap it in two. Now that the rope has snapped, do we tie its ends back 
together, or shall we undo its dangling braids still further, to see what we might weave from them?
Charles Eisenstein, March 20, 2020
the COVID-19 pandemic. A strong and competitive 
private sector and economy helps to manage crises. 
For instance, debates on green recovery after COVID is 
much more advanced in dynamic European economies 
than in weaker ones with less competitive private 
sectors. Thirdly, the COVID-19 pandemic has made 
it increasingly clear that stronger science-society-
policy interfaces and the exchange between different 
epistemic communities3 are integral to advancing 
and spreading evidence-based solutions (Haas 1992, 
Kohler et al. 2012). 
Political risks associated with the crisis, on the 
other hand, have increased dramatically around 
the world. Firstly, the pandemic has accelerated the 
autocratization that was ongoing before the outbreak 
of COVID-19, while the role of elected leaders in 
some democracies has been strengthened (e.g., New 
Zealand, South Africa). A high number of autocratic 
states and political leaders used emergency rulings 
and lockdowns to expand their political power (Brown 
et al. 2020, Leininger 2020). If leaders do not loosen 
restrictions of political and civic rights, we might soon 
face a world where the kind of governance we need for 
the long-term transformation to sustainability will be 
much harder to achieve, if at all. Secondly, societies are 
increasingly under stress, with increases in domestic 
and political violence. Societal resilience and cohesion 
will suffer further and make societies more vulnerable 
if negative economic, social, and ecological effects 
of the pandemic are not mitigated (Humphreys et al. 
2020, Ide 2020). Where states and the economy are 
fragile, there are few chances to tackle the impacts of 
the COVID-19 pandemic and social inequalities—in 
and between nations—are likely to further increase. 
Thirdly, populist and nationalist leaders question 
empirical evidence and have been reluctant to take 
advice from the scientific community. They spread 
misinformation and foster conspiracy theories, which 
creates mistrust in society and leads to dangerous 
political decisions (Spadaro 2020). Although the 
importance of a solid science-policy-society interface 
is doubtless, it has become more difficult to realize. 
3 Epistemic communities are networks of knowledge-based 
experts who inform policymaking (Haas 1992). For instance, 
TWI2050 is such a network, which brings together different 
communities.
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In this chapter, we first focus on the innovations 
in governing the implementation of the SDGs since 
the adoption of the 2030 Agenda in 2015. We start on 
this positive note to show that successful innovations 
in integrated SDG implementation were made and 
now need upscaling, regardless of the pandemic. 
Conceptually, we base these insights on TWI2050’s 
(2018) definition of transformative governance needed 
for the sustainability transformation and on empirical 
analyses of the participating TWI2050 researchers. 
In so doing, this chapter mirrors the findings from 
the 2019 Global Sustainability Development Report, 
which emphasizes the crucial role of governance for 
SDG implementation (GSDR 2019). The second part of 
this chapter focuses on the innovations that are needed 
in governing the transformation to sustainability 
in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. We focus 
on governance in the political, social, and business 
sphere. Here, we address three questions, which 
need further research and knowledge creation: What 
are fundamental political changes resulting from the 
COVID-19 pandemic and what are their implications for 
governing the sustainability transformation? What type 
of governance do we need to foster societal resilience? 
What does an effective science-policy-society interface 
look like in times of populism and nationalism?
4.1. Achievements: governance 
innovations for sustainability 
In 2018, TWI2050 released a high-profile report that 
outlined the core governance features that countries 
needed to support the Six Transformations toward 
sustainability (see Box 14). Though the report did 
not specifically foresee a COVID-19 pandemic, it was 
accurate in the analysis of potential disruptions from 
continuing down unsustainable development paths. 
It thus emphasized the importance of peace, political 
stability, and inclusive governance as necessary pre-
conditions to withstand such shocks.4 The report 
also moved beyond these prerequisite conditions to 
underline the critical role of capable public institutions, 
engaged civil societies, and active partnerships with 
scientists and the private sector to develop the policies 
and plans needed for the Six Transformations. Finally, 
it emphasized that these multi-actor governance 
arrangements would also need to work across scales, 
levels, and sectors to capitalize on possible synergies 
and manage the trade-offs across different SDGs.
Since the release of the first TWI2050 report 
(TWI2050 2018), a few discouraging and encouraging 
developments have altered the context for implementing 
4 The crisis featured in TWI2050 (2018). Transformations to 
Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Report prepared by 
The World in 2050 initiative. Laxenburg, Austria, International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). focused chiefly 
on the Arab Spring movements which were partially related to 
environmental stresses.
its recommendations. One of the more notable sets of 
discouraging trends involves the SDGs themselves. 
Current assessments suggest that at the five-year mark 
on SDG implementation progress is slow and uneven, 
with some evidence showing the world is moving in 
the wrong direction on some SDGs (UN 2019). There 
are only 10 years left to fulfill the 2030 Agenda. Yet 
recent assessments are not wholly discouraging. 
One of the more encouraging signs is that nearly 150 
countries have presented their voluntary national 
reviews (VNRs), revealing ambitious lists of policies 
required to achieve the SDGs—including those on the 
efficiency, sufficiency, and innovation themes featured 
in this report (Elder and Bartalini 2019). Another 
indication is the growing understanding of how the core 
governance features highlighted in the 2018 TWI2050 
report are affecting progress on the VNRs generally 
and integrated approaches to policy specifically. The 
next three subsections illustrate the relevance of 
governance for integrated SDG implementation on the 
national level, governing nature-based solutions (NBS) 
on city and regional level, and emerging business 
models. All have in common that the subnational and 
municipal governance levels are very relevant for 
effective SDG implementation.
4.1.1. Institutional frameworks for 
integrated SDG implementation
Transformative governance (Box 14) does not 
foresee a single institutional framework that is best 
suited for delivering the 2030 Agenda (OECD 2016). 
However, research on the effectiveness of sustainable 
development policies consistently underlines four main 
criteria that merit attention: (1) horizontal coordination 
across policy sectors (e.g., UNDP 2017); (2) vertical 
coordination across levels of state and government 
(e.g., UNDP (2017), ICSU (2017); (3) multi-stakeholder 
engagement (e.g., Dodds (2015), Beisheim and Simon 
(2016), Stafford-Smith et al. (2017)); and (4) high-
level political leadership (e.g., Abbott and Bernstein 
(2015), UN (2018)). Cross-national comparisons reveal 
considerable variation regarding the degree to which 
SDG governance arrangements meet these criteria 
and the potential challenges arising in constructing 
institutions based on these principles when countries 
implement the SDGs or related processes (e.g., CEPEI 
(2020), CCIC (2018), OECD (2016)).
• Horizontal coordination across policy sectors. 
Research on the National Sustainable Development 
Strategies (NSDS) and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSP) of the late-1990s and early-2000s 
suggests that balancing interdependencies between 
the social, economic, and environmental dimensions 
of sustainable development requires involvement 
of all relevant ministries. The NSDS, for instance, 
were typically implemented and monitored by 
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Box 14. Transformative governance (TWI2050 2018).
Basic reforms of the economy and societies need to be based on transformative governance and guide economic and social 
policies and instruments. The TWI2050 Report 2018 names the most important entry points of governance reforms (Table 4). 
Transformative governance is a network of state, nonstate and business actors, which is multiscalar, multilevel and 
polycentric. However, transformative governance is interdependent with political regimes, institutions, and states. For 
instance, if an autocratizing regime limits the space of action for nonstate actors and business, transformative governance is 
hampered or, in extremer cases, simply not possible. 
However, the transformations toward sustainability require not only capable institutions, transformative governance 
strategies, and adequate policies on all levels, but also a clear understanding of potential pitfalls and resistance against change, 
driven by politics. Five dimensions are critical and remain unchanged (Table 5):
Basic reforms for the economy (Table 6) and governance need to guide the deep changes needed to implement the 2030 
Agenda in the post-pandemic era. They will be the basis for transformative governance and guide economic instruments and 
policies. 
Problems to solve Reforms needed
Sustainability
transformation as a
civilization challenge
Four normative innovations:
1. Earth system responsibility
2. Global commons perspective - transnational fairness & justice
3. Anticipate impacts of decisions for many generations to come
4. Culture of global cooperation and norms diffusion through transnational 
governance
Flexible but stable institutions needed Network governance fostering interplay between formal institutions and 
governance networks
Overcoming institutional, political, 
sectorial path dependencies
Building transformative alliances across sectors and public spheres (state, market 
and civil society) from local to global
Integrated policy-making across 
borders, sectors and SDGs
Polycentric, multi-scalar governance and integrated management
Deep transformations lack public 
legitimacy
Invest in drivers of motivational change:
1. Normative triggers: How can we accept that?
2. Demonstrating success
3. Attractive future narratives
Dysfunctional and weak international 
organizations (IO)
Reinforce multilateral cooperation; strengthen autonomy of IOs
Dimensions Problem description
1. Vested interests Owners of fossil fuels, beneficiaries of unsustainable businesses or lifestyles
2. Power of elites Resistance to regulation, redistribution, taxation
3. Public – private relations Capture by private interests, weak civil societies
4. Conflicts Political blockades, eroding social contracts and cohesion
5. Disruptive dynamics Deep change producing legitimacy challenges
Table 4. Governance reforms.
Table 5. It’s politics, stupid!
Table 6. Economic reforms.
Problems to solve Reforms needed
Significant Public investments needed Increasing and stabilizing domestic tax revenues
Doubling local, national, and global 
infrastructures by 2050
Investment-oriented policies; long-term oriented financing
Fighting poverty and inequalities Redistributive policies; investments in human capabilities; focusing on the bottom 
40% nationally and globally
Aligning markets with the 2030 Agenda Re-embedding market dynamics
Stabilizing local and global commons Commons-oriented investments and guardrails
Trusted globalization Global and national governance to triggering inclusive development; transparent 
and accountable global economic governance
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environment ministries. While these strategies 
were sophisticated in their understanding of 
environmental sustainability principles, they were 
usually weak in understanding the linkages of these 
principles with the social and economic dimensions 
of sustainable development (Swanson et al. 2004, 
Gjoksi et al. 2010). Similarly, PRSP demonstrated a 
deep appreciation of the links between social and 
economic aspects of development but generally 
offered little in the way of environmental aspects. 
• Vertical coordination across levels of state and 
government. There is broad agreement in 
the international policy community that the 
integrated implementation of the 2030 Agenda 
will require policy coherence between different 
levels of government (OECD 2016, UNDESA 
2018). Subnational and local governments play 
an important role in formulating, implementing, 
and delivering services. They are thus crucial in 
strengthening the ownership and legitimacy of SDG 
policies by linking the implementation of the Global 
Agenda to local community needs that are affected 
by, and can benefit from, these policies (UNDESA 
2018). For this reason, strategic and effective 
national action for sustainable development needs 
to catalyze action at the subnational and local 
levels and manage interdependencies between 
levels (Swanson et al. 2004, Ongaro 2015). 
However, vertical integration may come at a cost. 
Decentralization of the responsibility for SDG 
implementation to lower levels of government 
may require additional structures, legislation and 
regulation, along with monitoring and evaluation. 
This is particularly challenging in developing 
countries where subnational institutions often lack 
the human and financial resources for expanding 
mandates. 
• Multi-stakeholder engagement. There is general 
agreement that building and implementing the 
integrated visions and strategies that are needed 
to support sustainability transformations requires 
a broad societal consensus. Such a consensus can 
only be achieved through the engagement and 
meaningful participation of major societal groups, 
including businesses, trade unions, academia, and 
civil society organizations. At the most basic level, 
awareness about, and ownership of, the SDGs by 
the whole of society needs to increase if the 2030 
Agenda is to succeed. Equally important is engaging 
the private sector to close what are significant 
investment gaps (Sachs and Schmidt-Traub 2015); 
engaging science for evidence-based policymaking 
is equally important (Colgazier 2016a; see Chapter 
4.3). 
• High-level political leadership. Research on the 
National Councils for Sustainable Development 
(NCSD), which were created in the follow-up to the 
Rio Earth Summit in 1992, indicates that leadership 
by the Center of Government (CoG) is conducive 
to effective policy coordination. Moreover, NCSDs 
with ministerial members proved more successful 
in securing an integrated government approach 
to sustainable development when given strong 
support by a head of state (Osborn et al. 2014). By 
contrast, NCSDs located within a specific ministry 
often lacked leadership and the political power to 
effectively coordinate sustainable development 
matters (UNDP 2017). However, the top-down 
approach of relying exclusively on the CoG for the 
coordination of sustainable development policies 
may produce adverse, centralizing effects, as local 
governments or sectoral agencies are often best 
placed to identify and reconcile conflicts over issues 
and policies where they possess intimate knowledge 
(Peters 2015). 
As noted previously, one of the encouraging 
developments is that it is possible to see whether 
and to what extent these criteria are reflected in the 
structures and processes of SDG implementation. Based 
on the VNRs from 2016 and 2017, Breuer et al. (2019a) 
answer this question by systematically mapping and 
comparing the national SDG coordination bodies of 
62 countries. The largest group of countries opted for 
a rather top-down and exclusive governance model 
where the national SDG coordination body is located at 
the CoG and involves the participation of three or more 
ministries. However, this body rarely grants formal and 
permanent membership to subnational governments 
or nonstate stakeholders. Such an institutional design 
provides favorable conditions for high-level political 
commitment and cross-sectoral coordination but may 
undermine social inclusiveness and policy coherence. 
Another finding from the review of the VNRs is 
that ministries of foreign affairs and environmental 
protection are more frequently represented in national 
SDG coordination bodies than other line ministries. 
The assignment of responsibility to ministries of 
foreign affairs is reasonable because the SDGs are 
an international and development policy agenda 
that requires considerable coordination among 
implementing states. However, this raises the question 
of whether national SDG implementation bodies are 
more interested in showcasing SDG-related activities 
internationally than in achieving multisector and 
multilevel coordination domestically. A related finding 
is the prominent role of environment ministries 
suggesting that the SDGs are often still perceived as 
an environmental agenda despite clearly broader 
aspirations and scope. This review suggests both that 
it is more challenging to meet the four main criteria 
in practice and emphasizes the pitfalls from trying to 
do so. It also may shed light on why there has been 
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limited progress on the SDGs and on implementing 
innovations despite significant efforts to advance 
policies and strategies reported in the inherently cross-
sectoral VNRs. 
4.1.2. Governance innovations of nature-
based solutions 
A related set of queries following on from the previous 
subsection is whether the same set of four criteria 
are needed for a narrower set of integrated solutions 
to a range of societal and environmental challenges, 
including protection against losses from climate-
related and geophysical hazards. Nature-based 
solutions fit this characterization well. They capitalize 
on nature to complement or substitute for traditional 
‘hard’ or ‘gray’ infrastructure responses to hazards and 
disasters. Much like the strategies in the VNRs, their 
implementation arguably requires working across 
sectors, scales, levels, as well as leadership to arrive 
at a transformative solution to a pressing—albeit 
narrower—set of challenges. 
Three case studies of large-scale NBS 
implementation (Martin et al. 2019) illustrate which 
of the previously mentioned dimensions of governance 
played a role in the successful implementation of NBS: 
• Mitigating flood risk through the restoration of the 
Isar River in Munich, Germany 
• Reducing landslide risk with natural measures in 
Nocera Inferiore, Italy 
• Halting deforestation and encouraging afforestation 
as measures to reduce flood/landslide risk in the 
Wolong Nature Reserve in China. 
While the substance and context of the cases differ, 
several of the key governance features played a role 
in all three of these success cases. These factors are 
described below.
Firstly, there was coordination and cooperation 
across space and agency remits to deliver financial 
and other forms of support needed to bring solutions 
to scale (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009). In each case, novel 
approaches to public administration were adopted 
that involved working across multiple scales and/or 
sectors to include flood and landslide protection as 
well as nature conservation, urban planning, water 
quality, waste management, tourism, recreation, 
and more administrative responsibilities. In the Isar 
case specifically, the regional and municipal water 
authorities collaborated on a far broader vision for 
the Isar river than their customary gray infrastructure 
solutions for flood protection. This collaboration was 
initiated by ecologically committed staff members who 
formed a multiscale and cross-sectoral working group 
that broke down the silos of water and urban planning. 
Bridging these remits was impressive by itself but even 
more so given the project’s magnitude. 
Secondly, there was meaningful participation 
of all persons and institutions with a stake in the 
outcome: multi-stakeholder engagement (Reed 2008). 
Stakeholder participation can range from providing 
a two-way dialogue to codesigning strategies and 
projects. In Germany, Italy, and China, innovative 
stakeholder participatory processes emerged that 
co-determined the design of NBS. In Italy, the process 
coupled stakeholders and experts in an unprecedented 
codesign of the eventual NBS over an intensive three-
year process (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2016, Scolobig 
et al. 2016). In China, local authorities designed and 
implemented incentives for households in consultation 
with villagers for community-based monitoring of 
illegal logging in a nature reserve. The unique system 
complemented the traditional ‘sticks’ approach for 
sanctioning illegal logging with ‘carrots’ in the form 
of payments to household groups who then had clear 
incentives to prevent logging in their assigned forest 
areas. 
Though the cases underline many of the same 
features as the VNRs, they—and the broader research 
on NBS—point to additional sets of factors that may 
prove influential in creating opportunities for NBS but 
also other attempts to advance transformative solutions 
to sustainability challenges in the COVID-19 era. First, 
major external jolts are a window of opportunity for 
nonstate actors and a moment to demonstrate political 
will effectively. Already active environmental groups or 
sympathetic state authorities can take the opportunity 
and advocate for a nature-based or hybrid green-blue-
gray solution. Political will (though to different degrees) 
was reinforced by individuals that championed 
innovative nature-based policy options. Both a shock 
to existing governance arrangements and a greater 
role for politics could help break ‘gray lock-in’ (Martin 
et al. 2019). Second, sufficiency is important to protect 
resilience of natural systems. There is an analogy with 
COVID-19. When the pandemic struck, many countries 
and institutions found that they did not have sufficient 
stores of protective wear and other critical material. 
Likewise, for environmental crises, we need abundant 
‘stores’ in terms of ecosystems, such as wetlands, 
species diversity, etc. There is need of transformative 
governance to protect the resilience of natural systems. 
In particular, there is a need to manage the conflict 
between resilience and ‘cost-effective solutions.’ It 
has been a focus on cost-effectiveness, which removed 
stores of medical equipment before the outbreak of 
COVID19, and replaced ecosystems with monocultures.
4.1.3. Emerging business models for solving 
societal problems
There are new business actors aiming to solve societal 
problems. They are key actors of transformative 
governance. For example, social entrepreneurs, 
The World in 2050
76
start-ups, and venture capital firms that employ 
emerging technologies and new business models 
to seek social returns in addition to economic ones. 
Financial resources have emerged, focused on returns 
beyond pecuniary value, such as social investors, 
environmental social governance funds, social impact 
funds, and crowdfunding, to name a few. There are 
knowledge appropriation tools that allow more open 
access to innovation for further use or sharing for 
public purposes (e.g., creative commons licenses, open 
and free source movement). Rules and regulations have 
emerged to focus on societal impacts of innovation 
or economic activities that reach beyond country 
and disciplinary boundaries, such as international 
standards addressing environmental, social, and ethical 
issues, including environmental certification and social 
labeling, sustainable and ethical business codes of 
conduct, such as fair trade. Advances in digitalization 
may also help to establish new certification schemes, 
including monitoring and verification, along complex 
value chains.
New governance mechanisms allow experimentation 
of new innovative solutions to diminish the time lag of 
users to benefits from the products and services, such 
as regulatory sandbox and regulatory pacing (Marchant 
et al. 2011), agile governance5, application of virtual 
reality simulations for policy, and participatory/open 
governance (e.g., Port Alegre, Brazil and Quebec, 
Canada). New business models have been created by 
the digital economy and the sharing economy, such 
5 Global Future Council on Agile Governance: https://www.
weforum.org/communities/global-future-council-on-agile-
governance.
as peer-to-peer reciprocal services, customized and 
decentralized small lot production that can respond to 
unmet needs quickly, such as makerspaces (see example 
of 3D visor printing in Chapter 1), decentralized power 
generation, and various forms of financial inclusion 
using mobile phones (e.g., M-Pesa and Go-pay) with 
accompanying e-commerce services, to name a few. 
Indeed, these developments have been made possible 
by emerging technologies that are said to have the 
potential to transform society, such as ICT, 3D printers, 
and AI (see also the above section on digitalization, 
Chapter 3 on new business models and TWI2050 
(2019)). Currently, the ‘signal’ is still a relatively 
isolated force but in a short space of time, these dots 
are being connected to manifest transformation from 
the bottom up in a variety of combinations. This is 
expected to occur more rapidly in the Global South 
than the Global North owing to the sheer necessity of 
overwriting the inhibiting factors, namely, institutional 
inertia, vested interests, and habits.
The question then becomes how such combinations 
are achieved so that they can gradually transform 
systems to generate broader impacts. The key is 
to design and configure different combinations of 
modules that not only generate new knowledge, but 
also generate positive externalities and network effects, 
work with external actors (Prahalad and Mashelkar 
2010), and capture benefits (Teece 2018). Here, 
innovation ecosystems and types of complementary 
assets play an instrumental role (Teece 2018). Clear 
economic incentives through transparent and credible 
policy instruments, like pollution taxes, would certainly 
Box 15. Excursion: TWI2050 – integrating governance and political conflict in future scenarios.
Modeling alternative future development scenarios on the basis of integrated assessment models (IAMs) is highly relevant 
to inform necessary policy processes for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The interdisciplinary developed Shared 
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) play a key role in this context as they provide a set of five different scenarios that outline 
alternative socioeconomic development narratives as well as quantitative pathways of GDP, and demographic and educational 
developments. Along with the SSPs possible future pathways—especially with regard to climate change and global emissions—are 
examined by various research communities (for a recent visualization see https://www.climatescenarios.org/). Some elements 
of delayed policy implementation and degree of international cooperation are also part of the model-based SSP quantifications 
in the literature.
Despite the broad social science evidence that political factors such as political institutions and armed conflict are closely 
linked to economic development (see Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004)), current development 
projections do not sufficiently account for these factors as quantified drivers (Beck and Mahony 2017). This is not least due to 
the fact that projecting and modeling future developments do not have a strong tradition in social sciences given the difficult and 
complex unfolding of this type of change. Quite recent approaches to estimate regime transitions (V-Forecast: Predicting Adverse 
Regime Transitions, PART) or violent conflict (Violence Early-Warning System, ViEWS, of the Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research, Uppsala University) are taking up this issue.
However, not considering the effects of armed conflict and governance on economic development can strongly influence 
the results of current pathways along the SSPs and weaken their value for informing necessary policy processes to achieve the 
transformation to sustainability. Researchers from the modeling community are already aware of this gap (Dellink et al. 2017) 
and first attempts to take ‘good governance’ or ‘civil conflict’ into account are notable (Andrijevic et al. 2019, Hegre et al. 2016). 
Still, future research should concentrate on the deepened integration of political drivers and—building on the results—the 
development of new (sub-)narratives for more realistic scenarios. 
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help to accelerate the widespread implementation of 
these new opportunities. 
Samurai Incubate Africa is one example of a number 
of emerging business models that generate their 
own ecosystems to solve societal problems. Samurai 
Incubate is one of Japan’s pioneers in bringing new 
business models and start-up expertise to emerging 
economies. It was established in 2008 as an incubation 
program but soon created its own venture capital 
fund. It was a successful frontrunner in incubating 
venture capital in Japan, investing in ICT related early 
stage start-ups when this area of work was not well 
established. It expanded its activities to Israel in 2014 
and subsequently into Africa in 2018. Samurai Incubate 
Africa started in 2018 and is now about to enter the 
second round of funding in 2020.6 Samurai Incubate 
Africa invested in MPost, a start-up that creates virtual 
addresses with mobile phone numbers to deliver a 
postal service in Kenya where the majority of people 
do not have physical addresses. To complement this 
strategy, Samurai Incubate Africa’s invests in start-
ups in digital payment, mobile delivery services, and 
e-commerce, because these are essential stepping 
stones for creating the value chains of e-commerce. In 
other words, the company tries to create markets while 
filling in missing services to make its prior investment 
sustainable (see Chapter 2).
4.2. Innovations of governance post-
COVID-19
The recommended features of governance have not 
changed significantly since the publication of the 
first TWI2050 report (2018, TWI2050 2019). In fact, 
the current sociopolitical climate arguably has made 
deepening and broadening those recommendations 
more vital. A stable, peaceful, and inclusive set of 
institutions has become essential to limit threats to 
public health and safety. The involvement of multiple 
actors working across the sectors, scales, and levels is 
also more critical to identify and act upon the synergies 
between health and other socioeconomic goals. 
But while staying the course on these prerequisite 
conditions makes sense in general, current trends 
require modest modifications in particular.
Those particular adjustments require taking note of 
some of the more discouraging trends that have surfaced 
since the COVID-19 outbreak. These trends include a 
notable rise in autocratic tendencies, the fracturing of 
societies, and a palpable distrust of science in some 
countries. If these trends continue, transformative 
governance as outlined above will be difficult—if not 
6 They selected projects focused on solving societal problems 
with the innovative application of technology and business 
models. Another unique feature of their investment is investing 
along value chains to create complementarities within the 
invested start-ups.
impossible—to achieve. Against this backdrop, this 
chapter first examines some of the political threats to 
transformative solutions to sustainability challenges 
in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. It then offers 
proposals and visions for models of transformative 
governance. It concludes with an outlook at the 
relevance and future of an effective science-policy-
society interface.
4.2.1. Acceleration of political risks through 
reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic
The most significant set of challenges lies in a clear 
shift toward more autocratic political systems as a 
consequence of lockdowns and emergency responses 
in several countries (Crabtree et al. 2020). We 
underline these shifts because less democratic societies 
will make innovations that can drive sustainability 
transformations more difficult. These risks also 
merit attention because the centralization of political 
power and restrictions on civil rights can undermine 
the collective learning processes and networks of 
intellectuals and public deliberations needed for 
innovation and transformation (Leininger 2020). In 
addition, context-sensitive approaches have proven to 
be very effective to tackle the pandemic. In this report, 
we give aggregated and more general insights, which 
need to be adapted to individual cultural, political, and 
socioeconomic contexts. For instance, Box 16 provides 
insights into path dependencies of East Asian countries. 
Recent research shows concerns about these 
risks are well founded. The “Pandemic Backsliding 
Risk Index” of the V-Dem Institute at the University 
Gothenburg demonstrates that autocratization and 
accompanying erosion of civil and political liberties 
as well as violations of human rights have accelerated 
since the pandemic (Lührmann et al. 2020b).7 Research 
based on the index shows that 48 countries are at high 
risk and 34 at medium risk to autocratize further 
due to restrictive lockdown measures, while only 47 
countries are at a low risk to become more autocratic 
(Lührmann et al. 2020a) (Figure 32). Risks of a 
pandemic backsliding are high if COVID-19 emergency 
responses are not proportionate, necessary and non-
discriminatory, lack time limits, disregard checks and 
balances, and fail to hold governments and politicians 
accountable. For example, suspending the legislature 
indefinitely in countries such as India heightens 
risks of backsliding in the world’s largest democracy 
(Lührmann et al. 2020a). The above trends are even 
more worrying because the index does not account for 
changes within closed autocracies.
7 This index combines data collected in the V-Dem network on 
different types of emergency responses of governments with 
previously existing V-Dem data on political regime classification 
and autocratization trends before the COVID-19 outbreak.
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Although there is a substantial number of countries 
with low or no risks (in green), the picture becomes 
less promising when looking at the number of people 
affected by high and medium risks of pandemic 
backsliding. Figure 33 illustrates the magnitude of 
those risks. It shows that 38% of the world’s population 
live under a high risk of pandemic backsliding, while 
20% live under medium risk. Considering that 25% 
already live in closed autocracies and only 14% in low-
risk countries, the prospects for political conditions 
fostering a transformation are definitely in question.   
A closer look at individual countries also paints a 
troubling picture. Several of the leading global and 
regional powers, including eight G20 members, are in 
the high and medium risk groups, while two additional 
G20 members are closed autocracies. Table 7 further 
shows that countries with large populations are 
characterized by a strong or medium risk of pandemic 
backsliding. Most of these high and medium risk 
countries are shaping the global order and providing 
important global public goods—for example, Brazil 
and the Republic of Indonesia are home to the world’s 
largest rain forests. As the rain forest example suggests, 
shifts to autocracy will not only influence progress 
on the SDGs and the transformation to sustainability 
within but also beyond their borders. 
4.2.2. Governance innovations for post-
COVID-19 stimulus packages and 
social transformation
We started this chapter with political risks and threats 
emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic and their 
implications for innovation and transformation. There 
have nonetheless been some positive signs emerging 
from the crisis. A potentially powerful driver of change 
is that governments have committed to approximately 
$7 trillion in recovery stimulus packages—a figure 
that is close to three times the size of the estimates 
of the $2.5 trillion funding gap per year for achieving 
the SDGs calculated prior to the pandemic (Figure 34). 
Box 16. Excursion: Political path dependencies – insightful examples from East Asia.
When identifying necessary governance reforms, we must not forget that political and social path dependencies shape states’ 
and societies’ policy priorities, political cultures, and governance mechanisms. Political reforms toward sustainability are an 
illustrative example for political path dependencies. Challenges for East Asian countries to transit to a green economy include 
legacies of the past authoritarianism in the Cold War era, the authoritarian expert politics, and the prioritization of economic 
interests (Feuer and Hornidge 2015). 
Legacies of the past authoritarianism in the Cold War era have hindered the progress of social transition in some East Asian 
countries. In spite of democratization, many East Asian countries have not entirely transited from the previous high carbon 
regimes (Chou 2018). The authoritarian governance and regulatory culture remains the center of policies governing this area 
(Chou and Liou 2012). Governments in these countries inherited bureaucratic cultures from the authoritarian era. These 
bureaucratic structures tend to be conservative and therefore are not highly open to the reformation of governance. As a result, 
plans for deep transformation can hardly be carried out.
In addition, authoritarian expert politics have impacted the policymaking rationales of these countries. Authoritarian expert 
politics are still dominant in the East Asian countries. The policymaking rationales of these countries are still in the shade of 
developmental neoliberalism (Yao 2013). Experts and technocrats, along with academics and stakeholders, form interest 
complexes. These interest complexes are prone to consolidate pre-existing developmental structures and therefore make the 
sustainability transition more difficult. The cases of structural disasters (Matsumoto 2012, Matsumoto 2013) and man-made 
calamities (Funabashi 2012) such as the ‘nuclear village’ in Japan (Hasegawa 2015, Hasegawa 2018), the ‘nuclear mafia’ in South 
Korea (Ku 2018) and the ‘nuclear complex’ in Taiwan (Chou 2018) exemplify the impact of an expert politics structure on energy 
transformation.
The prioritization of economic interests of the East Asian governments also challenges the social transformation. The East 
Asian post-developmental states tend to adopt pathways prioritizing economic interests and overlook environmental impacts 
in the policymaking process (Hornidge 2011, Chou 2015). The ideology of economic development priority and the brown 
economy with the massive use of brown energy form locked-in regimes and make societies of these countries into ‘compressed 
modernization’ in South Korea (Chang 1999, Chang 2010) or ‘delayed hidden risk societies’ (Chou 2000, Chou 2002, Chou 
2018). There is a need to also pay attention to the impact from the prioritization of economic growth, loose risk regulations, and 
nationalism, as Beck (2014) highlighted as the hidden coalition between neoliberalism and nationalism.
While East Asian's authoritarian technocratic past has resulted in a science-policy-society interface that has enabled a 
science-based and whole-of-government approach toward managing COVID-19, such development also required these countries 
to be awakened from their state of ‘delayed risk.’ In the case of Taiwan, top-down government coordination with businesses 
was key in spearheading the growth of a mask production strategy (from a daily production of 1.8 million in early-2020 to 
20 million by May 2020), as well as in providing the impetus to push biotechnological companies toward higher-value device 
and drug production, for COVID-19 test kits and vaccines. On the other hand, because the legacy of an authoritarian past still 
defers governance to one that is top-down, greater space for bottom-up participation would therefore need to be developed and 
legislated—for instance, doctors in Taiwan had to protest for their rights to be protected when a blanket travel ban was enacted 
on them in response to perceived manpower shortages due to COVID-19. As such, governance innovations would be required to 
enable social transformation for countries on their path dependencies.
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Figure 33. Population distribution in different Pandemic Backsliding Risk Index groups in million in 2020. A total of 175 
countries are considered. Source: Own compilation based on Lührmann et al. (2020b) for the Pandemic Backsliding Risk 
Index and the UNDESA (2019) World Population Prospects 2019 Revision for the population data in 2020. 
Equally important as the size of those resources, is 
that COVID-19 has created a window of opportunity to 
allocate stimulus funds to greener (new deal) programs 
and policies promoting efficiency, sufficiency, and 
innovation. Whether financial resources are distributed 
for more sustainable purposes is not guaranteed, 
however; it will depend on policy and political reforms 
discussed in this section.
Figure 32. Risks of pandemic backsliding worldwide. Displayed are the country assignments according to the Pandemic 
Backsliding Risk Index by Lührmann et al. (2020b) for 154 countries into three risk categories (green, orange, red) and 
a fourth ‘Closed Autocracy’ category (black). The index describes the risk of autocratization due to restrictive lockdown 
measures. It combines data collected in the V-Dem network in 142 countries with the existing V-Dem ‘Regimes of the 
World’ measure (v2x_regime) and further draws upon the already existing Liberal Democracy Index (v2x_libdem) 
to identify prior autocratization trends. The Regimes of the World measure is used to define the ‘Closed Autocracy’ 
category (v2x_regime = 0). Source: The rworldmap-R-tool was used for the mapping of the data (South 2011). Graphic 
courtesy of Christopher Wingens.
Sufficiency policies and governance reforms 
In the near term, policy changes may come before 
political reforms. This is chiefly because time is of 
the essence and policies often change faster than 
political institutions. Ensuring that sectoral policies 
are coherent with policies promoting innovation and 
transformation as part of the COVID-19 recovery is 
a useful step forward: incoherent policies can lock in 
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Table 7. The five most populous countries per Pandemic Backsliding Risk Index group. Source: Own compilation based 
on Lührmann et al. (2020) for the Pandemic Backsliding Risk Index and the UNDESA (2019) World Population Prospects 
2019 Revision for the population data in 2020. For readability short UN names are used.
Country Pandemic Backsliding Risk  
Index Group
Population
India High Risk 1,380,004,352
Brazil High Risk 212,559,424
Nigeria High Risk 206,139,584
Bangladesh High Risk 164,689,376
Philippines High Risk 109,581,080
USA Medium Risk 331,002,656
Indonesia Medium Risk 273,523,616
Pakistan Medium Risk 220,892,336
Russian Federation Medium Risk 145,934,464
Turkey Medium Risk 84,339,064
Mexico Low Risk 128,932,752
Japan Low Risk 126,476,464
Ethiopia Low Risk 114,963,584
Germany Low Risk 83,783,944
United Kingdom Low Risk 67,886,008
China Closed Autocracy 1,439,323,776
Vietnam Closed Autocracy 97,338,576
Thailand Closed Autocracy 69,799,976
Sudan Closed Autocracy 43,849,260
Morocco Closed Autocracy 36,910,560
vested interests and divert stimulus recovery packages 
to business-as-usual development (OECD 2018). A 
related need is to consider a mix of market-based, 
command and control, and informational instruments. 
Such mixes can work on multiple drivers and appeal 
to multiple stakeholders, bringing about wide-ranging 
changes to public health and related policies (Rogge 
and Johnstone 2017, Edmondson et al. 2019). 
An important area for COVID-19 recovery where 
these more general policy design principles on 
coherence and instrument mixes can be applied is what 
are called ‘sufficiency policies.’ This refers to policies 
and measures that promote ecologically sustainable 
consumption patterns and bring benefits to a substantial 
share of the population by altering unsustainable 
habits. Another characteristic of these policies is that 
they not only seek to influence consumers but also 
companies and third parties. Sweeping changes are 
needed because behavior depends both on personal 
factors like ingrained values, attitudes, and routines 
as well as social norms, the organization of work, and 
a host of technical, economic, infrastructural, and 
political conditions. Ideally, sufficiency policies would 
contribute to, and be influenced by, the shift to more 
innovative systems that themselves allow multiple 
elements and stakeholders to interact. To illustrate, the 
recent shift from business-related travel to online video 
that has followed COVID-19 restrictions is an example 
of sufficiency-related behavioral change that could 
bring about longer-lasting changes in mobility habits 
together with other policies that encourage flexibility 
in work-related travel. 
As the above business travel example implies, some 
of the desired changes depend on unpredictable factors. 
Yet, as that example underlines, policymakers also need 
to take advantage of opportunities with deliberate 
policy changes. Paralleling the previous discussion, 
some of these changes would aim to make existing 
policies more coherent with the goal of sufficiency—for 
instance, curbing incentives for unsustainable travel 
in energy, labor, and social policies. At the same time, 
policymakers will also need to introduce incentives and 
regulations to bring about a shift to more innovative 
systems. Also echoing the previous discussion, a 
mix of instruments ranging from information-based 
instruments (advertising, campaigns and websites 
and product labeling) to economic instruments (excise 
taxes and charges; schemes with tradable allowances; 
subsidies) to regulatory instruments (de facto bans on 
conventional light bulbs; setting of limits (on living 
space, energy saving); product standards) would help 
advance sufficiency. 
In the area of sufficiency policy specifically, an 
additional set of instruments is also needed. Those 
instruments should target planning and infrastructure 
provision as both areas can lock in unsustainable 
behaviors and planning. One potential approach would 
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Figure 34. Investments in recovery stimulus packages and SDG funding gap. Source: based on data from Subhani (2020) 
and Wilson (2016).
follow work on nudging and involve policymakers 
making sufficiency the default option in consumer 
decisions when they are the service provider (e.g., 
urban planning can encourage behavior switching 
to pedestrian and bike-friendly measures). Another 
alternative is that municipalities may want to actively 
promote services for collaborative consumption (e.g., 
in the food sector) that favor sufficiency. In both of these 
cases, carefully crafted governmental interventions 
can induce participation and lend direction to search 
processes for solutions to challenges to sufficiency. 
While the above suggestions should facilitate the 
adoption of sufficiency policies, there are barriers to 
their uptake. One such obstacle is that a key benefit of 
sufficiency and efficiency—environmental protection—
is chiefly long term and socially distributed, whereas 
many of the costs are near term and concentrated. There 
are hence likely to be strong and powerful interests 
opposing sufficiency-related reforms, especially in 
resource-intensive sectors—though the COVD-19 crisis 
and the allocation of stimulus funds could weaken 
their influence. An additional challenge is that poor or 
disadvantaged groups may be hurt when sufficiency 
policy leads to an increase in the prices of essential 
goods and services (i.e., energy, food, or travel costs). 
Limiting these undesirable social impacts should be 
considered in the effort to make policies coherent (for 
a broader perspective see Box 17). Another possible 
stumbling block is that changes in consumption 
patterns and innovations supporting sufficiency could 
also be argued as infringing on individual liberties and 
run into constitutional and legal challenges. These are 
just one of the ways in which policies interact with 
the larger political system and speak to the need for 
coherence not only among policies but also between 
policies and institutions. 
Entry points for sustainability breakthroughs in the 
face of the COVID-19 pandemic
Sufficiency policies may take time to be effective 
because they require fundamental individual and 
societal transformations of behaviors, attitudes, and 
values. A rapid and abrupt transformation of societies 
and governance is imperative to achieving the SDGs. 
Researchers (Otto et al. 2020)}have developed 
social tipping points, which are instrumental for the 
successful achievement of the SDGs (Figure 35). They 
define social tipping points as spreading processes 
in complex social networks of behaviors, opinions, 
knowledge, technologies, and social norms, including 
spreading processes of structural change and 
reorganization (Otto et al. 2020). These spreading 
processes resemble contagious dynamics observed 
for COVID-19, and once triggered, such processes can 
be irreversible and difficult to stop. They argue that 
the COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity 
for strengthening social tipping points, which can 
enforce the transformation to sustainability. While 
the study on social tipping points first focus on policy 
enforcement and the relevance of social movements 
for change in several domains, a later study proposes 
a polycentric model of governance for achieving social 
transformation to sustainability (Bhowmik et al. 2020) 
(see next section).
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Box 17. Entry points for the Six TWI2050 Transformations: sparing, sharing, and caring.
Governing the transformation to sustainability is highly complex. The nonlinear character of society and governance as well as 
the diverging entry points of a country’s transformation to sustainability demands that the historical context in understanding 
transformation be emphasized. Applying the conservation tools introduced by (Green et al. 2005) three governance typologies 
can be considered according to their entry points to transformation to sustainability: Sparing, Sharing, Caring. Each of these 
three reflect different arrays of governance structures, institutions, and even cultures. They represent ‘world regions’ defined 
by the distinct set of regimes and other governance structures that emerged through historical experiences following multiple 
transitions. Although the ‘efficient world region’ (sparing) prioritizes economic transformation, the ‘strong world region’ 
(sharing) prioritizes its political transformation, and the ‘cohesive world region’ (caring) prioritizes its social transformation, 
these world regions are equally viable pathways to sustainability.
This means that sustainability is attainable for all countries regardless of their position in a world region (Hernandez 2020). 
There are different sets of policy instruments available for these countries due to path-dependent governance structures. In 
addition, it is possible for countries to shift membership to a world region depending on long-term policy shifts. In general, these 
narratives confirm the existence of multiple sustainable futures, each of which adequately reflects different levels, degrees, and 
paces of political, social, and economic transformation.
Sparing refers to a cluster of countries where policies are oriented toward improving efficiency and maximizing value added. 
This cluster is driven by the main logic that networks (and not primarily the state) can best provide solutions. The state cannot 
be a rule enforcer and a player at the same time. Countries belonging to this cluster tend to institute economic transformation 
to consolidate distinct market dynamics to achieve an ‘efficient economy.’ Sharing pertains to a cluster of countries where a 
‘strong’ central authority drives the transformation to sustainability. Strengthening state capabilities is the main goal of political 
transformation so that the state is empowered to ‘share’ not only the benefits but also the costs/risks of sustainable development. 
Caring is, in theory, positioned between sparing and sharing, but it is driven by an ‘enlightened self-interest’ rather than pure 
altruism. In this world region, countries prioritize social transformation to fulfill specific policy priorities such as social equity.
Twelve interconnected socioeconomic subsystem 
domains were formed, which can be further grouped 
into four social transformation system domains by Otto 
(Otto et al. 2020), and an empirical analysis of SDGs 7 
(energy), 13 (climate), and connected SDGs conducted. 
This approach on social tipping points indicates 
how the existing recovery and prevention programs 
enacted during the COVID-19 crisis can foster rapid 
sustainability transformation as well as suggestions 
for additional ‘sustainability breakthroughs’ through 
interventions and measures that can remove 
backlashes for both COVID-19 mitigation, and climate 
and sustainability action (Figure 36). Six core social 
tipping interventions for which researchers found 
empirical evidence were consolidated, which can 
help in developing refined rapid socioeconomic 
transformation pathways and narratives customized at 
appropriate scales.
Political domain: Strong climate policy enforcement 
is the cornerstone of rapid decarbonization through 
eliminating the use of fossil energy from most sectors 
and spheres of human life. These policies can foster 
producer responsibility and a circular economy but 
can also intervene where necessary, for example by 
banning advertisement of fossil fuel products and 
abolishing the trade in fossil energy. A complete 
removal of subsidies for fossil fuel industries is of 
high urgency and these subsidies should be redirected 
to renewable energy generation. The COVID-19 
crisis is an opportunity for enacting these policies 
through political enforcement.  For example, while 
oil companies are facing a substantial loss given the 
reduction in mobility, governments could force them to 
align their business model with a 1.5°C world, and thus, 
remove the subsidies for fossil fuel production and 
mobilize them into wind and solar energy production. 
The same applies for the aircraft industry or car and 
truck manufacturers (see also Chapter 3). In addition, 
‘carbon bubble,’ a view which holds that there exists 
many times more fossil fuel reserves than can be used 
if we are to meet international climate targets, and that 
as such the fossil energy industry may be significantly 
overvalued, is currently evidenced by the COVID-19 
crisis and ongoing citizen movements. A divestment 
movement is already underway and several economic 
measures that can potentially scale up this movement 
can benefit both COVID-19 and climate mitigation.8 
Another example on the importance of nonstate actors 
is the protest of doctors in Taiwan for better provision 
of medical assets during the COVID-19 pandemic (see 
Box 16).
Information domain: Information and knowledge 
systems are the key for rapid sustainability 
transformation. Not only are science-policy-society 
interfaces important but also society as a whole (see 
Section 4.3). For example, the Fridays4Future movement 
led by an informed high school student Greta Thunberg 
8 For example, many companies will benefit from a cut in 
business taxes during the COVID-19 pandemic, when a global tax 
on companies to help support the infrastructure needed to deal 
with global crises like pandemics, sea-level rise, and extreme 
weather events should be negotiated. This cannot only drive 
the divestment from fossil energy but also solve the unfairness 
and tax inequity. On the other hand, for companies receiving 
bailouts, governments should insist that once the companies 
are back on their feet, they invest in transitioning to a circular 
business model and renewables.
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Figure 35. Social tipping points in 12 interconnected socioeconomic subsystem domains. Note: Socioeconomic 
transformation system (panel a) and subsystem domains (panel b) instrumental for rapid and complete decarbonization 
of the global energy system by 2050, are identified through responses from 212 international experts in the field, an 
expert workshop, and literature review (see Otto et al. (2020) for details). The frequency (colored bars) and mean 
confidence (black lines) in a transformation system and subsystem domain, represent the percentage of experts who 
indicated that system and subsystem domain, and the average value of expert assigned confidence that transformation in 
that domain and subdomain will take place (on a scale from 1–5, where 1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest), respectively. 
Source: based on Otto et al. (2020).
(a)
(b)
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Figure 36. Six tipping interventions for sustainability breakthroughs that can potentially rapidly transform the world’s 
socioeconomic system to achieve SDG 7, 13, and connected SDGs. The world’s socioeconomic system today is trapped in 
a valley where it still depends heavily on burning fossil fuels, leading to high rates of GHG emissions. The interventions 
have the potential to erode the barrier through triggering social tipping dynamics in different sectors and thus paving 
the way for rapid transformative change. Source: adapted from Otto et al. (2020), graphic courtesy of Avit K. Bhowmik.
achieved global impact. Information feedbacks are 
critical, such as labels related to ‘Earth Facts’ and 
disclosure of information regarding individual carbon 
footprints and emissions on the products we consume 
like those used for nutritional facts. For example, 
regulation of advertising could include as mandatory 
indicators of sustainability of products and services in 
the way energy labeling and efficiency indicators are 
required in the EU. In addition, our knowledge system 
should include and enrich new world views such as 
reconnecting to the biosphere, modern shamanisms, 
and indigenous approaches to nature. This should go 
hand in hand in transforming our education system 
by integrating climate change into the broader 
processes of history, politics, and economics. To fight 
the COVID-19 crisis, some countries are now willing to 
share information openly, and public awareness of that 
shared data is crucial to fight pandemics and increases 
pressure on governments around the world. This 
potential in information sharing could be expanded 
for fossil energy production, usage and emission 
information, as well as for sharing good examples of 
sustainability transformation and solutions. Like the 
current global effort to produce and distribute medical 
equipment, sustainability solutions and strategies can 
be globally produced and shared.
Technology domain: Our energy production and 
storage systems are currently being transformed 
through the exponential diffusion of renewable 
energy, distributed generation and efficient systems, 
local energy cooperatives, and community driven 
solar and wind projects, and especially in the end-
use demand and provision of energy services (see 
Chapter 3). Local entrepreneurs and public-private 
partnerships should engage with these efforts to make 
the energy transition faster and swifter. Digitalization 
of the economy through technologies like tele-working, 
e-mobility, artificial meat, multipurpose farm-ponds 
etc., which can be sustainably produced, can drive a 
rapid reduction in energy demand (see Chapters 2 
and 3). Human settlements and cities are the hub of 
energy demand reduction (see Chapter 3). One of the 
biggest positives of the current crisis is the dramatic 
reduction of air pollution in cities. Government efforts 
should secure this trend, and instead of reducing 
congestion charges to encourage traffic back, should 
raise congestion charges, subsidize public transport, 
and incentivize people to cycle or walk in cities. 
Behavioral domain: A major shift in lifestyles 
and the dominant paradigms that influence what is 
desired and valued by individuals, and how the choices 
and decisions taken by individuals are rewarded 
by the society, is crucial for rapid sustainability 
transformation. Shifts in values and norms are also 
critical. Raising public awareness to the disproportional 
impacts of GHG emissions and global environmental 
changes on the most vulnerable social groups such 
as women and children and for the wellbeing of 
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future human generations can drive a major social 
shift to sustainability and clean energy. This can be 
fostered by informed citizenship involvement. Five 
percent of mindful consumers led to the achievement 
of European Union climate goals by 2020. In recent 
weeks, some of the most successful efforts to contain 
the COVID-19 pandemic were orchestrated by South 
Korea and Singapore, who relied on extensive testing, 
honest reporting and the willing cooperation of a well-
informed public (see Chapters 1 and 2). At the same 
time, the COVID-19 pandemic has also shown some 
of the unintended, negative, psychological, and social 
consequences of confinement and social distancing. 
All of these positive and negative fundamental aspects 
of human behavior, wellbeing, and social response 
need to be taken into account. Thus, resistances and 
movements organised by the minority of the society 
may lead to a global network of social movements, for 
example Fridays4Future, and can transform the 
majority of the society to take actions to battle climate 
change and remove sustainability backlashes. . 
Governments could intervene by making it a condition 
that companies continue low-carbon working practices 
like working from home to reduce emissions from 
commuting and congestion.
A polycentric networked governance system 
for rapid and abrupt social transformation to 
sustainability
A collective achievement of the SDGs and the Six 
Transformations inherently requires cohesive 
societies that are able to integrate heterogeneous 
values and norms among societal groups, including 
religions, and nations. Cohesive societies tend to be 
more resilient, including to external shocks like the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Equally important, societies need 
to align with a new global identity based on shared 
responsibilities and a vision for a sustainable future. 
This also requires a great reduction of inequality 
within and between countries. With the accelerating 
inequalities driven by the COVID-19 crisis, function-
based polycentric networked governance systems 
should complement rule-based policymaking. This 
approach is deemed to foster rapid and abrupt, as well 
as longer-term, social transformation to sustainability. 
It may furthermore enhance social cohesion and 
catalyze the transformations essential in socioeconomic 
domains to achieve the SDGs. 
A polycentric networked governance system creates 
agencies across social cohorts and has relevance for both 
rapid COVID-19 contagion and rapid social response to 
the COVID-19 and sustainability crises. Recent research 
models a polycentric networked governance, here 
utilizing the ‘Powers of 10’ framework proposed by 
(Bhowmik et al. 2020) (Figure 37). This model meets 
the criteria for transformative governance as outlined 
in Box 14.
A polycentric networked governance system moves 
away from the current focus on nation states, and 
rather focuses on every level of society—individual to 
global levels. We are aware that political affairs tend 
to refocus on nation states nowadays (see above). 
Nevertheless, it is important to constantly develop 
visions and models for transformative governance 
that do justice to developments that go beyond the 
nation state. In particular, the focus of this multilevel 
approach lies in networked cities, as intermediate 
governance entities between nation states and local 
communities. There are four drivers why they are well 
placed to address the civilizational challenge of the 
transformation to sustainability: (1) the population 
sizes of 193 UN signatories vary by four orders of 
magnitude and hence, indicate different degrees of 
capabilities, resources, and contributions; (2) several 
local and community level sustainability initiatives 
demonstrated more success and impact than global 
and national level initiatives, which does not only 
become evident in the fight against the COVID19 
pandemic but also the successful NBS cases outlined 
above (see Section 4.1.2); (3) governance on city level 
has a high capability to interconnect different policy 
realms such as sustainable livelihoods and job creation, 
environmental sustainability, sustainable energy, and 
sustainable consumption; and (4) implementation 
of sustainability action strategies demand active 
formation of human agencies to govern transformation, 
which relies on the actual size of the population in 
different societal levels rather than imprecise national 
or global measures (Bhowmik et al. 2020). Distributed 
global responsibilities from individual to global levels 
through agencies that can be formed using a Powers 
of 10 framework will thus enable transformation in 
every social sphere and implementation of SDGs across 
every level of society (see Bhowmik et al. (2020) for 
details). Note that seamless relationships with private 
business (101) and markets (105) are fundamental 
for transforming the social sphere and creating 
innovations. 
4.3. A strong science-policy-society 
interface
Basic science as well as interdisciplinary research is 
key to identify sound and timely sustainability policies. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has made this more obvious 
than before. Scientists have become public figures 
and indispensable advisers to some governments and 
international organizations (Roehrl et al. 2020). Where 
investments in research and development are high, 
states have performed better in fighting the pandemic 
so far. Even though most would agree that evidence-
based policy advice is crucial to overcome crises like 
the COVID-19 pandemic, it is not yet clear to what 
extent and through which institutional mechanisms 
political decision making and policies are shaped by 
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scientific evidence. Where the science-policy-society 
interface failed in response to COVID-19, we saw 
disastrous outcomes for public health, the economy, 
and international collaboration. It was astounding 
that so many advanced countries with highly capable 
science advisory ecosystems, including and especially 
the USA, had serious failures in responding to this 
quickly emerging, unexpected threat. Governments in 
many countries were unable to act wisely and early. 
Political conflicts over medical supplies and assignment 
of blame stymied a globally coordinated response.
In the light of global crises, two urgent questions 
emerge. How can we shape an enabling political 
environment open to critical science? What are 
institutional and societal mechanisms of an effective 
science-policy-society interface? 
Credible and trustworthy science requires open 
exchange between individuals, data sharing without 
interference of vested interests from states or business, 
as well as constructive criticism. Also, as outlined in the 
previous chapters, innovations more and more depend 
on a network of individuals who share ideas and 
cocreate inventions (see Chapter 2). This suggests that 
academic freedom is an indispensable precondition 
for an effective policy-science-society interface. 
Academic freedom was in decline before the outbreak 
of COVID-19. As Figure 39 depicts, the current state of 
academic freedom worldwide, according to the V-Dem 
Academic Freedom Index, is mixed and shows strong 
overlaps with the distribution of democratic regimes in 
the world.
Where states tend to limit and restrict academic 
freedom substantially, the pandemic backsliding risk is 
also remarkably high (see Section 4.2.1). As Figure 40 
depicts, most low pandemic backsliding risk countries 
have the highest degree of academic freedom. Low 
academic freedom groups mainly include medium 
or high pandemic backsliding risk countries or 
autocratically ruled ones. This might indicate that 
a well-established science-policy-society interface 
is key for states to cope with the long-term political 
consequences of the pandemic and actually functions 
Figure 37.  A networked governance approach for societal transformation Note: A ‘Powers of 10’ approach to form 
agencies and polycentric networked governance between every individual and estimated 10 billion people by 2050. The 
community to urban level or a community of 10,000–1,000,000 people may provide a sweet spot for maximizing the 
sustainability action impact through polycentric networked governance. Source: Bhowmik et al. (2020).
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Box 18. Science-policy-society interfaces in national frameworks for SDG implementation.
Institutional frameworks for national SDG implementation should foresee an established and frequent exchange with actors 
who provide empirical evidence for good sustainability policies. However, an analysis of the VNRs submitted between 2016 and 
2018 shows that science actors are represented in only 20% of the national SDG implementation bodies (see Section 4.1.1, Figure 
38). Even in technical working groups and committees, science is only present in 15% of cases. In other words, in 64% of the 
countries that had submitted a VNR, science actors were not involved in official SDG implementation bodies.
Figure 38. Engagement of nonstate stakeholders in SDG implementation. Source: based on Breuer A. et al. (2019b), graphic 
courtesy of Anita Breuer.
Figure 39. State of academic freedoms worldwide (2019). Displayed are the country assignments according to the 
V-Dem Academic Freedom Index that is included in the V-Dem Dataset v10 (Coppedge et al. 2020, Pemstein et al. 2020). 
The index is an aggregated measure to quantify the degree of the realization of academic freedom in a given country. 
It is coded from low (0) to high (1) – high values are therefore indicating a high degree of the realization of academic 
freedom. In total, 141 countries are considered. There is still a high number of missing countries (in gray) because the 
index is very recent. Future versions will include the missing countries. Source: The rworldmap-R-tool was used for the 
mapping of the data (South 2011). Graphic courtesy of Christopher Wingens.
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as an anchor of stability. Populist and nationalist 
governments and heads of state who distrust and 
discredit empirical evidence and spread fake news to 
attract popular support make it difficult to establish 
science-policy-society interfaces. They foster mistrust 
in scientific institutions and individuals as well as 
neutral generation of evidence. The USA and Brazil 
are currently the most prominent examples with 
devastating consequences for individuals and social 
groups in their societies. Overall, the political context 
conditions for an open, critical and, thus, effective 
science-policy-society interface is in decline. Although 
designing institutional frameworks of a science-policy-
society interface is important, it will not be enough. 
Any discussions about institutional frameworks needs 
to take into account the broader political picture.
The science-policy-society interface is a shorthand 
description of an idealized system with three 
components (Hadorn et al. 2008). The best scientific 
information and advice is provided by the most 
knowledgeable institutions and experts inside and 
outside government. That advice is acted upon by 
key decision makers in government and international 
organizations recognizing that politicians take factors 
other than science into account. The decisions of 
the government or international organizations are 
communicated to the public in a candid, trustworthy 
way with trade-offs and uncertainties recognized. 
Prior to 2020, the 10 actions viewed by many analysts 
as most important to strengthen the science-policy-
society, mainly on the national level, were (Colglazier, 
2016a):
•  Appoint a highly competent chief science adviser to 
the head of state and create an advisory committee 
of nongovernmental scientists and technologists to 
assist the chief science adviser
• Appoint science advisers for each of the relevant 
government ministries and connect them in a 
network with the chief science adviser
• Create civil service positions for individuals with 
scientific and technical backgrounds for serving in 
government ministries
• Provide fellowships for young and mid-career 
scientists, engineers, and medical professionals to 
experience working in government
• Solicit independent scientific advice on key policy 
issues—both science for policy and policy for 
science—from the most respected nongovernmental 
scientific and technical institutions in the country, 
and have that advice made public
• Create a unit with scientific and technical 
professionals to serve the legislature on issues 
where scientific input is needed
• Encourage scientific professional societies to 
present awards for high-quality science journalism
• Encourage universities to create courses on science 
and technology policy and train students for careers 
that combine competence in science and technology 
with knowledge about policy in the public and 
private sectors
Figure 40. Number of countries in the Academic Freedom Index subgroups by Pandemic Backsliding Risk Index group 
(2020).  Displayed are the number of countries in the Academic Freedom Index (Coppedge et al. 2020, Pemstein et al. 
2020) subgroups by Pandemic Backsliding Risk Index (Lührmann et al. 2020b) assignments. Based upon the Academic 
Freedom Index, which is coded from low (0) to high (1), five subgroups of equal size were developed in steps of 0.2. For 
each subgroup the constellation of Pandemic Backsliding Risk Index assignment is defined. In total, 141 countries are 
considered.
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• Encourage the domestic scientific and technical 
community to engage and collaborate with the best 
scientific and technical communities around the 
world
• Utilize science and technology to help solve regional 
and global problems as well as to help improve 
relations between countries.
Then came the pandemic. The above top 10 actions 
might have been necessary elements, but they proved 
not to be sufficient to prevent the early failures in 
responding to COVID-19. With hindsight coming from 
the searing experience of 2020, it now seems clear that 
the list needs a preamble to emphasize prerequisites 
for achieving an effective global science-policy-society 
interface (Ullah 2017). First, the science-policy-
society interface must be fit for transnational science 
cooperation if it shall help to address global crises 
and to achieve the sustainability transformation. 
Second, we need to move from a largely supply-
driven, linear standard model (Figure 41, panel A) 
about the relationship between science and society to 
a more fluid, reflexive and pervasive engagement of 
stakeholders (as an active proxy for society). We need 
to develop demand- and problem-driven, solution-
oriented science, which then is actively taken into 
consideration in decision making and policymaking 
(Figure 41, panel B). Rather than being a passive actor 
concerned only with scientific discovery, in this model 
science would play an increasingly active role. It would 
engage in the codesign and coproduction of knowledge 
to diagnose problems; to devise options for technical 
and policy solutions; and to help chart various 
possible future pathways to choose from, as well as 
creating trust in scientific results (Taylor et al. 2017). 
As outlined above, one of the main challenges will be 
to create continuous, long-term partnerships based 
on trust in order to advance science. Therefore the 
focus needs to shift from consultation to continuous, 
and potentially institutionalized, transnational and 
disciplinary collaboration (Scholz et al. 2020).  
In the face of autocratic, populist trends, pandemic 
backsliding, and decreasing academic freedom, 
creating the ‘triangle approach’ is demanding. Five 
important prerequisites need to be considered:
• Creation of a culture of trust and shared values 
between scientists and the public as well as between 
scientists and decision makers (which may require 
scientists to listen more to the public and for 
decision makers to understand the needs, values, 
and multiple perspectives of citizens) (Colglazier 
2020)
• Creation of an international environment that 
boosts global capacity for all sciences and improves 
cross-border collaboration for transdisciplinary 
and diverse research (including easing visa 
requirements for researchers, funding for 
international cross-disciplinary scientific grants, 
investments in exchange programs, and training for 
researchers on policy advice) (Scholz et al. 2020)
• Restructure and align global science organizations 
such as the International Science Council, the 
Inter Academy Partnership, and the Sustainable 
Development Solutions Network (SDSN) with the 
SDGs (Scholz et al. 2020)
• Creation of a duty for scientists to communicate 
clear and accurate information to the (global) 
public regardless of decisions and communications 
coming from government (Colglazier 2020)
• Creation of an incentive structure for scientists 
to ensure that the public and the government 
are promptly made aware of the opportunities, 
challenges, and threats that are seen from the 
rapidly advancing knowledge of science and 
technology (Colglazier 2020).
Figure 41. From a standard linear model (A) to the Science-Policy-Society Triangle (B). Source: Ullah (2017), adapted 
from Hessels and Van Lente (2008). 
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Efforts to strengthen the science-policy-society 
interface at the global level have emphasized most 
of these elements. They are needed in order to share 
knowledge and data, to promote collaborative research, 
to ensure universal access to solutions, and to act 
with greater urgency on global scientific assessments 
(Roehrl et al. 2020). Moreover, international 
cooperation and exchange can also help to share good 
and bad experiences in a joint learning process across 
countries of very different cultures and historically 
emerged governance systems. Policy advisers must 
not only present accurately the state of scientific 
knowledge with its uncertainties to decision makers 
and the public, but also clearly state where the advice 
incorporates value judgments that go beyond science 
(Colglazier 2016b). Credibility is the most precious 
asset for an individual or an institution that provides 
effective and trusted science advice.
4.4. Summary
This chapter has elucidated the tension between the 
achievements in transformative governance since 
the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the current 
global political trends, which make it more difficult 
to achieve the transformation to sustainability. 
It shows that innovations in governing the SDG 
implementation have taken place. Many states 
have introduced institutional frameworks, which 
emphasize horizontal coordination across policy 
sectors, vertical coordination across levels of state, 
multi-stakeholder engagement and high-level 
political leadership; nature-based solutions have 
become more popular and new business models 
have emerged. Although the COVID-19 pandemic has 
accelerated negative political trends such as global 
autocratization and polarization of societies, it has 
also provided opportunities for effective sufficiency 
policies and for accelerating social tipping points for 
a transformation to sustainability. It underlines the 
need to invest more in a global science-policy-society 
interface, which informs evidence-based policy 
making through higher investments in research and 
development, the creation of trust in science, the 
restructuring of global science organizations, and 
a change of the incentive structures of scientists to 
improve the communication of research results to 
the public.  
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1.	 The	 world	 is	 at	 a	 crossroads	 –	 achievement	 of	 the	 2030	
Agenda	 is	 possible	 but	 requires	 accelerated	 action	 and	
transformative	pathways	for	sustainable	development.
2.	 A	 just	 and	 resilient	 sustainable	 future	 for	 all	 –	 entails	
socioeconomic	development	for	improved	human	wellbeing	
while	preserving	Earth-system	resilience.
3.	 The	 COVID-19	 pandemic	 is	 a	 great	 threat	 to	 humanity	 –	
but	 it	 provides	 an	opportunity	 for	 change	and	 innovation	
toward	sustainability.
4.	 Six	TWI2050	Transformations	are	a	 framework	 for	how	to	
achieve	 the	2030	Agenda	–	 	 jointly,	 they	 integrate	 all	 the	
SDGs	and	provide	an	entry	point	for	achieving	them.
5.	 Transformative	governance	is	emerging	–	there	is	a	growing	
understanding	 of	 governance	 needs	 for	 integrated	 SDG	
implementation.
6.	 Science,	 technology,	 and	 innovation	 are	 at	 the	 core	 of	
human	 progress	 –	 paradoxically,	 they	 have	 also	 brought	
about	negative	impacts,	but	they	also	provide	solutions.
7.	 Granular,	 small-size	 innovations	 generally	 have	 faster	
adoption	and	diffusion	–	they	can	enable	rapid	change	but	
require	sustained	investments.
8.	 The	science-policy-society	interface	is	essential	for	evidence-
based	 transformations	 –	 research	 and	 development	 are	
enablers	of	sustainability-oriented	innovations.
9.	 Transforming	 service-provisioning	 systems	 is	 necessary	 –	
improving	 human	 wellbeing	 and	 sharing	 resources	 fairly	
requires	people-centered	efficiency	and	sufficiency.
10.	 Transnational	 crises	 demand	 global	 context-sensitive	
responses	 –	 support	 of	 actors	 from	 local	 to	 international	
is	key	for	accelerating	reforms	to	achieve	the	sustainability	
transformation.
